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Introduction 
He was just a word for me. I did not see the man in the name any more than you do. Do 
you see him? Do you see the story? Do you see anything? 
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness 
3 
It is an Augustinian habit to defend one's work before it is to be read, whether he 
be damping the enthusiasm of charismatic interpreters (doct. chr. prologue), or writing an 
irritated note about stolen manuscripts and artistic differences (prefatory letter to trin.). So 
the reader of this essay should be forewarned on what to expect and what not to look for 
in the pages that lie in wait. 
For example, the aim of this work is not necessarily to outline Augustine's place 
in the history of ideas. Predecessors will indeed be mentioned, as will expositors and 
those who have come under the spell of this most daring of thinkers, but only insofar as 
their own work helps to elucidate that of Augustine. We are not dealing here with an 
uncritical heir of late Roman Stoic tradition, though curious excavators of texts will be 
able to find stoic sense nestled in Augustinian argument, for he was indeed familiar with 
that philosophical trend 1• Neither are we examining a proto-Wittgensteinian, though areas 
of the Saint's thought were immensely suggestive in this direction, and he was a 
dominating source for twentieth century thought on language, provoking strong and 
respectful criticism from that Austrian logician. 
Another expectation that may be disappointed in what follows is that of the 
relation of Greek-inspired logos thought (especially concerning the Trinity) to 
Augustine's own treatment of word-philosophy. While it is certainly an important source, 
it very rarely helps to elucidate the work in focus. It is true that the term "logos" (reason, 
system, order) in Greek covers a much wider range of meaning than "verbum" in Latin, 
and it was probably in that context that concepts like order, idea and thought came to be 
associated with words. Augustine, aware as he is of the difference (diu. qu. 632), does not 
appeal to those nuances of meaning, confining his thinking to the areas we would 
normally call verbal, or even linguistic. Even in the more abstract sections of the De 
Trinitate (eg. XIV.22; XV.20), he makes reference to common, philosophically 
1 For a portrayal of Augustine in the Stoic tradition, cf Colish (1985b) 
2 
"Quod graece A.6yo~ dicitur, la tine et rationem et verbum significat." 
4 
uncontroversial qualities of words3: "Augustine only in this fashion 'saves' philosophy by 
characterizing reason more as internal speech, something produced in time by power and 
therefore more akin to a rhetoricallogos"4 
As for methodology, this will vary according to the level of existing academic 
debate. The first section is largely exegetical, since the interpretation of the work treated 
there (De Magistro) is perhaps not one that immediately receives the greatest attention in 
textbooks5, and some of Augustine's key concepts (e.g. 1.6: Natural Signs) are rarely 
expounded. The other two sections contain more elucidation of Augustinian thought, 
largely attempting to overcome interpretive problems occurring in the wider corpus as a 
result of the strong claims made in section one. My general thesis is that language, and 
more generally signification, is an important category in these texts. My problem is: how 
is this category understood? 
We commonly witness a picture of Augustine's thought concerning language that 
involves a major turn-around in his theology, contrasting his early work as a philosopher 
with his later work as a bishop, as if the philosopher were no Christian, or the bishop lost 
his philosophical sophistication. A typical instance of this view is Mallard's story: 
In the long pilgrimage of those years (395-430), language came into increasing significance. The 
Incarnation in the church had become the key to fullness and wholeness in language, as shown 
above. Yet in the early years after his baptism Augustine hoped that language, for the true disciple, 
could give way increasingly to direct inner contemplation of the Wisdom of God (The Teacher 
38,45-46) .... Long years as pastor-bishop changed his understanding.6 
There are a number of problems with this interpretation. One is that it postulates a 
change in Augustine's thinking that is not registered anywhere as a revision in his 
thought, in contrast to many of his other early over-platonic views, that receive correction 
in later writings, notably in the retractationes. Further, this view of the De Magistro leads 
3 For further discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between abstract wordiness and literal 
language, cf below II.3: The Trinity 
4 Milbank 1997: 462 
5 Notably Kirwan (1989), although Rist's (1994) treatment is refreshing. 
6 Mallard 1994: 164f 
s 
to many difficulties in our understanding of the text (cf below, I: Things are Learnt 
Through Signs: de magistro). 
I would like to make the suggestion that Augustine's view throughout is altogether 
more sophisticated than a simple yes/no answer to the question of language's usefulness. 
Like his contemporaries and philosophical predecessors (I think here mainly of Stoics, 
Academics and Sceptics), he is deeply aware of the extensive implications of any theory 
of language. Whilst he will be suspicious of language throughout his life, I will be 
arguing that he also held to the necessity of language in works both early and late. It is 
ironically in precisely the section of De Magistro (one of Augustine's early works) that 
Mallard refers to that we find this (virtuous) necessity and utility affirmed of language: 
"[Christ] who prompts us externally through men by signs, so that we are instructed to be 
inwardly turned toward Him." (mag. xiv.46, emphasis mine)7 
This approach to language parallels that found in the Confessions, where 
Augustine assumes that while words can indeed deceive, this is not as a result of their 
being words, but because of the sinfulness of their users. This seems to be a view he held 
onto. 
The words are certainly not learnt any the more easily by reason of the filthy moral, but filth is 
committed with greater confidence as a result of learning the words. I have nothing against the 
words themselves. They are like choice and costly glasses, but they contain the wine of error 
which had already gone to the heads of the teachers who poured it out for us to drink. (1.16.26)8 
Essentially, the primary contention of this essay is that Augustine did not greatly 
depart from the views outlined in the De Doctrina Christiana in any of his works. In 
particular, the maxim that things are learnt through signs (res per signa discuntur) is 
supported throughout his life. If this is seen to be the case, then we can perhaps elevate 
the status of words to beyond a mere metaphor. Where illumination has always been seen 
7 
"ipse a quo etiam per homines signis admonemur etforis, ut ad eum intro conversi erudiamur." n.b. words 
are signs par excellence for Augustine. 
8 
"Non omnino per hanc turpitudinem verba ista commodius discuntur; sed per haec verba turpitudo ista 
confidentius perpetratur. Non accuso verba, quasi vasa e/ecta atque pretiosa; sed vinum erroris quod in eis 
nobis propinabatur ab ebriis doctoribus:" cf also trin. VII.iv.7, where the more human activity involved, 
6 
as the staple for Augustine's theory of knowledge, we might even read the light imagery 
as literary tools, and verbal learning as the phenomenon under description. This move is 
also inspired by the Confessions. According to Soskice's reading, Augustine's ascent 
before the conversion took a visual format. But after conversion, the Ostia ascent is 
definitely a verbal affair: 
The Milan account uses metaphors of vision throughout - Augustine enters a vision and sees a 
light. The verb, vide re, is used six times. Ostia is more of an audition . ... The vision at Ostia is 
social, not solitary, for that is how we hear the Word - through Scriptures, preaching, the witness 
of others. These are the ligatures of love which bind us to one another and to God.9 
So this thesis will have implications for Augustine's theory of knowledge. It will also 
have an effect on how we treat the word-imagery in De Trinitate. 
Throughout the work I will be trying to vindicate the position of Augustine 
against the Derridaean accusations that he represents the old kind of metaphysics of a 
rational emotionless soul, as he unfolds his view of language in community, relationship 
and dispute. In general, I would like to see Soskice's insight that "It is the crux of the 
Confessions that if words are the means of corruption so also are they the source of 
healing" 10 worked out in reference to his theology in general. 
the worse the result: "God can be thought about more truly than he can be talked about, and he is more truly 
than he can be thought about." ("Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et veri us est quam cogitatur.") 
9 Soskice 2002: 456f, emphasis original. She is here drawing upon the magisterial work of exegesis 
O'Donnell has made on these sections in J J O'Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Vol. Ill, Oxford: OUP, 
pl28. 
10 2002: 453 
1: Things are Learnt Through Signs: de magistro 
We are always ready to be persuaded that learning and sharing are really about some other realm 
than flesh; but whether or not people can communicate by telepathy, the primary way in which we 
are connected to each other is by flesh. 
Rowan Williams, Open to Judgement 
I. 1: Introduction 
7 
The immediate counter-example to Augustine's strong claim that "things are 
learnt through signs" in De Doctrina Christiana is his earlier dialogue, De Magistro. The 
generally negative attitude to signs (and therefore words) in this work might support the 
suggestion that the later confidence is simply an aberration in Augustine's theology, a 
heuristic tool used to explain the importance of the text of the Bible under consideration 
in that discourse. 
There are a number of reasons for taking this challenge seriously. One is that the 
De Magistro is a book that Augustine clearly remembers throughout his life, and not 
something kept tucked away under document, discourse and dust until it was brought to 
light at the administrative chaos involved in the writing of the retractationes (a work 
written during the last year of his life where he examined all his previous works and 
commented on them in the light of his later thought). He refers to it some years later in 
the Confessions (IX.vi.14), for example. In addition, when the review is made in the 
retractationes, he makes no criticism of the dialogue at all, letting it stand as it was (a fact 
King 11 attributes to his love for his late son, Adeodatus, the sole interlocutor in the De 
Magistro, who probably died shortly after the dialogue was written). Contrast this to the 
detailed criticisms made of other early dialogues like De beata uita (also involving 
Adeodatus, throwing doubt over King's hypothesis), and we can see that even if a major 
change of theology can be argued for between early works like these and Augustine's 
mature thought (which is unlikely), De Magistro hardly seems the place to look for it. On 
the contrary, the dialogue met with approval throughout his life. The allegation of 
inconsistency between it and De Doctrina Christiana thus becomes a good deal more 
serious. 
11 1995:94 nl 
8 
That this model of signs and knowledge is not part of a youthful neoplatonism is indicated, first, by 
the fact that in Retractations, Augustine does not revise his teaching and says that the whole 
purpose of de Magistro was to defend philosophically Jesus' statement that he alone was to be 
teacher. Second, Augustine's discussion of the "interior word" prior to all language in the later 
treatise de Trinitate (15.10.17-15.11.20) is a variation of the same type of theory. 12 
We should note the context. In line with most of the early dialogues, Augustine 
seems to be much concerned with the views of the Academicians, with whom he had only 
recently broken rank. It comes shortly after De animae quantitate, and straddles the 
composition of De Musica. He is at this point living in Thagaste, and is given to 
philosophical discussion, together with his small community of monastic servi dei. 
Atherton13 argues that the distinction made in mag. viii.22-24 which would today 
probably be dubbed the "use-mention" distinction (and used to untangle philosophical 
puzzles such as those of G E Moore's Principia Ethica) 14 , is an original Augustinian 
development on the saying of Chrysippus (the third Stoic leading light, after Zeno and 
Cleanthes) that "every word is by nature ambiguous" 15• At the same time, though, he is 
already taken up with refuting the Manichees, with whom his history is longer, if slightly 
further back in time. So the dialogue comes between the classic De Genesi adversus 
manichaeos and the work directed at Honoratus the Manichee, De Utilitate Credendi. 
In this respect, De Magistro is a little odd, for it bears the marks of both these sets 
of conversation partners with whom Augustine was in dialogue. It is both philosophical 
and theological. He refers both to Paul and to Cicero; to Vergil and to the gospels. The 
issues of authority that occasionally crop up (e.g. appeal to Paul and Cicero in v.15f) 
seem to be directed towards the Manichees, although traditional philosophical debates are 
also addressed as Augustine treads along similar lines to the (now generally considered 
genuine) early work de dialectica, which makes more specific use of Stoic philosophy. 
12 Leithart 1999: 138n 
13 1993: 289-310 
14 Augustine makes a genius application of this distinction to incarnational thought in trin. Vll.4 
15 Compare the so-called "wagon argument": "If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you 
say wagon, consequently a wagon passes through your lips." Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers VII.? .187 
9 
It will be worth bearing these issues in mind as we consider the dialogue itself: the 
relation of De Magistro to the Academics in particular is not often brought to light in 
many treatments, which will affect the interpretation in some respects. 
1.2: De Magistro or De Doctrina Christians 
In the disputatio the aim was not so much to demonstrate that your opponent was utterly 
and in every way wrong, and to be derided and dismissed as a fool. Instead you had to 
show the limited sense in which he was right. The aim was, through disagreement and 
mutual criticism, to arrive at common truth, that was able to accommodate what was true 
in each position. (Timothy Radcliffe, Sing a New Song) 
So exactly how does the De Magistro differ from the De Doctrina Christiana? 
Augustine and his son Adeodatus start off the De Magistro by arguing that nothing can be 
learnt without signs (i.l-x.31 ). They do this by way of pointing to the fragility of 
communication, and how mysterious our intentions are to others. Augustine famously 
overturns the whole debate, however, by the example of the bird catcher (x.32), who 
demonstrates his trade to us without the use of signs (we just watch and learn) and what 
has come to be seen16 as a version of Meno's paradox in Plato's dialogue by that name: 
signs do not teach us anything, for we need to know their meanings before we can 
understand them 17 , and their meanings are all they tell us anyway. 
So, on the one hand, signs only signify if we know the reality they signify, which renders such 
signification otiose; and, on the other, since we have no access to the mind of another, we have no 
way of interpreting the signs which are meant to express what is in his mind - what the speaker 
sees interiorly. 18 
This seems to contrast fairly conclusively with the view of De Doctrina 
Christiana (l.ii.2), that res per signa discuntur. If things are learnt through signs, how can 
Augustine give as a paradigmatic example of learning a wordless contemplation of 
someone catching birds? Where are the signs in that? Where earlier in the argument, they 
16 King 1998:182ff; Erikson 2000: 131 
17 Cf uti/. cred. xiii.28, on page 39 
18 Louth 1989:153 
10 
had argued that any learning in this situation would require pointers to show the learner 
what they are to pay attention to, now the pointers are explicitly transcended. "These 
examples already suggest not one or another but thousands of things that are exhibited 
through themselves, without any sign being given." (mag. x.32) 19 
Correspondingly, if someone wants to explain to me that Shadrach, Meshach and 
Abednego were wearing special hats called sarabarae, it wouldn't help them much to 
simply tell me, unless I knew what sarabarae were. Were they to then show me a picture 
of sarabarae, I would still have learnt nothing whatsoever from their words, since it is 
only the sarabarae themselves that taught me what they were. I had to witness the thing 
first, before using the signs (mag. xi.37). "The truth is always found- if it is found at all-
inside the individual and not outside amongst the signs. "20 
So meanings21 are by necessity not given by words, and meanings are private (in a 
sense similar to Wittgenstein's22 "Private Language Argument"). It is exactly your 
meaning, and not simply your words, that I need to grasp when I listen to you. But only 
your words are available to me. So I am unable to know what you are thinking of. 
We carry these images in the recesses of our memory in this way as certain attestations of things 
sensed previously. Contemplating them in the mind, we have the good conscience that we aren't 
lying when we speak. Yet they are proofs for us [alone]. If anyone hearing me was then present 
and sensed these things, he doesn't learn from my words but knows them again from the images 
stored away within himself. (mag. xii.39)23 
19 
"Jam enim ex his non unum aliquid aut alterum, sed millia rerum animo occurrunt, quae nullo signa data 
per se ipsa monstrelltur." 
20 Erikson 2000: 136 - "Sannheten fines al!tid - om den overhodet fines - inne I den enkelte og ikke ute 
blant tegnene." (translations from the Norwegian of Erikson (2000) are my own) 
21 Augustine's words are the modern-sounding "sense", "force", and "signification"- sensus; vis; 
significatio. Anachronism is a danger here, though - the quest for meaning is a modern problem, and 
Augustine will more often talk in terms of "intention"- the translation "meaning" covers over a number of 
problems, and has no unambiguous Latin source: contrast Ayers 1979: 71- " ... Augustine, emphasized the 
category of "meaning". The outer word is a sign of the inner word." 
22 2001 [1953] 
23 
"Ita illas imagines in memoriae penetralibus rerum ante sensarum quaedam docwnenta gestamus, quae 
animo contemp/antes bona conscientia non mentimur cum /oquimur: sed nobis sunt ista documenta; is enim 
qui audit, si ea sensit atque adfuit, non discit meis verbis, sed recognoscit ablatis secum et ipse 
imaginibus:" 
11 
There are several factors that make words inadequate to the task of conferring the 
contents of my mind onto someone else. Augustine lists them towards the end of the 
dialogue (mag. xiii.42-xiv.45). 
Firstly, we say what we don't believe. We can lie, we can play devil's advocate 
(e.g. "The view of de magistro seems to contrast fairly conclusively with the view of de 
doctrina christiana"). Secondly, we say what we didn't intend. Our body doesn't obey its 
orders, and we make slips in our speech, whether they be revealing or not. They were not 
our intended utterance. Thirdly, we misunderstand one another. Language is fragile, and 
many words have more than one meaning. The meaning is inaccessible to us apart from 
words, so we do not know what people are getting at. Fourthly, we mishear. Fifthly, we 
do not believe what we are told anyway. Just because something is told us, we may not 
necessarily agree with them: so the communication of the proposition "Shadrach wore a 
baseball cap" results in my stubbornly thinking "Shadrach did not wear a baseball cap", 
which is exactly the opposite. So words do not transfer the contents of our minds. 
One final and overpowering argument against words as an effective medium for 
knowledge is that they are arbitrary. They must be learnt first, as we have seen with the 
instance of sarabarae, and such learning is not only very difficult (iii.5f), but it is 
importantly not a reasonable process. It is not like maths, because different people will 
have different words for different things. This view of language, implied in the De 
Magistro (especially in the third objection above), is backed up in numerous works 
written around the same time, where Augustine refuses to discuss words, but instead 
decides to discuss the things they refer to. 
[Master] For we can't reply to a question about names as to one about things belonging to a 
discipline, because things are implanted in the minds of all in common, but names are imposed 
arbitrarily, and their force depends for the most part on authority and usage. And so there can be a 
diversity in tongues, but in the very truth of constituted things there certainly cannot be. (mus. 
III.ii.3)24 
24 
"Non enim ut de rebus ad disciplinam pertinentibus, ita de nominibus possumus respondere interrogati: 
propterea quia res omnium mentibus communiter sunt insitae; nomina vera, ut cuique placuit, imposita, 
quorum vis auctoritate at que consuetudine maxi me nititur: unde etiam esse linguarum diversitas pot est, 
12 
In this way, De Magistro would seem to be a philosophical corrective to the later 
optimistic De Doctrina Christiana. In place of confidence in words, it argues for 
"linguistic scepticism"25 ; in place of the necessity of words, it argues for their 
contingency; in place of the truth potential of words, it argues for their fragility and 
inadequacy. Can these two diverse views be reconciled? If not, we will have to 
hypothesise a radical change in Augustine's thought concerning language. The rest of this 
chapter will be devoted to explaining why I believe this interpretation of the De Magistro 
to be wrong-headed, and why the dialogue can be brought into line with the De Doctrina 
Christiana without too much interpretative wizardry. 
1.3: Teaching vs Language 
"Exactly!" said Deep Thought. "So once you do know what the question actually is, you'll 
know what the answer [42] means." 
Douglas Adams, The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy 
The first point I want to make about the De Magistro as a work is that it does not 
seem to be primarily taken up with words as such, but teaching26. The opening question 
can be misleading: Augustine asks "When we speak, what does it seem to you we want to 
accomplish?" I will argue that the theme of the dialogue is mainly the answer to this 
question ("either to teach or to learn")27 , given by Adeodatus, rather than the question 
itself. It would be typical of Augustine to want to talk about issues that lead to the 
consideration of truth and knowledge (as the problem of teaching and learning does) 
rather than the technical functions of human communication. My interpretation here flies 
rerum autem in ipsa veritate constitutarum project a 11011 potest;" cf. also Acad. III.xiii.29; ord. II.ii.4, 
vii.21; an.quant. vi.\1; mus. VI.ix.24 
25 Ferretter 1998: 260 
26 Contrast Ando (1994: 45): "In his early treatise on language, the de magistro, Augustine ... criticized 
language as a means for teaching on the basis of its ambiguity." 
27 
"AUGUST/NUS: Quid tibi videmur efficere velle cum loquimur? ADEODATUS: Quantum quidem mihi 
nunc occurrit, aut docere, aut discere".Mag. i.l. Cf Rist 1994: 27 "its main aim is to investigate the 
processes of teaching and learning and the role of words in these processes," 
13 
unashamedly in the face of that of King: "Language, therefore, is the topic of The 
Teacher and explains the structure of the dialogue. The importance of the theory of 
illumination, and especially of Christ the inner Teacher, shouldn't obscure this fact."28 
The first and foremost argument for treating De Magistro as a work on the 
impossibility of teaching as opposed to the uselessness of words is found in his summary 
given in retractiones. There he does not once mention words, but takes the text given in 
the dialogue's conclusion as the key point. So we have two specific overviews (one 
within the dialogue, one without) that see teaching as the work's theme: "I wrote a work 
entitled The Teacher. There it is debated, sought, and found that there is no teacher giving 
knowledge to man other than God."29 (Retractationes i.l2, tr. in King (1995: 94 nl)) 
It appears from this quotation that teaching is a matter of the transference of 
knowledge. Such a definition will be borne out by the treatment that follows, but we 
should note that it is always the aim throughout that the learner should know what 
walking is, and know what bird catching is (mag. x.32). Consequently, the work is also 
deeply concerned with the phenomenology of knowledge. 
In addition to these textual concerns, it would appear that scepticism towards the 
whole project of teaching and learning was not an innovation in the ancient world. In fact 
it was a prime target of Pyrrhonian scepticism, which had experienced a kind of revival in 
the work of third century philosopher Sextus Empiricus, a writer of whom Augustine 
must have been aware. 
They [Pyrrhonian sceptics] used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they 
say, either the existent is taught through its existence or the non-existent through its non-existence. 
But the existent is not taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent to 
and recognised by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the non-existent, for with the non-
existent nothing is ever done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone. (Diogenes Laertius, The Lives 
of Eminent Philosophers IX.ll.lOO) 
28 King 1995: xvii 
14 
The implications of this shift in our interpretation from words to teaching are 
many and varied. Apart from opening up the possibility that we may learn from words, 
though they can not necessarily teach us, it also allows us to give a completely different 
evaluation of words themselves. So teaching may be impossible, but words can still be 
useful, provided they serve other ends. If we claim that the dialogue is chiefly concerned 
with denying teaching, and only subordinately with denigrating language, insofar as it is 
usually associated with teaching, then language itself cannot be interpreted as being 
generally useless in De Magistro, but only useless for teaching. "At another time we 
shall, God willing, look into the whole problem of the usefulness of words - which, if 
considered properly, is not negligible!" (Mag. xiv.46)30 
Of the objections noted against the usefulness of language (see above, p 11), we 
can see that a number of them are directed more towards teaching (and communication) 
than towards words themselves. For example, we cannot use words to teach somebody 
the nature of sarabarae - they need to find that out for themselves - but we can of course 
continue to use the word in our discourse?' 
Again, if we look to the supposed problems with language, it is noticeable that 
they are more criticisms of language as a tool to make someone find out what one is 
thinking about than devaluing language itself (and here we must note that teaching is only 
one of the three functions of language listed in doctr. chr. IV.xvii.34). So in order for 
successful teaching to occur, we need to believe what is said; intend to say it; be 
understood; be heard as we wished to be heard; and we must be believed (the five 
objections as listed on pll). Otherwise we simply cannot be said to have taught anything 
at all, according to the definition Augustine seems to be working with. 
29 
"Per idem tempus scripsi librum cujus est titulus, de Magistro: in quo disputatur et quaeritur, et 
invenitur, magistrumtwn esse, qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi Deum," 
30 
"Sed de tota uti/itate verborum, quae si bene consideretur non parva est, alias, si De us siverit, 
requiremus." 
31 Jason Drucker (1997) argues that we learn from signs what we already know. I would rather want to say 
that Augustine is making the point that signs do not communicate anything new to us, but when we 
discover something new, the discovery is always semiotic, or verbal. 
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I now give in and concede that when words are heard by someone who knows them, he can know 
that the speaker had been thinking about the things they signify. Yet does he for this reason also 
learn whether the speaker has stated truths, which is the question at hand? (mag. xiii.45)32 
Note in this quotation that the argument is directed towards whether successful 
teaching has occurred - i.e. whether the student has now gained knowledge - and the 
earlier five arguments against the adequacy of language are ancillary to this aim. "In 
trying to isolate and examine this theory [of signs and language] it is, therefore, as well to 
be on one's guard against attributing to it an importance in itself which it would certainly 
not have had in Augustine's estimation."33 
Hence the often missed turn towards the learner in the middle of the dialogue. At 
the beginning of the monologue section (which Augustine characteristically delivers at 
the end of the work, mag. x.32ff), Augustine turns from asking whether teachers can be 
understood through their words, to asking whether a learner understands anything through 
words. Before the monologue, problems were raised over how words could indicate the 
intention of the speaker- for example, how anyone knows that I mean what I am pointing 
to- but at the end, no such indications are necessary, because knowledge can be attained 
simply by noticing things, and it is no specified knowledge in particular. Again, it is the 
necessity of teaching individual bits of knowledge that has been withdrawn and words 
only insofar as they are used in the project. 
Apart from when involved in teaching, though, words are of course very useful. 
We can arguably learn the doctrines of Plato just as well from one who believes them as 
we can from one that does not. But in the latter case, the speaker is not strictly speaking 
teaching us34 (NB: objection one above (pll) would imply that when we say what we do 
not believe, we are not actually teaching). In fact, we have evidence of Augustine's 
32 
"Sed ecce jam remitto et concedo, cum verba ejus auditu cui nota sunt, accepta fuerint, posse illi esse 
notum de iis rebus quas significant, /oquentem cogitavisse: num ideo etiam quod nunc quaeritur, utrum 
vera dixerit, discit?" 
33 Markus 1957: 84 
34 In the uti/. cred. vi.l3, Augustine argues that we should seek a teacher who believes what they are 
teaching in order to understand the subject best- but there he is specifically using the expression teacher, 
implying that one who did not believe it would therefore not be a teacher: "Quis enim sibi unquam libros 
Aristote/is reconditos et obscuras ab ejus inimico exponendos putavit; ut de his loquar disciplinis, in quibus 
lector fortasse sine sacri/egio labi potest? Quis denique geometricas litteras Archimedis lege re, magistro 
Epicuro, aut discere voluit;" 
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believing that not even a correct understanding of the speaker's intention is necessary for 
knowledge (Conf XII.xxxi.). So long as we understand something true from what is said, 
it does not have to be what was intended to be understood. We can imagine being inspired 
by somebody's slip of the tongue, or ambiguous words. In fact, the Saint even commends 
such kinds of learning in other works! "The third [kind of reading error] is the perception 
of some kind of truth from the writing of another, though the writer himself did not 
understand it. In this kind there is no little profit; nay, if one considers carefully, therein 
lies the whole, entire fruit of reading." (uti!. ere d. iv.l0)35 
In this respect, it becomes clear that the De Magistro is not primarily concerned 
with demonstrating that things are not learnt through words, but rather that things are not 
taught by words alone. As we have seen, the difference lies in the specification of a 
particular area of knowledge or one proposition stated by a person. Where this is present, 
we can speak of both teaching and learning. Where the knowledge attained is not 
specified by anyone, nor transferred from one person to another, we can talk of learning, 
but not teaching in the Augustinian account. King36 dubs this the "Information 
transference account", but probably "Knowledge transference account" would be more 
accurate. 
Of course, this distinction between learning and teaching is in part artificial, 
because Augustine holds that where learning takes place with no obvious teacher, then it 
is the inner teacher, Christ, who has produced the knowledge (perhaps maximising on the 
supposed absurdity of the above sceptical doctrine (on page 13) of the impossibility of 
learning). Since he then demonstrates that in no case whatsoever can it be argued that 
some human has strictly speaking taught another, all knowledge comes about as a result 
of the Teacher. 
This would be continuous with the opening paragraphs of the Confessions, where 
it is argued that language is not taught by people37 , but by God himself38 . Of course, if 
Augustine actually makes no distinction between learning, words, and teaching, as King 
35 
"Tertium est, cum ex alieno scripta intelligitur a liquid veri, cum hoc ille qui scripsit non intellexerit. In 
quo genere non parwn est utilitatis, imo si diligentius consideres, totus legendi fructus est integer." 
.lb 1998: 184 
37 although n.b. an.quant. xviii.32, where it is stated that both teachers and a ready mind are necessary for 
language learning in a mature adult. 
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seems to impll9, then my argument will be trivial at best. I hope the above notes (p 15) 
on the crucial turn towards the learner in the dialogue suffice to show that such a division 
exists in his thought, whether consciously or otherwise. 
1.4: Verbal knowledge? 
'Can't you read my thoughts?' 
"Mortal thoughts aren't like that,' snapped Om. 'You think it's like watching words paint themselves 
across the sky? Hah! It's like trying to make sense of a bundle of weeds. Intentions, yes. Emotions, 
yes. But not thoughts. Half the time you don't know what you 're thinking, so why should !?' 
Terry Pratchett, Small Gods 
Augustine's notion that "thinking is inner speaking"40 is not surprising when we 
consider that he had only recently proposed thar dialectic - which is more obviously 
concerned with words41 (cf dial., and its close similarity to the De Magistro) - is truth 
itself (Sol. Il.xv.27)42 • On a similar note, when Augustine wants to speak of truth (and the 
notion of knowledge is dependent on that of truth, since "no one knows the false" (Sol. 
II.xi.20)43), he usually does so on the level of propositions 
And so I hold what truth I had learned from them; what I had considered false, I reject. But the 
Catholic Church taught me many other things, also, to which those men, bloodless of body but 
heavy of mind, cannot aspire, that is, such truths as: God is not corporeal; no part of Him can be 
seen with the eyes of man; ... (uti!. cred. xviii.36)44 
Correspondingly, in a most interesting passage in De libero arbitrio (a 
contemporary of De Magistro) which works through with Evodius an argument 
frequently returned to, namely the exalted nature of Truth as a proof for the existence of 
38 See Burnyeat ( 1999) for a brilliant exposition of the continuity between these two works. 
39 1998:185 
40 Matthews 1972b [ 1967]: 181; also Watson 1988: 81 
41 As stated concerning Stoic dialectic in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII.\.44: "The 
second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included 
written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical 
diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions 
and style." 
42 
"veritatem esse disputandi rationem" 
43 
"nemo autem quae didicit ac tenet, ne scire dici pot est; et nemo scit falsa." Cf also trin. XV.x.l7: "it must 
all be true, otherwise it would not be known." ("quae utique vera sunt, alioquin nota non essent.") So also 
Ferretter 1998: 266, n36 
44 
"Ita quod apud eos verum didiceram, teneo: quodfalsum putaveram, respuo. Sed et alia multa me docuit 
Ecclesia catlwlica, quod illi homines exsangues corporibus, sed crassi mentibus, aspirare non possunt: 
Deum scilicet non esse corporeum, nu/lam ejus partem corporeis oculis posse sentiri," cf. also de moribus 
ecclesiae catholicae xii.21; uti/. cred. iii.9; xiv.31 
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God, Augustine speaks of this truth in terms of dialectical rules, joining the metaphysical 
to the logical in a seamless procession. This truth is unchangeable, and accessible to all. 
[Augustine:] We make these judgments according to those rules of truth within us which we see in 
common, but no one ever passes judgment on the rules themselves. For whenever anyone affirms 
that the eternal ought to be valued above the things of time, or that seven and three are ten, no one 
judges that it ought to be so, but merely recognizes that it is so. He is not an examiner making 
corrections, but merely a discoverer, rejoicing over his discovery. (lib. arb. II.xii.34)45 
There are still problems surrounding the case of the bird-catcher, though, which 
would seem at first sight to raise incontrovertible objections to the case of words being 
useful. Augustine notably remarks that the bird catcher actually does teach those 
watching him, presumably because there is knowledge in him to start with, and then 
knowledge in the spectators at the end of the process, and the knowledge is identical in 
subject matter. "I ask you: wouldn't [the bird catcher] then teach the man watching him 
what he wanted to know by the thing itself rather than by anything that signifies?" (mag. 
x.32)46 
It is important to notice that in this quotation the knowledge is extracted by the 
one watching - he is the one that wants to know ("quod ille scire cupiebat"). There is a 
clear parallel here with Augustine's theory of perception, where it is the soul that exerts a 
perceiving power on the physical world, not the senses and bodies breaking in on the 
soul. The soul is active in acquiring knowledge. 
[Augustine:] The soul applies itself to the sense of touch; through it it feels and distinguishes hot 
and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light and heavy. Then it distinguishes between 
45 
"Et judicamus haec secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis, quas communiter cerninws: de ipsis vera 
nullo modo quis judicat. Cum enim quis di.xerit aeterna temporalibus esse potiora, aut septem et tria decem 
esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed tantum ita esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum 
laetatur inventor." Cf. Parallel with God in diu. qu. 30: "Moreover, reason judges everything that it uses. 
God alone it does not judge, because God is the standard according to which it judges other things." 
46 
"nonne ilium spectatorem suum doceret nullo significatu, sed re ipsa, quod ille scire cupiebat?" 
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unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound and shapes, by tasting, smelling, hearing and 
seeing. (an.quant. xxxiii.71)47 
In this learning process, the soul makes use of what Augustine will later call 
"natural signs", which are deeply important for his theory of knowledge, particularly 
when it is set in its philosophical background. We will return to this (cf 1.6: Natural 
Signs). 
Note also Augustine's solution to the problem of teaching. He did not argue that 
the world enters into the mind like a microcosm. He argued that we receive revelation 
from the internal teaching, not a kind of perception. Is not revelation a verbal concept?48 
In arguing that Christ is our teacher, did he not imply a kind of inner language by which 
we are taught? 
This would solve Stead's quandary, that "Augustine's main theme, of course, is 
Christ as the teacher of supreme reality, which points one away from the philosophy of 
language"49. Instead, it is human teaching - where teaching involves verbal 
communication of knowledge - and not words per se that are under threat of judgement, 
as Cynthia Hahn puts it: "for Augustine human speech is empty, and knowledge comes 
only from God's speech."50. For although Augustine rarely uses the word "speech" for 
what God does, some kind of speech is still involved. 
Of course, this internal teaching is not in any way vulnerable to the kind of 
arguments brought against external teaching. For it is internal, and so the inner teacher is 
present to our mind, and the gap of physicality seen above does not apply here. Christ 
does not lie, nor speak ineffectively to the soul. Neither can the soul mishear, or suspect 
the teacher of being wrong, since the teacher is internally present to it. So the inner 
teaching is subject neither to the arguments against words or teachings (on page 11). For 
47 
"lntendit se anima in tactum, et eo calida,frigida, aspera, lenia, dura, mollia, levia, gravia sentit atque 
discemit. Deinde innumerabi/es di.fferentias sapo rum, odorum, sonorum, formarum, gustando, olfaciendo, 
audiendo videndoque dijudicat." 
48 Cf /o. eu. tr. CIV .I: "quomodo simul/oquantur in suorum spiritualium cordibus et Dei Filius et Spiritus 
sanctus, imo ipsa Trinitas quae inseparabiliter operatur, inte/ligentibus est verbum, non inte/ligentibus 
autem proverbium." 
49 Stead 1989: 63 
50 Halm 1991: 179 
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these reasons, I believe the notion of God's speech is not just a metaphor for the more 
usual idea of illumination in Augustine's thought, but rather a well-worked out alternative 
to human speech and teaching. 
The notion of an "inner word" is a queer one, and philosophically suspect, so we 
will return to it later (11: "The Inner Tongue": Verbum vs Lingua). For now it is sufficient 
to note that, although it is not explicitly mentioned, the argument of the De Magistro 
seems to imply that we are taught by inner words, and that both knowledge and learning 
can be construed as verbal. 
despite the surface crudity of his distinction between things and names, Augustine's scheme in 
DDC certainly has affinities with the popular notion that everything is language, everything is 
interpretation. What we know is what we 'read. ' 51 
1.5: Words Alone? 
'It's better to light a candle than curse the darkness, captain. That's what they say.' 
( ... )'Who says that? When has that ever been true? It's never been true! It's the kind of thing people 
without power say to make it all seem less bloody awful, but it's just words, it never makes any 
difference' 
Terry Pratchett, Men at Arms 
It seems, however, that words are not the only requirement for learning. Augustine 
goes beyond the demands of his particular argument and hints at a few other aspects that 
get involved in knowledge. As Rist puts it, "What he intends to make plain is that words 
(and more generally signs) are a necessary but not sufficient condition of learning."52 
One quotation which would seem to raise considerable doubt over the thesis that 
words are necessary for knowledge is raised by King53 , and to my mind confirms the 
whole case of the insufficiency of signs. 
51 Williams 1989: 145f 
52 Rist 1994: 32 
53 1998: 189 
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Most of all I'm trying to persuade you, if I'll be able to, that we don't learn anything by these signs 
called words. As I have stated, we learn the meaning of the word - that is, the signification hidden 
in the sound - once the thing signified is itself known, rather than our perceiving it by means of 
such signification. (mag. x.34)54 
It is perhaps in this quotation that Augustine states most directly that things are 
not learnt through signs. When we look ahead, though, to see what would be necessary 
for teaching to take place, we may note that not only do we require a perception of the 
things, but also a presentation of them: "Yet someone who presents (praebet) what I want 
to know to my eyes, or to any of my bodily senses, or even to my mind itself, does teach 
me something." (xi.36)55 
Presentation is clearly exactly what words are meant to do - they point beyond 
themselves. We do not intend our listeners to dwell on the physical properties of the word 
itself, but on that which the word shows, or exposes (praebet). The problem is that 
pointing only works if one can point to something everyone can witness. Hence words of 
themselves are not even significant (and therefore paradoxically not words) without their 
referents. A word is only present when the sound is spoken and the meaning apprehended. 
Words without meanings are not properly called words, but just sounds. If the weakness 
of words inheres in their lack of meaning, then all the criticism achieves is to say that if 
we were to understand words independent of things, we would be misled. But we do not 
understand them thus: "Therefore, knowledge of words is made complete once the things 
are known. On the other hand, when words are [only] heard, not even the words are 
learned." (mag. xi.36)56 
It may be useful to expand on the other aspects of learning in order to get a fuller 
view of exactly how things are learnt through signs, as this will in turn reflect on our 
interpretation of doctr. chr. I. So I will use the works against the Academicians to show 
54 
"Et id maxime tibi nitor persuade re, si potero, per ea signa quae verba appellantur, nos nihil discere; 
potius enim, ut dixi, vim verbi, id est significationem quae latet in sono, re ipsa quae significatur cognita, 
discimus, quam illam tali significatione percipimus." 
55 
"Is me autem aliquid docet, qui vel oculis, vel ulli corporis sensui, vel ipsi etiam menti praebet ea quae 
cognoscere vola." 
56 
"Rebus ergo cognitis, verborum quoque cognitio perficitur; verbis vera auditis, nee verba discuntur." Cf 
also trin. VIII. viii.l2: "enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipswn, sed non se verbum indicat, nisi 
se aliquid indicare indicet" 
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how assent was necessary, the little book de catechizandis rudibus to elucidate the role 
and nature of understanding in language, and the treatise De Fide et Symbolo to 
demonstrate the ways of life required to supplement the word. 
1.5.1: Academic Assent 
Straight from the horse's mouth into the note-book. The boys scribbled like mad .... 'I 
shall begin at the beginning,' said the DHC, and the more zealous students recorded his 
intention in their notebooks: Begin at the beginning. 
Aldous Huxley, Brave New World 
In this section I will suggest that assent is one of the key features of teaching in 
Augustine's De Magistro, and thus relate it to the slightly earlier works he had been 
writing in response to the Academicians. In making assent a necessary element of 
learning knowledge, he emphasises the role of the learner's mind in the process of 
acquiring knowledge. Information transferred unprocessed from one mind to another just 
won't do. "But we are no passive recipients of these truths. We also teach ourselves. 
Cognition is an active process."57 
The point is that language simply doesn't work like that. We do not receive the 
truth expressed by a teacher as if we were Dictaphones, because we are more than 
machines. Our minds are more complex. 
The first and last points in the above list (on page 11) of the failings of language 
are philosophically suggestive. Augustine remarks that teaching requires assent, or belief, 
on the part of both teacher and learner. If a teacher is saying something she doesn't 
herself believe, then she can not be said to be teaching in the Augustinian account. More 
importantly, if students do not agree with the teacher, or have reason to believe she is not 
telling the truth, then they will not be taught either58 . 
This insight is itself parasitic on the importance of truth in teaching and 
knowledge. For if something is not true, we do not say it can be known (Sol. Il.xi.20, on 
57 O'Daly 1987: 176 
58 Hence the knowledge is shared, as in trin. Ill.pr.2: "Si quid in eis veri comprehenderis, existendo non est 
meum, at inte/ligendo et amando et tuum sit et meum" 
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page 17), and therefore neither can it be learnt or taught. So assenting to something -
deciding its truth value - is vital in the acquisition of knowledge. If teaching is the 
transference of knowledge from one person to another, then assent needs to be given on 
both sides. It is also interesting to note that assent itself is dependent on a verbal 
suggestion: if we have no proposition, we cannot assent to it (imagine someone agreeing 
with you without being sure what they agree about), but if we merely have a proposition 
and no assent, then there is only information, not knowledge (imagine someone pointing 
out they know it is raining, but that they do not believe so - Wittgenstein called this 
"Moore's paradox"). "Reason: Therefore, error is not in the things themselves, but in the 
sense (in sensu), and he who does not assent to something false is not mistaken." (Sol. 
I I. ii i. 3 )59 
It is important to notice that the assent given by the learner can never be conveyed 
by the teacher. Even if the teacher does manage to persuade the student (which would 
obviously happen by words - cf m us. Ill. viii.l960), the assent is not inherent in the 
teaching itself. It may come as a result of the teaching, but it springs from within the 
students themselves. All that can be learnt from the words is that "the speaker had been 
thinking about the things they signify." (mag. xiii.45) Discerning whether the teacher is 
lying or not can not be taught as such, but must be the student's own decision (for further 
on this, cf below, 1.6.5: ). It is here that the Inner Teacher mediates truth. 
Whatever we may say, the hearer either (a) doesn't know whether it is true; (b) knows that it is 
false; (c) knows that it is true. In (a) he either believes it or has an opinion about it or doubts it; in 
(b) he opposes and rejects it; in (c) he bears witness to the truth. Hence in none of these three cases 
does he learn. (Mag. xii.40)61 
According to Augustine's account, though, it is not even desirable for the 
language to act on its own in its transference of information. Assent is something 
59 
"R. Non igitur est in re bus falsitas, sed in sensu: non autem fa/litur qui falsis non assentitur." 
60 
"M. Mihine credens, an per te ipse vera esse perspiciens? D. Per me ipse sane, quamvis dicente te vera 
haec esse cognosco." 
61 
"omnia scilicet quae loquimur, aut ignorare auditorem utrum vera sint, autfalsa esse non ignorare, aut 
scire vera esse. Horum trium in primo aut credere, ar1t opinari, aut dubitare; in secunda adversari atque 
rem1ere; in tertio attestari: nusquam igitur discere." 
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necessary for knowledge. "For what foolish curiosity it is to send your son to school so 
that he can find out what the teacher thinks!" (Mag. xiv.45)62 
The parallel with his arguments against the Academy is striking. For one of the 
most important points he has to make there is that the key element of Academic 
philosophy - that only those who withhold their assent are wise - is simply impossible. 
We are always giving our assent to various propositions, whether we like it or not. The 
example he gives is of a sceptical philosopher at a crossroads, who has been given advice 
as to the road both by a shepherd and a noble-looking man. His response is, ""I do not," 
he says, "accept that information as something true: I accept it as truth-like. And, since it 
is neither fitting nor profitable to be here idle, I shall take the road."" Acad., III.xv.3463 
In this sense, assent is necessary in both life and philosophy. We can not take a 
road without deciding on that road, and neither can we receive information without 
assessing its validity. It is as much part of the language process as the unquiet soul is part 
of spiritual activity64 . 
So it is knowledge and not just information that is impossible to give away in the 
process of teaching. The arguments against the possibility of transferring information 
would not include these considerations concerning assent65 . It is possible that we may 
comprehend one another's language and transfer information, given certain felicitous 
conditions like an understanding listener, and an arena of discourse familiar to both 
speaker and listener. The point he is making near the end of the dialogue, though, is that 
this is not enough for knowledge, and therefore not enough for teaching. There is more 
62 
''Nam quis tarn stulte curios us est, qui filium suum mittat in sclwlam, ut quid magister cogitet discat?" 
63 
"Non enim monstrationem istam tanquam veram, inquit, approbo; sed quia est veri similis. Et hie otiosum 
esse nee honestum, nee utile est; hac eam" on this see also uti/. cred. xi.25; xiv.30 
64 In fact, it seems to be a part of most mental processes, perhaps because understanding is a part of the 
mind- cf the judiciary power in mus. VI.xiv.45: [Master) A man also using those numbers in either kind as 
directing, in the role of moderators and examiners of things passing in the senses, not for an idle or harmful 
curiosity but for a necessary approval or disapproval? "illis etiam qui in utroque genere quasi moderatores 
exploratoresque caeterorum transeuntium in sensu praesident, non ad superfluam vel perniciosam 
curiositatem, sed ad necessariam probationem vel improbationem utitur:" (also VI.ii.3) 
65 King (1998: 184) misses the point of the difference between knowledge and information, and so moves 
freely between the two: "I hear your utterances, and, knowing the language, I decode them back into ideas. 
That is how knowledge can be transferred from your mind to mine." 
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involved. Mann neatly expresses it, "the verb 'to teach' is a success verb, not a mere task 
verb. Whatever I am doing, I am not teaching you if you are not learning from me."66 
Correspondingly, we do not learn, if we do not assent to what is being said67• Here 
we have inklings of Augustine's later philosophy of the mind, which entails that the will 
is involved in all mental activity, not simply those that are explicit decisions. We will to 
understand, we will to remember, just as we will to turn our attention to certain things. 
The subject also reminds us of the later De Doctrina Christiana, where Augustine lays 
the distinction between use and enjoyment over that of sign and thing (for which cf 
below, III.2: Desire). We do not simply say. We love and value68 - for speech involves 
movement and attitude, not just information. 
1.5.2: Teaching and Understanding 
A small boy asleep on his right side, the right arm stuck out, the right hand hanging limply 
over the edge of the bed. Through a round grating in the side of a box a voice speaks 
softly. 
'The Nile is the longest river in Africa and the second in length of all rivers of the 
globe ... ' 
At breakfast the next morning, 'Tommy,' someone says, 'do you know which is the 
longest river in Africa?' A shaking of the head. 'But don't you remember something that 
begins: 'The Nile is the ... ' 
'Thee Ni I e-is- the-1 on ge st-river-in-A frica-and-the-second- i n-Iength-of -all-the-rivers-of- the-
globe ... ' The words come rushing out. 'Although-falling-short-of ... ' 
Well, now, which is the longest river in Africa?' 
The eyes are blank. 'I don't know.' 
'But the Nile, Tommy.' 
'The-Nile-is-the-longest-river-in-Africa-and-second ... ' 
'Then which river is the longest, Tommy?' 
Tommy bursts into tears. 'I don't know,' he howls. 
Aldous Huxley, Brave New World 
In this section I intend to discuss another reading of Augustine's De Magistro 
which also leads to the conclusion not only that teaching is impossible, but that language 
66 Mann 1998:217 
67 And again, "he who does not assent to something false is not mistaken." (Sol. II.iii.3) 
68 Here I use the word "value" in its ethical sense, not its semantic, as for example de Saussure's (1960 
[1916]: 114) definition of a word's value as "its property of standing for an idea". 
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is necessary for learning. The argument hinges on the notion that the dialogue is primarily 
talking of teaching in terms of eliciting understanding, not mere knowledge.69 
In his oft-quoted article on Wittgenstein and Augustine70, Burnyeat argues that it 
is exactly this - understanding - that Augustine associates with successful teaching. 
Burnyeat's reading rests on the point that for Augustine, knowledge is only 
strictly speaking acquired when understanding is present. Although we may say that we 
know something without understanding it, the technical usage of the expression 
knowledge (cogitatio) does not allow such a claim: 
[Master] But it is the greatest error to hold even true phantasms for things known, although in both 
kinds there is that we say, not absurdly, we know, that is, we have sensed such and such things, or 
imagined them .... And so let us resist them as much as we can, nor so fit our mind to them that, 
while our thinking is on them, we believe we see them with the understanding. (mus. VI.xi.32)71 
The point is that the mind is not latent when understanding or knowing something. 
Not only does it consider the content and assess its validity, in order to give assent or 
not72, the mind also connects the proposition heard with all the other memory items 
associated with it. This will apply to propositions both compatible and incompatible with 
the suggestion and to the meanings of the words themselves. Burnyeat sums it up well: 
For I take it that the important difference between knowledge and understanding is that knowledge 
can be piecemeal, can grasp isolated truths one by one, whereas understanding always involves 
69 These interpretations are clearly not in conflict in terms of Augustine's theory of language in general: cf 
trin. I.ii.4- " ... to account for the one and only and true God being a trinity, and for ttie rightness of saying, 
believing, understanding that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance 
or essence." ("reddere ratione m, quod Trinitas sit unus et so/us et verus De us, et quam recte Pater et Filius 
et Spiritus sanctus unius ejusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, inteUigatur;" (emphasis 
mine)) 
70 Burnyeat 1999 
71 
"Sed vera etiam phantasmata habere pro cognitis, summus error est. Quanquam sit in utroque genere 
quod nos non absurde scire dicamus, id est, sei!Sisse nos talia, vel imaginari nos talia . ... Quare his 
potissimum resistamus, nee eis ita mentem accommodemus, ut dum in his est cogitatio, intelligentia ea cemi 
arbitremur." 
72 although it is precisely this- the necessary element of belief in understanding- that Augustine highlights 
in uti/. cred. xi.25: "Quod intelligimus igitur, debemus rationi: quod credimus, auctoritati : quod opinamur, 
errori. Sed intellige/IS omnis etiam credit, credit omnis et qui opinatur: non omnis qui credit intelligit; 
nul/us qui opinatur intelligit." 
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seeing connections and relations between the items known. 'The only part of modern physics I 
understand is the formula "E=mc2" is nonsense. "The only part of modern physics I know is the 
formula "E=mc2" is merely sad.73 
For our purposes, it is important to note that this kind of understanding can not be 
transferred. No one can guess all the connections I make, for no one shares my 
idiosyncratic combinations of beliefs, prejudices, leanings and mental wanderings. In this 
way, Augustine was right to argue against the possibility of teaching as transference of 
understanding, and in doing so he emphasised the importance of the listener's mind in 
language, as well as partly anticipating the more recent notion of the way we construct 
our world through language. It is Trygetius that points out this aspect of the 
interconnectedness of language first in the Augustinian corpus: '"'What will be the end of 
it, if I again should like you to define something, and then demand that all the words of 
this self-same definition be defined one by one, and likewise what follows upon them, 
pretending that I understood nothing?"" (A cad. I. v .15) 74 
There is another work of Augustine's that is often quoted in reference to his 
distaste for language as a medium, namely de catechizandis rudibus. One of the reasons 
for his negative criticism in this work is due to his use of the idea of an inner tongue, an 
inner voice, to which we will return (cf below, ll: "The Inner Tongue": Verbum vs 
Lingua). For our purposes, it is enough to point out that here Burnyeat's reading of 
Augustinian understanding seems to be vindicated. 
In writing to his friend, Deogratius, on the subject of teaching new converts, 
Augustine laments his inability to convey to them the wondrous insights he receives 
outside the classroom in prayer. Notice how he talks of this mismatching of inner 
complex understanding, and external simple propositions: 
For it is my wish that he who hears me should have the same complete understanding of the 
subject which I have myself; and I perceive that I fail to speak in a manner calculated to effect that, 
and that this arises mainly from the circumstance that the intellectual apprehension diffuses itself 
73 Burnyeat 1999:298 
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through the mind with something like a rapid flash, whereas the utterance is slow, and occupies 
time, and is of a vastly different nature, so that while this latter is moving on, the intellectual 
apprehension has already withdrawn itself within its secret abodes. (cat. rud. ii.3)75 
While Augustine is excited by the implications of a certain idea, which rushes 
through his mind, connecting with all the truth he has already learnt, his hearers will 
never realise what the same idea means to him, because they do not make the same 
connections. In order for him to explain what it means to him, he would have to elucidate 
all the connections and implications himself, which takes far too much time, and which 
simply won't happen, as he forgets them once he has seen them. 
The connections can be both implications and justifications. For Augustine, 
knowledge is not knowledge unless it has been reasoned out, and "What we understand 
... we owe to reason" (uti!. cred. xi.25)76• If we know something to be true, but don't 
understand the background, the reasons why, it is not understanding. In the language of 
De animae quantitate (xxvi.49, xxx.58), awareness is knowledge "only if that awareness 
results from an exercise of reason."77 Correspondingly, knowledge does not stand alone 
even once it is established: reason will always tease out the applications. "[Evodius:] So 
then, unless this reason found in me something known as a starting point for leading me 
on to what is unknown, I would never learn anything by reason and I would never call it 
reason." (an.quant. xxvi.51)78 
There are two things at work, and their relationship is one of dependency. There is 
the understanding, and there is the thing to be understood. What is to be understood can 
be verbal, but the understanding itself clearly cannot: it operates on the thing to be 
understood. So without language, this kind of understanding would not happen, for there 
would be nothing to understand (or at least, the argument does not require the understood 
item to be non-verbal), but at the same time, the understanding is entirely non-
74 
"Quis enim modus erit, si ego rursus velim definiri abs te aliquid, et rursus ejusdem definitionis verba, et 
consequentium item singillatim omnia, fingens quod nihil intelligam, definiriflagitem ?" 
15 
"Totum enim quod intelligo, vo/o ut qui me audit intelligat; et sentio me non ita loqui, ut hoc e.fficiam: 
maxime quia i/le intel/ectus quasi rapida coruscatione perfundit animum, iLia autem /ocutio tarda et longa 
est, /ongeque dissimilis, et dum ista volvitur, iam se ille in secreta sua condidit" 
76 
"Quod intelligimus igitur, debemus rationi:" 
71 
"Non continua esse scientiam si quid non latet, sed si per rationem non later'' 
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communicable by language. "No one can achieve my understanding for me, not for the 
trivial reason that it is mine but because to internalize the requisite connections is to go 
beyond what is presented in any occasion of so-called teaching."79 
1.5.3: Ways of Life 
Words resemble fish in that some specialist ones can survive only in a kind of reef, where 
their curious shapes and usages are protected from the hurly-burly of the open sea. 
'Rumpus' and 'fracas' are found only in certain newspapers (in much the same way that 
'beverages' are found only in certain menus). They are never used in normal conversation. 
Terry Pratchett, The Truth 
The final aspect of our suggestion that words are necessary but not sufficient for 
teaching involves the context words find themselves in. The fact is that words never occur 
on their own. They appear in forms of life. It is not a problem that the meanings change, 
since the context explains everything, and when we find the sentence outside its context, 
we do not get confused over the meaning - we just do not approach the sign as a sign. Its 
meaning disappears. Consider, for example, the possible reactions to finding a small 
square of yellow paper whose reverse is slightly sticky, with the words "please leave" 
written on it, (a) placed on a pile of books in the library, (b) slipped inside your book in 
the library, or (c) left on the floor of the library. 
This, I take it, is partly what Augustine is getting at towards the end of De 
Magistro: that words need good interpretation from within their context in order to 
signify properly. Without that context, they simply don't work. On the other hand, the 
context without the words themselves would obviously tell us nothing. 
This is the kind of point being expressed in Augustine's treatise on the creed, De 
Fide et Symbolo. In the section on the Incarnation, he tries to bring out the frustration 
involved in not being understood, when we try to share with others what is going on 
inside. The emphasis is not on eliciting in someone else knowledge that had previously 
78 
"Ita ista ratio nisi inveniret in me aliquid cognitum, quo innitens ad incognitum duceret; nihil omnino per 
illam discerem, nee eam prorsus rationem nominarem." 
79 Burnyeat 1999: 300 
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been in oneself, but rather on revealing what is internal to those addressed. "For ... by our 
words, when we speak truly, our mind lets him who hears them know something, and by 
signs of that kind brings to the knowledge of another what we hold secretly in our heart," 
(j. b ... 3)80 et. sym . 111. 
The passage is again used81 as a demonstration that language fails as a 
communicative tool. For Augustine points out that we are unable to reveal what is within 
through words alone: in fact, the very project seems impossible: 
We do this with words and sounds and looks and bodily gestures - so many devices that serve our 
purpose to make known what is within our minds. But we cannot produce anything exactly like our 
minds, and so the mind of the speaker cannot make itself known with complete inwardness. if. et. 
symb. iii.4)82 
Notice, however, that this does not rule out the necessity of words for learning. In 
the communication act, we use whatever we can, but it is not enough. The problem we 
have is not so much that words are the wrong tool for learning, but that anything external 
is for Augustine of a fundamentally different nature from the internal. So even if we had 
the best tools in the world for expressing ourselves, we would fail to sufficiently portray 
our minds, as long as we were trying to make an external depiction of internal reality. 
In fact, there is good reason to believe that in this work, Augustine considered the 
knowledge that occurs within as verbal in nature. There will still be a difference between 
internal knowledge and public, external, expressed knowledge, and this puzzle will be 
taken up later. The fact remains, though, that De Fide et Symbolo seems to suggest an 
intrinsically "wordy" inner life. "We profess with the mouth the faith which we hold in 
our heart." (j. et symb. i.l )83 
80 
"Sicut ergo verbis nostr.is id agimus, cum verum loquimur, lit noster animus innotescat audienti, et 
quidquid secretum in corde gerimus, per signa hujusmodi ad cognitionem alterius proferatur:" 
81 Kato 1995 is a good study. 
82 
"Jdfacimus conantes et verbis, et ipso so11o vocis, et vu/tu, et gestu corporis, tot scilicet machinamentis 
id quod intus est demonstrare cupie11tes: quia tale aliquid proferre 11011 possumus," 
83 
"etiam ore profiteamur fidem quam corde gestamus;" cf. lo. eu. tr. XX.! 0: "Hoc idem ab utroque factum 
est: sed 11umquid similiter? ... Hoc ergo fecit corpus, quod fecit animus; sed no11 similiter. Fecit enim 
ani m us quod te11eat a11imus; fecit autem li11gua quod so11at, et per aerem aurem verberat"; trill TI.3: "He 
does not do other things likewise, like a painter copying pictures he has seen painted by someone else; nor 
does he do the same things differently, like the body forming letters which the mind has thought." 
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Here, in the profession of faith, Augustine seems to see not just a correlation 
between the inner word and the outer, but that it is actually the same profession. So we 
can profess the faith within as well as without for Augustine, thus making a strong case 
for the mental event as verbal - for "Even if no words are spoken, the man who is 
thinking is of course uttering in his heart." (trin. XV.l7)84 
In this way, we have seen once again that Augustine did not wish to rule out the 
role of words in the learning process, but rather to rule out "words alone". On the other 
hand, he does seem to consider words rather important for knowledge, even if the words 
he is talking about are often "inner" words, and so open to the objection that they are only 
words in a metaphorical sense. 
1.6: Natural Signs 
Against the Capitol I met a lion, 
Who glar'd upon me, and went surly by, ... 
And yesterday the bird of night did sit, 
Even at noon-day, upon the market-place, 
Hooting and shrieking. When these prodigies 
Do so conjointly meet, let not men say 
'These are their reasons, they are natural;' 
For, I believe, they are portentous things 
Unto the climate that they point upon. 
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 
This section will relate an important feature of the De Doctrina Christiana, 
namely the signa data - signa naturalia bifurcation, to the De Magistro. This distinction 
made in doctr. chr. 11 separates out Augustine's two usages of the word "sign" (although 
the fact that the two phenomena have the same name, and are listed together (II.i.l ff) is 
both important and highly unusual). One use is perhaps the more colloquial, whereby 
signs like words (for example) signify things, denoting them: signa data -given signs-
are signs that are given by agents to communicate with one another (called "symbol" by 
84 
"Nam etsi verba non sonent, in corde suo dicit utique qui cogitat." 
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Aristotle, and signifier-signified by the Stoics85), and it is on the merits of this innovation 
(i.e. calling these "given signs") that the book is said to have "a better claim than any 
other to be considered the first semiotic work. "86 The other usage of the word refers to 
symptoms: signa naturalia are signs that are simply there, not given by anyone, but free 
to be interpreted by all reasonable creatures, for example smoke as a sign of fire, 
footprints as a sign of passing animals, and involuntary expressions such as smiling or 
frowning as signs of our emotions (doctr. chr. II.i.2; this usage represents mainstream 
sign theory among ancient philosophers). 
We may also note that here the two types of signs [data-naturalia] -which remained completely 
separate for Augustine's predecessors- are integrated: what was sign for Aristotle and the Stoics 
becomes "natural sign," Aristotle's symbol and the Stoics' combination of signifier and signified 
become "intentional signs" (moreover, the same examples are always used). 87 
It will be argued below that the cases Augustine makes use of in the De Magistro 
to demonstrate that learning does not take place through words are precisely the kind of 
examples he could use to illustrate the concept of "signa naturalia" - natural signs -
although the terminology does not seem to have arisen to mind yet (however cf the use of 
"God or nature" on page 44)88• The earlier marked "turn towards the learner" (on page 
15) is also the point where the dialogue moves away from dealing with signa data (again 
not necessarily the terminology used), including mainly words, and begins to consider the 
kind of sign more familiar to the ancient world, namely signa naturalia (cf below, on 
page 39). In this way, we can see that there is a great deal of continuity between the two 
works. 
85 Hence in the highly stoic influenced work (cf. Co!ish 1985b), de dia/ectica, the noun "signum" is 
mentioned only 12 times (most of which walk of the written word as a "sign" of the spoken word), as 
ofposed to verb forms, which occur 46 times. 
8 Todorov 1982 [1977]: 40 
87 Todorov 1982 [1977]: 47. The "same examples" are smoke as a sign of fire (doctr. chr. II.i.lf; Sextus 
Empiricus, Adversus Mat he maticos viii.l52); footprints as a sign of an animal (doctr. chr. II.i.l f; Sextus 
Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos viii.271). Rist 1994: 34 is probably more accurate when he notes that in 
passing swiftly over natural signs, Augustine is "neglecting much of the material given a central place by 
Stoics and Epicureans:" 
88 The earliest explicit reference I can find to signa naturalia appears ins. dom. m. I.ix.24, in the various 
stages of anger, where first it is hidden, eventually it is spoken out, but the intermediary category is when 
the anger "wrests from him a vocal sound not signifying anything", which is later called "a sound signifying 
anger" ("vox quae iram significat"), to be distinguished from the verbal expression of that anger ("certae 
vituperation is expressio"). I assume the sound does not signify anything as a given sign, but signifies anger 
as a natural sign. 
33 
A warning is perhaps apt at this point: I am assuming that the fundamental 
difference between signa naturalia and signa data is contained in their use: i.e. their 
categorisation will be determined by the person hearing or apprehending them, and are 
not to be read as objective categories. So one person will treat something as signa 
naturalia, and another will treat it as signa data, according to their individual relationship 
to that signifying thing. 
So, to give a practical example of Augustine's theory, as I understand it, consider 
crop circles. There are some, blissfully unaware of extra-terrestrial theories and Mel 
Gibson films by Shyamalan, who simply think they are pretty. For such as these, the 
circles are merely things, with no great significance. For others, meteorologists perhaps, it 
gives them reason to expect unusual weather conditions - the crop circles are perhaps a 
(natural) sign of turbulent winds. Still others try to decode the patterns of the crop circles 
in order to understand what is being communicated to them- for them the circles signify' 
something, and each shape may denote a word or number. So different people can read 
the same thing as different kinds of sign. 
I put it this way not because Augustine wants to make the point about the various 
interpretations of things as signs in either the De Doctrina Christiana or the De Magistro, 
but because it is generally assumed89 that he is making an ontological distinction, and I 
don't think that is what he is getting at either. It is tempting to assume so, not least 
because, as a result of both Augustine's and Saussure's work90, we have become used to 
the signa data sense of the word "sign" - a sense we have to remember would have been 
unfamiliar to Augustine's readers- but such an assumption leads the theory into all sorts 
of muddy waters that are entirely unnecessary. 
It is to be hoped that the reading of Augustine's texts offered below will be its 
own argument. As a preliminary justification, though, let me just note that there does not 
seem to be any evidence (textual or logical) to suggest that signa data cannot be 
understood as a subcategory of signa naturalia. It is perhaps important to note that he 
89 Notably by Kirwan (1989: 40-43), gets into real trouble as a result, and so accuses Augustine of four 
logical errors, all of which can be solved by allowing that many phenomena can be taken either as signa 
naturalia or as signa data, according to the approach of the listener/speaker 
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introduces natural signs first, and then moves on to narrow the subject down (in a manner 
comparable to the way we went from things to communication in the crop circles example 
above, on page 33), first to given signs (doctr. chr. Il.ii.3) then to words (II.iii.4) - which 
are themselves a kind of given sign91 - and finally to literal and transferred signs (doctr 
chr. x.l5, cf. below II.S.l: Transferred Signs: Non-verbal Continuity). Notice he does not 
say that he simply leaves the category of natural signs to one side, but rather "It is not my 
intention to discuss this whole category (hoc toto genere) now,"92 (doctr. chr. II.i.2, 
emphasis mine). So it is perfectly viable to assume that he is investigating a part of it, 
namely the kind of natural signs that are given. If signa data actually have nothing to do 
with signa naturalia, then why does Augustine even mention the latter (somewhat 
confusingly, since previous tradition had held the two apart, cf above on page 31 ), given 
that he himself decides not to discuss it? For it seems implausible that 
He does this to dispose of signa naturalia (smoke as a sign of fire, a contorted expression on the 
face of a man as a sign of pain), for though they are an important way of communicating, they 
provide no basis for any developed form of human communication.93 
Natural signs were never a question of communication (except for one mention in de 
musica Vl.xiii.41 (quoted below, on page 46), which does not seem to be working with 
the same understanding as doctr. chr. Il), but of understanding. Augustine himself 
explains the inclusion by remarking that "it comes into my classification (partitionem)" 
(doctr. chr. Il.i.2), thus implying that it is a necessary step in the process of categorising 
what kind of things signa data are. 
The reverse, of course, is not true: natural signs may not be interpreted as a 
subcategory of given signs, because they are distinguished from the latter not by certain 
essential characteristics, but by their not fulfilling all the qualifications needed to identify 
them as given signs. But that does not exclude signa data having all the qualities 
necessary for possible categorisation or use as a natural sign.94 On the other hand, it 
9
° Cfbelow, nl06 
91 
"sed innumerabilis multitudo signorum, quibus suas cogitationes homines exerunt, in verbis constituta 
est." (doctr. chr. Il.iii.4) 
92 
"Sed de hoc toto genere nunc disserere non est propositum." 
93 Louth 1983: 80 
94 Markus 1995: !06f makes something like this distinction. 
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would seem logical that, for example, words can be used as a natural sign that someone 
has mastered a language. 95 So there are grey areas. For example, if someone walks into a 
reception, and coughs in order to indicate their presence, they have given a sign. The 
receptionist may think "where there's coughing, there's a person present" (in the same 
way as one thinks "where there's smoke, there's fire"), and so react accordingly. Or if the 
person said "I'm here", how would a receptionist who did not speak English react? Here 
qualifications for both kinds of sign are present, but Augustine would probably say that it 
was a given sign, because there was a desire to signify. Kirwan96 thinks that such 
examples count as criticisms of the theory, which would only be the case if we 
understood the two categories as rigid ontological distinctions. As soon as we admit of 
differences in interpretation and use, such problems disappear. 
So it would appear that signa data can be thought of as dependent on signa 
naturalia, forming a kind of shaky extension of it. Perhaps when we speak, we intend our 
words to be taken as a kind of sign-symptom of our inner state97 . This makes good sense 
of the otherwise puzzling concept of speaking our memories when trying to referring to 
absent corporeals (in mag. xii.3998) as problematised by Gareth Matthews: "Augustine 
seems to be saying that whenever we are asked about familiar, but absent, sensible things 
we respond by changing the subject, that is, by talking of our memory images instead."99 
Therefore all given signs may be construed as natural signs, and Augustine never 
actually leaves the conception of sign as symptom, but instead stretches it in new 
95 Markus ( 1957: 90-92) agrees that some instances may "be treated as either symptomatic [signa naturalia] 
or symbolic [signa data] in their meaning" but strangely does not imagine the distinction's author to have 
seen this point. 
96 Kirwan 1989: 41 
97 Aristotle hinted at this kind of interpretation of his "symbol" (Augustine's given sign) when he called it a 
"sign" (Augustine's natural signs) of the experience of the soul (de interpretatione 1.16a4-8). The system is 
not identical to Augustine's though, because Aristotle also assumes the experience of the soul resembles 
what the words refer to in some way: "Esti men oun ta en te phone ton en te psuche pathematon sumbola, 
kai ta graphomena ton en te phone. kai has per oude grammata pasi ta aut a, oude phonai hai autai hon 
mentoi tauta si!meia protos, tauta pasi pathemata tespsuches,". A similar mention (with no systematic 
discussion) of words as natural signs can be found in stoic sources: Sextus Empiricus, Adversus 
Mathematicos viii.279, 290- "eiper de ouden sudenos esti semaion, etai semainousi ti aikata tau semeiou 
ekpheromenai phonai e ouden semainousin . ... ei de semainousi, mataioi kathestasin oi apo tes skepseos, 
logo men ekballontes to semeion, ergo de touto paralambanontes." 
98 
"Cum vera 11011 de iis quae coram sentimus, sed de his quae aliquando sensimus quaeritur; non jam res 
ipsas, sed imagines ab iis impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur:" 
99 Matthews 1972a [1965]: 168. Matthews' article is exceptionally interesting because he uses a version of 
Wittgenstein's (2001) [1953] "Private Language Argument", which the latter had himself directed at 
Augustine. 
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directions. Evidence for this approach to our semiotic activity is found, of all places, in 
the opening words of the De Magistro quoted below on page 38. He also seems to be 
hankering after such an understanding when discussing Vergil with Adeodatus in mag. 
ii.3, as he asks where what "if' signifies is situated ("Adeodatus: ... where is doubt but in 
the mind?"), and challenges the interpretation of "nothing" as signifying something (not) 
in the world ("Augustine: ... shall we not say that this word signifies a certain state of 
mind rather than the very thing that is nothing?"). 100 
when it is necessary to convey the knowledge in the language of those we are speaking to, some 
sign is adopted to signify this word. And usually a sound, sometimes also a gesture is presented, 
the one to their ears the other to their eyes, in order that bodily signs may make the word we carry 
in our minds known to their bodily senses .... the vocal sounds of our speech are signs of the 
things we are thinking of. 101 (trin. XV .19) 
In addition, signs are distinguished from things purely by their use ("I mean by 
signs: those things which are employed to signify something" (doctr. chr. l.ii.2); cf also 
Augustine's criticism of Jews for treating signs as things in doctr. chr. III.v.9), so we are 
simply continuing Augustine's practise onto the next distinction. "The [res-signa] 
opposition can be reconstituted only at another level - at the level of function, not of 
substance. A sign indeed may be considered from two points of view: as thing or as 
sign". 102 
With regards to this sign theory's relation to the De Magistro, however, we shall 
have to look at the phenomena under description rather than at the vocabulary used, as the 
terminology seems to have only been introduced in the De Doctrina Christiana. So we 
will extract aspects of Augustine's descriptions in the later work and see whether they 
apply to anything in the earlier. 
100 Ayers 1979: 76-78 suggests an interpretation of this kind. 
101 
"sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur peiferre notitiam, aliquod signum quo significetur 
assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, il/e auribus, ille oculis exhibetur, ut per signa 
corporalia etiam corporis sensibus verbum quod mente gerimus innotescat . ... cum ipsae voces in sermone 
nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sint rerum." 
102 Todorov 1982 [1977]: 46 
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1.6.1: Intention 
The main difference between signa data and signa naturalia in the De Doctrina 
Christiana is the aspect of intention. 103 In the former it is present, in the latter it is not. 
Natural signs are those which without a wish or any urge to signify cause something else besides 
themselves to be known from them, ... Given signs are those which living things give to each 
other, in order to show, to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything else 
that they have felt or learnt. (doctr. chr. II.i.2f) 104 
In this way it is no accident that we described the major shift in the De Magistro 
as a "turn towards the learner" (on page 15). For just as the burden of teaching moves 
from the teacher to the learner in the De Magistro, so the active figure in signification 
changes from the speaker (or mover, or actor, etc) with signa data, to the observer with 
signa naturalia. The latter signifies "because of our observation" (rerum ... 
animadversione), the former does so ''in order to show ... " (ad demonstrandos). I would 
argue that it is exactly the same movement that takes place in the De Magistro. 
If we examine Augustine's treatment of signs towards the end of the De Magistro, 
he repeatedly uses the notion of sign whereby what we understand is not something 
necessarily intended to be understood. So Adeodatus notably does not need his listeners 
to understand that he means walking, so long as they understand what walking is. 
Similarly, the bird catcher does not display his skill because he wants them to understand 
how it works, but because he is "wanting to show off after seeing the attention focused on 
him," (auceps autem cum in se videret attentum, ostentandi se studio cannas expediret; 
mag. x.32). It is also notable that the only fact we learn from a teacher's utterance is that 
she thinks in such a way - something that the teacher did not necessarily intend us to 
learn, assuming she was trying to teach us the subject itself, and not merely auto-
biographical information. The intention was that the signs given by the teacher should 
direct the pupils' attention towards the subject matter (as would be expected with given 
signs), yet Augustine holds in mag. xiv.45 that the hearer only learns the views of the 
103 Engels (1962: 371) 
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teacher (as would be expected with natural signs) from her words (cf. 1.5.1: Academic 
Assent). 
It is interesting to note that this shift, disallowing any knowledge of what is 
denoted (and therefore signified by signa data) while allowing for knowledge deduced 
from the utterance itself (therefore signified by signa naturalia) comes at the rhetorical 
climax of the dialogue, where Augustine sweeps away his previous discussion in order to 
pronounce his concluding argument: 
See here: I now give in and concede that when words are heard by someone who knows them, he 
can know that the speaker had been thinking about the things they signify. Yet does he for this 
reason also learn whether the speaker has stated truths ... ? (mag. xiii.45) 105 
So towards the end of the dialogue, the notion of intention seems unimportant - a 
characteristic of signa naturalia. Before the crucial shift, though, intention is vital to the 
argument. "Anyone who speaks gives an external sign of his will by means of an 
articulated sound." (mag. i.2) 106 
It is here that Adeodatus tries to make a distinction between walking and hurrying, 
wary that actions on their own can mean a number of things (iii.6). Similarly, Augustine 
chastises him for not trying to discern the intention of the question - what it actually 
meant: "For if it is ambiguous, you should have had caution and not have replied before 
you had ascertained in what sense [way] I was asking." (mag. viii.22) 107 
104 
"Naturalia sunt, quae sine voluntate at que ullo appetitu significandi, praeter se aliquid aliud ex se 
cognoscifaciunt, ... Data vera signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem dant ad demonstrandos, 
quantum possunt, motus animi sui, vel sensa, aut intellecta quaelibet." 
105 
"Sed ecce jam remitto et concedo, cum verba ejus auditu cui nota sunt, acceptafuerint, posse illi esse 
notum de iis rebus quas significant, loquentem cogitavisse: num ideo etiam quod nunc quaeritur, utrum 
vera dixerit, discit ?" 
106 
"Qui enim loquitur, suae voluntatis signum foras dat per articulatum sonum." Note that here 
Augustine's use of the word "sign" is an immediate development from evidential (natural) signs- it is a 
sign of his mind. Contrast de Saussure's arbitrary use of the word "because I do not know of any word to 
ref.lace it," (De Saussure (1960 [1916]: 67) 
10 
"nam si est ambigua, prius hoc cavere debuisti, neque mihi respondere antequam certusfieres quonam 
modo rogaverim." Atherton (1993: 456) agrees that this appeal to a rule of discourse has general 
applicability to ambiguity in language. 
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In this way, the dialogue starts with discussion on intended signs, and ends with 
non-intended signs. We could call the latter evidential signs, to highlight the fact that in 
the ancient world signs were not usually associated with words, as they are immediately 
in Augustine. This emphasis, and his extensive explanation, was his own innovation 108 . 
Instead, signs were thought of as ways of recognising and proving things - natural signs 
were pre-eminent. Markus 109 traces this conception back to Aristotle's definition of the 
sign as "a demonstrative premiss, either necessary or probable" in the Prior Analytics 
11.27.70a7, although he was certainly not alone in this, not least because Philosophy was a 
common hobby for doctors, who had more practical reasons for working out a theory of 
evidential signs, whereby for example, shivering would be a "sign" of fever 110. Stoic 
thought based signification on the process of induction (if-then propositions: cf Sextus 
Empiricus (also a doctor), Adversus Mathematicos viii.276), and Augustine seems to have 
held to this view in many other earlier works. For example, in speaking of how to discern 
a wise person, he writes "For there are no signs whatever by which one can recognize 
(cognoscere) something, unless he knows the thing itself of which these are the signs." 
(uti!. cred. xiii.28, emphasis mine)111 
In this way, signs are forever dependent upon the reasoning behind them. In this 
case, the reasoning is based on past experience: if someone can solve problems involving 
two mothers and one child, then that person is wise. Some signs can be altogether more 
reliable, however: ifthere is smoke, then there is fire; ifthere is a daughter, then there is a 
parent. In addition, of course (as we have seen), given signs can also be treated as natural 
signs: if.this person says "Shall I open a window?", then they feel hot. In this way, even 
natural signs can be more or less reliable depending on the interpreter112 : if someone 
takes their coat off, then they are warm, or perhaps dry, or allergic to rubber, or perhaps 
have discovered a wasp in their sleeve. Eco notes that the Stoic model of signs 
108 Markus 1957: 75-78. Jackson 1972 [1969]: 128-137 disagrees, but is unable to give an unambiguously 
linguistic use of either "signum" or "semaion"(cf. above, n97). Cf Also Todorov 1982 [ 1977]: 15- "But 
Augustine did not invent semiotics; it can even be said that, quite to the contrary, he invented virtually 
nothing, that he merely combined ideas and notions drawn from several horizons." 
109 Markus 1957: 72 
110 so Eco ( 1984) begins the semiotic story with Hippocrates 
111 
"Neque enim signis quibuslibet cognoscere aliquid potest, nisi il/ud ipsum, cujus ea signa sunt, noverit." 
Cf. also I o. eu. tr. XXV .11: "ideo pan is signum, ne confusa cum aliis, a te non possit agnosd' 
112 What we learn from natural signs can be radically different, according to our society, pace Babcock 
1995: 159, n 16. The point was fairly common in antiquity: cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 
viii.l93 
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... assumes, therefore, the form of inference (p-::>q), where the variables are neither physical 
realities nor events, but the propositions that express the events. A column of smoke is not a sign 
unless the interpreter sees the event as the true antecedent of a hypothetical reasoning (if there is 
smoke ... ) which is related by inference (more or less necessarily) to its consequent (then there is 
fire). This is why the Stoics can say, and they do, that the sign is a lekton and, therefore, an 
incorporeal. 113 
So in seeing Augustine turn from intentional signs (how does a student learn what 
a teacher is intending to say?) to evidential signs (how does a student learn?), we may say 
that he moves from treating words as given signs, paying attention to what they denote, to 
treating them as evidential - or natural - signs, discerning what lies behind them. 
1.6.2: Reasoning 
The above notes on the nature of signa naturalia show that the notion of reasoning 
is also important for the category of natural signs. Inductive reasoning is vital to 
understanding that smoke means fire. The smoke will not always necessarily be a natural 
sign, and it is the crucial element of reasoning (if there's smoke, there's something 
suspicious happening in the kitchen) that makes it such. "It does not signify because it 
wishes to do so; but because of our observation and consideration of things previously 
experienced it is realized that there is fire beneath it, even if nothing but smoke appears." 
(de doctrine christiana l.i.2, emphasis mine) 114 
It is not difficult to show that reasoning is used in the example of the bird catcher, 
strengthening our hypothesis that towards the end of the dialogue, knowledge is attained 
through signa naturalia: "On seeing this birdcatcher, he follows closely in his footsteps, 
and, as it happens, he reflects and asks himself in his astonishment what exactly the 
man's equipment means." (mag. x.32) 115 
113 Eco 1984:31 
114 
"Non enim volens significare idfacit, sed rerum expertarum animadversione et notatione cognoscitur 
ignem subesse, etiam si fttmus sol us appareat. " 
115 
"non tamen aucupanti, sed iter agenti, quo vi so premeret gradum, secumque, ut fit, admirans cogitaret et 
quaereret quidnam sibi hominis ille vel/et ornatus;" 
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The use of signs near the beginning of the dialogue is altogether more complicated 
(as might be expected if signa data constitute a further development of signa naturalia). 
For reasoning clearly takes place when interpreting words, but it is of a different kind. For 
our purposes, we should note that the reasoning ascertains only the meaning of the phrase, 
but does not get us anywhere nearer to understanding its truth or falsity. In a sense, it is 
not, as it were, owned until the hearer can form a conclusion. That kind of reasoning is 
delayed until the hearers can consider it themselves, concluding that the speaker has said 
p, so must be thinking/feeling in such a way. In this way, the words at the beginning of 
the dialogue can be said to suggest (we are concerned with what was spoken), whereas 
the signs at the end demonstrate (we are concerned with what that means). 
In the works contemporary with De Magistro, we find repeated assertions that 
knowledge is impossible without reasoning 116• Even if we happen to come across a truth 
through some other method (rumour, mistaken logic), it is not knowledge until we have 
reasoned it out. The example given in De animae quantitate (xxiv.45) is instructive: 
"Augustine: Therefore, to perceive with the sense is one thing; to know is another. 
Evodius: Altogether different; for we perceive the smoke that we see, and from that we 
know (cognoscimus) the presence (subesse) of the fire which we do not see." 117 
In this way we can see that knowledge is only brought about by reasoning, which 
is parallel to what we have been saying about signa naturalia. The example is all the 
more remarkable for being exactly the same as that produced by Augustine later in the De 
Doctrina Christiana as an example of natural signs. Here we appear to have an early 
demonstration of Augustine's later assertion that res per signa discuntur (although once 
again the signa are not called such in the early works - the terminology seems to have 
emerged later). For if we define learning as acquiring knowledge, we see that it can not 
happen without the kind of reasoning involved in discerning the fire through the smoke. 
The smoke stands for the fire, it elicits knowledge of fire, is a natural sign for the fire. 
116 Sol. I.iv.9; an.quant. xxvi.49; lib. arb. I.vii.l6; ll.iii.8 
117 
"A. Aliud est ergo sentire, aliud cognoscere. E. Omnino aliud: nam sentimusfumum, quem videmus; et 
ex eo ignem, quem non videmus, subesse cognoscimus." Cf. the point rephrased in /o. eu. tr. XXIV.6: "Nihil 
igitur vacat, omnia innuunt, sed intellectorem requirunt: ... Cernimus quippe animo, quod oculis non 
potuimus:" 
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Therefore we may perceive the smoke, but unless we use it as a sign (Evodius seems to be 
saying in the above quotation) we get no knowledge. 
The evidence is strong, then, for seeing the reasoning present at the end of the De 
Magistro as a use of signa naturalia. It has been established that natural signs are based 
on inductive reasoning both in Augustine and in his philosophical predecessors ( cf 1.6.1: 
Intention), and it is only at the end of the dialogue that such reasoning really comes to the 
fore, bearing with it sure knowledge which is itself something Augustine says (in works 
contemporary with De Magistro) only comes about as a result of reasoning (cf. nll6 
above). Hence he admits that he believes rather than knows what he is told - through 
words, which are a kind of signa data - in the Bible (mag. xi.37). The quotation from de 
animae quantitate above gives as an example of reasoning exactly the same case as he 
would later give to illustrate natural signs (doctr. chr. Il.i.2). 
This aspect of our interpretation of signa naturalia, incidentally, may also aid the 
reading of opening sections of the Confessions, 118 where Augustine is accused of 
describing the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not 
understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or 
again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean 
something like "talk to itself'. 119 
The sting of this critique120 may be drawn perhaps if we interpret "to think" rather as "to 
interpret natural signs" -or, as we have argued here, "to reason". This reading may be 
confirmed by Augustine's designation of human actions as verba naturalia - surely an 
echo of signa naturalia. So the child interprets actions as revealing human desires and 
118 Wittgenstein's text runs: "Cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum earn 
vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum 
eam vel/ent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus 
omnium gentium, quae jiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis 
indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis 
sententiis locis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam 
voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam. " 
119 Wittgenstein 2001 [1953]: 32 
120 Defended (fairly shakily in the light of the discoveries of Generative Grammar) on the basis of the 
variety of languages by Kirwan (200 I: 203) 
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beliefs, just as language does: "According to Augustine, then, speech is a means of mind-
exposure, and speakers expose their minds by giving signs of their minds' contents." 121 
The revelation of mind through actions as well as words is a fairly Wittgensteinian 
move in the understanding of the inner life, and when we remember that the soul can be 
conceived as a social entity (trin. XIII.i.2122) for Augustine, it is only a short step to the 
modem view that the self is constituted by our actions, or that there is no private soul. So 
Augustine is not so far away from Wittgenstein as some123 have imagined. 
1.6.3: Observation 
It is an interesting fact (which few people know) that the yellow-bi\led cuckoo's other 
name is the rain-bird, because when he's noisy it means there's going to be a downpour; 
and this one was making a tremendous racket. The doves listened carefully to what he was 
saying, and then flew back. 
Dick King-Smith, Noah 's Brother 
The other element we saw required by the definition of signa naturalia (on page 
40) was observation. Natural signs have to be observed carefully in order to extract from 
them their referent. Given signs, on the other hand, seem to need very little observation, 
as the focus is more on the referent than the sign itself. So we have to consider smoke 
carefully in order to discern that there is fire below it, whereas words seem a good deal 
more automatic, if it can be put in such a way. 
For once, the examples in De Magistro actually make the argument a good deal 
clearer. For the element of observation comes to the fore very obviously in the case of the 
bird catcher. We attain knowledge about the technique of ensnaring birds by watching it. 
There is no convention required, nothing automatic, but merely an intelligent person 
examining something (a man and a collection of rods) and coming to conclusions about 
something else (the art of catching birds). "Adeodatus: I also can add this to the other 
121 Kirwan 2001: 192 
122 
"Utrisque enim notum est quid sit homo, cujus exteriorem partem, id est, corpus per corporis lumina 
didicenmt: interiorem vero, id est, animam in se ipsis, quia et ipsi homines sunt, et per humanam 
conversationem cognitam tenent:" 
123 e.g. Kirwan 2001: 201-204 
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case! If he is sufficiently intelligent, he'll know the whole of what it is to walk, once 
walking has been illustrated by a few steps." (mag. x.32) 124 
It is in this context that Augustine comes as close as he ever does in the dialogue 
to pre-empting the later distinction, by remarking that this sign-less apprehension is a 
natural process for some discerning person, who does not need any pointing, but 
identifies reality as it is for what it is: "doesn't God or Nature show and display to those 
paying attention, by themselves, this sun and the light pervading and clothing all things 
present, the moon and the other stars, the lands and the seas, and the countless things 
begotten in them?" (mag. x.32) 125 
In contrast, the beginning of the dialogue displayed a complete unwillingness on 
the part of the learner to observe. The onus to demonstrate was on the teacher, and if the 
teacher could not point something out immediately, then the teaching had failed. 
Augustine: ... But if when one says 'wall' I were to ask what this one-syllable word signifies, 
couldn't you show me with your finger? Then when you pointed it out I would straightaway see 
the very thing of which this one-syllable word is a sign, (mag. iii.5, emphasis mine) 126 
The De Magistro is not alone of the works of Augustine in attributing the sure 
acquisition of knowledge to proper perception. It is a commonplace point, in the early 
works, that right observation leads to knowledge, via reasoning127 . "knowledge exists 
only when something is perceived and known by certain reason" (an.quant. xxvi.49)128 
124 
"Ad. Hoc etiam ego possum illi addere; si enim sit bene intelligens, paucis passibus ambulatione 
monstrata, totum quid sit ambulare cognoscet." 
125 
"sol em certe istum lucemque haec omnia perfundentem atque vestientem, lunam et caetera sidera, terras 
et maria, quaeque in his innumerabiliter gignuntur, nonne per seipsa exhibet atque ostendit Deus et natura 
cementibus ?"For other earlier instances of this kind of distinction, cf m us. VI.ix.24: "Names are imposed 
by convention, not by nature" ("placito enim, non natura imponuntur") 
126 
"sed si quaere rem istae tres syllabae quid significent, cum dicitur, Paries, nonne posses digito 
ostendere, ut ego prorsus rem ipsam viderem, cujus signum est hoc trisyllabum verbum," 
127 
cf Sol. Il.v.S; de moribus ecclesiae catholicae vii.l2; an.quant. xviii.32; uti/. cred. xvi.34 
128 
"scientiam non esse, nisi cum res aliquafirma ratione percepta et cognita est?" 
1.6.4: Agreement 
Like, for instance, standing in the kitchen wondering what you went in there for. Everybody does it, 
but because there isn't- or wasn't- a word for it, everyone thinks it's something that only they do 
and that they are therefore more stupid than other people. 
Douglas Adams, The Salmon of Doubt 
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In the De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine quickly drops the concept of natural 
sign, and goes on to discuss given signs, since he is dealing primarily with Scripture, 
written and intended by the biblical authors. It is interesting to note, though, that he 
explains the meaning of given signs (amongst humans, that is 129) in terms of social 
agreement. This will of course account for the "automatic" feel to signs - we do not have 
to go through a complicated reasoning process in order to discern their meaning: all we 
need is contained in the community we are socialised into. 
When I say lege a Greek understands one thing by these two syllables, but a Latin speaker 
something else. All these meanings, then, derive their effects on the mind from each individual's 
agreement with a particular convention. As this agreement varies in extent, so do their effects. 
People did not agree to use them because they were already meaningful (valebant ad 
significationem); rather they became meaningful because people agreed to use them. (doctr. chr. 
II.xxiv.37) 130 
Correspondingly, given signs cement communities together, and allow us to live without 
questioning everything. So what we need for the interpretation of Scripture is more 
precisely contained in the communities the biblical authors were part of, which means we 
have to learn all the aspects of other societies too. Hence the enlarging of the semiotic 
encyclopaedia in doctr. chr. Il.xx.30-xxx.47. 
The new Christian civilization accepts and introduces (by further and further reelaborations) into 
the interpretive circle, that is, its own growing encyclopedia, all the knowledge of classical 
129 cfTodorov 1982 [1977): 47 
130 
"et cum dico, Lege, in his duabus syllabis, aliud Graecus, aliud Latinus intelligit: sicut ergo hae omnes 
significationes pro suae cujusque societatis consensione animos movent, et quia diversa consensio est, 
diverse movent; nee ideo consenserunt in eas homines, quia jam valebant ad significationem, sed ideo 
valent, quia consenserunt in eas:" 
46 
civilization, as it was inherited by the late Roman culture, under the form of a syncretistic 
encyclopedia. 131 
Now clearly the signs towards the end of De Magistro have nothing to do with the 
conventions referred to here. There was no agreement as such between the watcher and 
the bird catcher about what was happening. Even if the bird catcher had been oblivious to 
the audience, the latter would nonetheless have learnt. 
In the first part of the dialogue, however, the interlocutors are forced to rely on 
convention and agreement in order to learn. It is notable that in the case of Adeodatus 
trying to teach what "walking" means, they assume that the person has already asked 
what walking means in the first place (mag. iii.6). More evidence of social agreement as 
key for communication can be seen in the handling of sound and signification, where 
Adeodatus attempts to avoid the conclusion (based on the fact that he is not made up of 
two syllables) that he is not a man (homo). 
If anyone asks me whether man is a name, then, I would answer that it is nothing else, for he 
signifies well enough that he wants to hear the answer from the standpoint in which it is a sign. If 
he asks whether man is an animal, I would give my assent much more readily. If without 
mentioning "name" or "animal" he were to inquire only what man is, then in virtue of that agreed-
upon rule of language the mind would quickly move along to what is signified by this syllable 
["man"], and the answer would simply be "an animal"; (mag. viii.24, emphasis mine) 132 
The nature-convention distinction was one of Augustine's earliest analyses of sign 
forms, and is subtly different from the natural-given distinction. He seems to be 
exclusively describing signs of mental activity when he writes that 
It happens from the condition of sinners, though, that souls are permitted to bring forth something 
from the mind by signifying those movements through one of two bodies: either through natural 
131 Eco 1984: 151 
132 
"Qui ergo quaerit utrum homo nomen sit, nihil ei aliud quam esse respondeam: satis enim significat ex 
ea parte se velle audire, qua signum est. Si autem quaerit utrum animal sit, multo proclivius annuam: 
quoniam si tacens et nomen et animal, tantum quid esset homo requireret, placita ilia loquendi regula ad id 
quod duabus syllabis significatur, animus curreret; neque quidquam responderetur nisi animal," 
47 
signs, such as facial expression or a gesture; or through conventional signs, such as words. (mus. 
VI.xiii.41; translation mine) 133 
So it seems that the notion of signs established by societal agreement was not such 
a late discovery for Augustine after all. In fact, the conventionality of signification was 
one of his more frequent comments on the subject of language 134 . 
For reason was held fast by a certain natural bond in the fellowship of those with whom it 
possessed reason as a common heritage, since men could not be most firmly associated unless they 
conversed and thus poured, so to speak, their minds and thoughts back and forth to one another. 
(ord. II.xii.35) 135 
In this way we can see the distinction between natural signs and given signs works 
out in the early works as well, specifically in the De Magistro, thus bringing it into line 
with De Doctrina Christiana. 
1.6.5: Assent 
Finally in this section we must consider the crucial .role of assent and how it 
affects natural and given signs. For just as words were important but by no means enough 
for the enterprise of teaching knowledge (1.5: Words Alone?), so signs do not produce 
knowledge automatically on their own: we must assent to the results of the signification 
process in order to know anything. 
133 
"Peccatorum tamen conditione fit, ut permittantur animae de animis aliquid age re, significando eas 
moventes per alterutra corpora, velnaturalibus signis, sicut est vultus vel nutus, vel placitis, sicut sunt 
verba." The key word to this distinction is "placita", for which see also mag. viii.24 (in nl32); doctr. chr. 
II.xx.30; II.xxiv.37; II.xxv.38; II.xxv.39. The seminal article for this discussion is Engels (1962). 
134 cf also ord. II.xi.31; mus. l.i.l, III.ii.3 (en page 11), V.i.l, VI.ix.24; an.quant. xxxiii.72; uti/. cred. vii.l9; 
trin. VII.vi.7. I also see the arbitrariness of signs as the reasoning behind Augustine's talk of disregarding 
words in Acad. III.ii.3, III.xiii.29; Beata. u. iv.31; ord. II.ii.4, II. vii.21; an.quant. vi.!!; mus. V.iii.4; trin. 
V.ix.IO; gn. litt. IV.v.ll. The "res non verba" tradition goes back at least as far as Cicero, Tusc. V.xi.32: 
"Rem enim opinor spectari oportere, non verba" 
135 
"Namque illud quod in nobis est rationale, id est, quod ratione utitur, et rationabilia vel facit vel 
sequitur, quia naturali quodam vinculo in eorum societate astringebatur, cum quibus illi erat ratio ipsa 
communis, nee homini homo firmissime sociari posset, nisi colloquerentur, atque ita sibi mentes suas 
cogitationesque quasi refunderem, vidit esse imponenda re bus vocabula, id est significames quosdam 
48 
Assent still remains outside the boundaries of the sign. But in this case, it is 
delayed even further than the words given by a teacher. If we are taking the simple case 
of noticing fire, we see the thing, use it as a sign of fire (here we can see why it is so 
complicated to locate the sign itself), and come to the conclusion that there is fire. We 
assent to our own reasoning. 
The case of someone teaching is a little more complicated. Here, someone tells us 
something, for example, that the sky is really pink when you get up close to it. The words, 
when considered as natural signs, are only signs of someone else's opinion (cf. mag. 
xiii.45, quoted on page 38). We hypothesise, "If Adrian says the sky is pink, then Adrian 
must actually think that the sky is pink". So the words are signs of Adrian' s opinions, to 
which we would otherwise have no access. 
Accordingly, ... it is our intention, when we speak truth, that by means of our words our mind 
should be made known to him who hears us, and that whatever we carry in secrecy in our heart 
may be set forth by means of signs of this sort for the intelligent understanding of another 
individual (j. et. symb. iii.3) 136 
So words are something that bring an absent thing to the mind (doctr. chr. 
II.i.l) 137• But notice that the abs~nt thing is no longer a simple proposition (as we had 
above, in 1.5.1: Academic Assent): it is Adrian's proposition. So with a natural sign, we 
do not merely give assent to the proposition, but the proposition as held by a certain 
person. Hence on the one hand we will take a different attitude to Augustine when he tells 
us that he has seen a flying man as to when he tells us that wise people are better than 
fools (mag. xii.40), because assent is exclusively the domain of the listener where signa 
data are concerned. On the other hand, we do not consider belief in a good authority 
worthless (mag. xi.37), because propositions are considered in the context of their 
speakers where they are used as signa naturalia. We cannot have one without the other, 
because when we consider utterances as natural signs, they are signs of both a proposition 
sonos; ut, quoniam sentire animos suos non poterant, ad eos sibi copulandos sensu quasi interprete 
uterelltur." 
136 
"Sicut ergo verbis nostris id agimus, cum verum loquimur, ut noster aninws innotescat audienti, et 
quidquid secretum in corde gerimus, per signa hujusmodi ad cognitionem alterius proferatur" 
49 
and a speaker. "When the teachers have explained by means of words all the disciplines 
they profess to teach, even the disciplines of virtue and of wisdom, then those who are 
called 'students' consider within themselves whether truths have been stated." (mag. 
xiv.45) 138 
Once again, this is not an insight unique to the De Magistro. In the De Ordine, for 
example, Augustine complains that some readers "pay little heed either to the why of a 
question or to the purpose of the authors or even to what is fully explained and proved by 
them." (I.ll. 31) 139 
This "why" question is something that appears again and again in the sermons, as 
Augustine seeks not just to apprehend the given signs, but also the reasoning that went on 
behind it. What provoked the Psalmist to express himself like this? As Peter Brown notes: 
Thus the first question he must ask is not 'what', 'what was the nature of this particular religious 
practice in the ancient Near East?' but 'why' - 'why does this incident, this word and no other, 
occur at just this moment in the interminable monologue of God; and so, what aspect of His deeper 
message does it communicate? Like the child who asked the basic question: 'Mummy, why is a 
cow?', Augustine will run through the text of the Bible is such a way that every sermon is 
punctuated by 'Quare ... quare ... quare' 'Why? ... why? ... why?' 140 
In this way the radical incommunicability of assent we discovered (1.5.1: 
Academic Assent) can not in any way be opposed to the important role of belief as 
portrayed both in the De Magistro, and the roughly contemporary De Utilitate Credendi. 
Our own judgement is unavoidable - as no one can force us to assent - and is even 
present when we listen to authorities, but in the latter case, it is not simply judgement of 
the propositions presented, but also of our own knowledge that the authority tells us this. 
With given signs, we assent or not to the notion that God is a rock. With natural signs, we 
137 
"aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire" 
138 
"At istas omnes disciplinas quas se docere profitentur, ipsiusque virtutis atque sapientiae, cum verbis 
explicaverint; tum illi qui discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant, interiorem 
scilicet illam veritatem pro viribus intuentes." 
139 
"lsti enim in litteris 11011 multum attendunt aut unde sit quaestio, aut quo pervenire disserentes 
moliantur, quidve ab eis explicatum at que confectum sit." 
140 Brown 1967: 253 
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assent or not to our own observation that "The Bible says that God is a rock". We only 
believe that "God is a rock", but the fact that the Bible says so is fairly unassailable. 
I. 7: Conclusion: The Use of Words 
So what have we found out about Augustine's wordview? Well, words are not 
enough to produce knowledge in someone else. But then, Augustine does not think that is 
a particularly good project anyway. Teaching, in terms of producing exactly the same 
knowledge in the pupil that was in the teacher, is not what listening and knowing is all 
about. Instead, the mind is more active in its cognitive processes, according to the De 
Magistro. Memories Will always be different, and so, therefore, will understanding. The 
role of the will is all-important as it is a virtue and a necessity to assess the suggestions 
brought before the mind. So the idea of teaching as attacked in the De Magistro will need 
severe revising before it can be of any use philosophically. It is no wonder the later works 
speak much more of learning than of teaching. 
Instead, knowledge is learnt by the perceiver apprehending phenomena in the 
world as natural signs, using them in inductive reasoning, combining them with their 
existing understanding of the world, and coming to conclusions about things that are 
witnessed here and now as well as things that are not seen. These signs are not, however, 
explicitly called signs in the De Magistro. This is not an essential point, since Augustine's 
terminology is usually quite fluid 141 , and rarely fixed down to one usage, as is continuous 
with his own philosophy of the arbitrariness of language. 
So are things really learnt through words? Certainly the De Magistro leaves that 
option open. If natural signs are dependent on induction, they may well also require 
verbal propositions 142• Given the uselessness of teaching, then, and the terminology of use 
and enjoyment that comes to light alongside words and things in the De Doctrina 
141 for other uses of the expression "sign", cf ord. II.xi.34; an.quant. xi.l8, xxxiii.72; lo. eu. tr. III.2 
142 cf quotation from Eco (1984) on page 40; also Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos viii.256: 
" ... the sign is a proposition, and also it is the antecedent in a valid major truth premiss which begins with 
truth and ends in truth," 
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Christiana (cf below, III.2: Desire), it is interesting to note this aside near the end of the 
dialogue: "At another time we shall, God willing, look into the whole problem of the 
usefulness of words- which, if considered properly, is not negligible!" (Mag. xiv.46) 143 
143 
"Sed de tota utilitate verborum, quae si bene consideretur non parva est, alias, si De us siverit, 
requiremus." 
l/: "The Inner Tongue": Verbum vs Lingua 
Often long after the hobbits were wrapped in sleep they would sit together under the stars, 
recalling the ages that were gone and all their joys and labours in the world, or holding 
council, concerning the days to come. If any wanderer had chanced to pass, little would he 
have seen or heard, and it would have seemed to him only that he saw grey figures, carved 
in stone, memorials of forgotten things now lost in unpeopled lands. For they did not move 
or speak with mouth, looking from mind to mind; and only their shining eyes stirred and 
kindled as their thoughts went to and fro. 
J R R Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings 
11. 1: Introduction 
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So we have argued that signs are necessary, but insufficient for knowledge. In this 
chapter I hope to discuss the proposition that mental events are verbal by nature (not that 
this excludes the notion of mental images, but compliments it), and the immediate 
problems this raises. 
However useful natural signs were for understanding teaching in the De Magistro, 
they do not solve the problem of language for Augustine. We still need to learn through 
words, or more specifically, texts, and even when we treat the words as natural signs 144 
(pointing to the mind of the author, and not just to the things referred to by them), a use of 
the convention of given signs is unavoidable. Natural signs do approach necessary truths 
(if smoke then fire), but when they involve language, they are only as useful as the 
conventions that drive it. Someone informing me that snow is white, is a fairly sure sign 
that they believe snow to be white. However, what "snow is white" itself means is still 
undecided, and a contingent truth. It may be that when they say the word "snow", they are 
thinking about what we would call grass, or perhaps they know someone called Ms Snow. 
Language is fragile. This is what I take Wittgenstein to be getting at when he writes: "It is 
clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the 
form "'p" says p' :" 145 
So learning is still most fragile, since there is a weakness in the way we hear 
people, our words meaning different things in different contexts, destabilising the security 
of Scriptural truth and human learning. The Augustinian account of knowledge is beset by 
144 For the natura-data distinction as being contained in the approach of the listener, see above, on page 31 
145 Wittgenstein 1921: 5.542 (emphasis original) 
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a sceptical challenge: how do we even learn right faith if we may not rely on the words it 
is transmitted with? 
I wish to outline Augustine's response to this kind of sceptical challenge by first 
noting the difference between verbum and lingua in the Augustinian corpus, and relating 
it to his trinitarian illustrations, arguing that the comparison cuts both ways. This will lead 
on to an examination of the notion of an inner tongue, which may be more than just a 
metaphor for the mind. We will also need an appraisal and application of these solutions 
to the project of learning from Scripture, based on the hints and tips to be found in the 
doctr. chr. II. 
11.2: Verbum vs Lingua 
A name was just a sound you heard, and didn't have that rich, heady reek of really being something. 
A sound didn't well up inside your head and go woomph the way a smell did. Smell was real, smell 
was something you could trust. 
Douglas Adams The Salmon of Doubt 
If one were to carry out a search for the word "language" (lingua) in the 
Augustinian corpus, a very negative picture would emerge. Languages are diverse, 
sensual things that can hinder us and lead us into deceptive ways of thinking. A brief 
glance over a work we have already looked at, de catechizandis rudibus, gives us a good 
example. Language can not answer to the experience of the heart (ii.3) 146; it is a step away 
from our thoughts, distancing the learner (ii.3); it is not common to all people (ii.3; 
xxiii.41 ); it can run away with itself, requiring restraint (vi.lO); it is conducive to vanity 
(ix.13) 147; and it is a seat of mockery (xxv.46). 
Were this the final word on language, the conclusion would be quite evident that 
Augustine does not think much of language as a medium for anything good. There are 
146 cf trin. V.i.l: "Hinc jam exordiens ea dicere, quae dici ut cogitantur vel ab homine aliquo. vel certe a 
nobis non omni modo possunt:" 
147 also hiding evil works with good words- cf trin. XII.viii.13: "tanquamfolia dulciumfructuum, sed sine 
ipsis fructibus, ita sine fructu boni operis bona verba contexunt, ut male viventes quasi bene loquendo 
contegant turpitudinem suam" 
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good reasons for his negativity, though. We must note that the Latin word for language, 
"lingua", also denotes the tongue. 
[Augustine:] We use the term "tongue" not only for the bodily member which moves about in our 
mouth when we speak, but also for the effect produced by this movement of the tongue, namely, 
the arrangement and sequence of words. It is in this sense that we say that Greek is one tongue, and 
Latin another. (lib. arb. Ill.xix.54) 148 
It is for this reason, i.e. the tongue's corporeality, added to the danger he knew all 
too well of persuasive speech and powerful rhetoric in service of lies (doctr. chr. IV.ii.3; 
dial. 7), and possibly also the cautionary notes to be found in the book of James, that 
Augustine denigrates language as something outer, bodily, fundamentally different from 
truth and wisdom, God and soul. "Communication, by language pre-eminently, is 
communication across the external by means of the sensible, and the Platonist in 
Augustine deeply distrusts it."149 
This is not the case for all kinds of words, though. There is an equally strong 
thread in Augustine's thought that speaks of inner words, that are explicitly not 
susceptible to the above deficiencies of language, but incorporeal. For this phenomenon, 
however, he never uses the word lingua (language/tongue), but the altogether more 
flexible and biblical verbum (word). The distinction between corporeal voice and mental 
expressions was already known in the ancient world, for example among the Stoics150 : 
"Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: . . . A statement or 
proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. "It is day."" 
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers: VII.l.55f) 
148 
''Nam sicut linguam dicimus non solum membrum quod movemus in ore dum loquimur, sed etiam illud 
quod lwjus membri motum consequitur, id est formam tenoremque verborum, secundum quem modum 
dicitur alia lingua graeca, alia latina:" 
149 Louth 1989:154. cfalso Brown 1967:256 
150 Watson ( 1988) is almost certainly right in attributing the substance of Augustine's "inner word" theory 
to the Neoplatonists, rather than the Stoics: the coherence argued for in Jackson 1972 [ 1969] between de 
dialectica, de doctrina christiana, and de trinitate is unconvincing. The occasion, however, for these 
reflections, is almost always the exposition of biblical phrases "the inner voice" (lib. arb. II.xv.39), "word 
of God" (la. eu. tr. XIV. 7) or "he that speaks in his heart" (mend. xvi.31 f) 
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It is not this corporeal sound, though, but the inner word 151 , this verbum, that 
justifies our speaking of verbal mental events, for it is the word Augustine uses to 
describe knowledge and desire in his trin. IX. Here, it is the mental word that motivates 
our actions, being the underlying knowledge and will that our actions betray. "Nobody 
voluntarily does anything that he has not previously uttered as a word in his heart." trin. 
IX.vii.12152 
Augustine seems to think of this kind of inner word as the essential word, closer to 
the mind and not prone to bodily error. In this way, he negates the problems he found 
with lingua when he speaks of them: "The word . . . is neither uttered in sound, nor 
thought of in the likeness of sound, which necessarily belongs to some language;" 153 (trin. 
XV.xi.20) 
For more logical reasons, this kind of word can answer to the experience of the 
heart more effectively, does not require restraint, nor is susceptible to the kind of vanity 
mentioned above, since it can not be grammatically correct. So perhaps the account of 
lingua is not the last word on words. On the contrary, the very problem with lingua is that 
it is corporeal. And the corporeal word is not the only sense of the word "word" (verbum) 
for Augustine: 
In one sense we give the name of word to whatever occupies a space of time with its syllables, 
whether it is spoken aloud or merely thought; in another, everything that is known is called a word 
impressed on the consciousness, as long as it can be produced from the memory and described 
••• 
154 (trin. IX.x.l5) 
Thus the word which makes a sound outside is the sign of the word which lights up inside, and it is 
this latter that primarily deserves the name of "word."155 (ibid XV.xi.20) 
151 For a fascinating analysis of this concept in Augustine, cf. Matthews 1972b [ 1967]: 181-184 
152 
"[quod non verba apud nos intus edit a praevenimus.] Nemo enim a/iquid volens facit, quod non in corde 
suo prius dixerit." Cf. also trin. IX.l4f 
153 
"quod neque prolativum est in sono, neque cogitativum in similitudine soni, quod alicujus linguae esse 
necesse sit" 
154 
"Aliter enim dicuntur verba quae spatia temporwn syllabis tenent, sive pronuntientur, sive cogitentur; 
aliter omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur animo impressum, quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri 
potest," 
155 
"Proinde verbum quodforis sonar, signum est verbi quod intus lucet, cui magis verbi competit nomen." 
L_ _______________________________________________________________________________________ _ 
56 
If corporeality is not essential to words, then it can be seen that most of Augustine's 
negative statements concerning language are not directed at words across the board, but 
the bodily nature. This is often seen most clearly when he refers to the teaching of God: 
he ... delivers his body to the ministry of God that the preaching of the truth hold pre-eminence 
and the service of the body be given the least consideration; yet through that very service of the 
body the higher teaching should blaze forth which through bodily functions, that is, through voice 
and tongue and other actions of the body, should seep into the learners in good works156 • (s. dom. 
m. I.vi.l7, emphasis mine) 
As an example, we can take the supposed negative statements concerning 
language in the De Genesi adversus manichaeos. 151 These are often 158 taken to be the 
marks of Augustine's theology of language as a post-fall thing159, not an ideal tool, but 
what humans turned to once they had left their paradisal state of wordless 
communication: "Augustine says that is was the Fall of man that made necessary 
communication by means of signs .... this rather suggests that language itself is a fruit of 
the Fall." 160 
A close examination of the text itself, though, will show that the analogy worked 
out here is not that language was instituted after the Fall, but that God's truth (here 
represented as water) could no longer be given to humanity internally, due to the break 
156 
"corpus suum ministerio Dei subjicit, ut superior sit praedicatio veritatis, et inferior servitus corporis: 
per ipsam tamen corporis servitutem excelsior luceat doctrina, quae per officia corpora/ia, id est per voce m 
et linguam et caeteros corporis motus in bonis operibus insinuatur discentibus." 
157 A similar passage can be found ins. dom. m. Il.x.37. Some authors (Harrison 2000: 66) refer to gn. /itt. 
in this context. This is a strange move, since in this later work, Augustine appears to be even more 
favourable to bodily signs in paradise: "God did not wish the man to live in Paradise without the mysteries 
of spiritual things being presented to him in bodily form (mysteriis rerum spiritualium corpora/iter 
praesentatis). So then in the other trees he was provided with nourishment, in this one with a sacrament- a 
sign" (gn. /itt. VIII.iv.8) 
158 e.g. Brown 1967: 261; Harrison 1992: 59f; Markus 1995: 110; O'Daly 1987: 175; Rist 1994: 37, who 
qualifies: "It seems, however, from book 2 of Christian Teaching, that Augustine later concluded only that 
the diversity of languages presupposes the expulsion from the Garden." (emphasis original) 
159 Contrast the later work, gn. litt. VIII.xviii.37: "Was it inwardly in the mind, directly to his intelligence, 
that is so that he would clearly be aware of the command and understand God's will without any bodily 
sounds or likenesses of bodily things? But I do not somehow think that that is how God spoke to the first 
man." ("Utrum inrus in mente secundum intellectum, id est, ut sapienter intelligeret voluntatem ac 
praeceptum Dei sine ullis corporalibus sonis vel corporalium similitudinibus rerum? Sed non sic existimo 
primo homini locutum Deum. ") 
160 Louth 1989: 154, emphasis original. The view may originate from mus. VI.xiii.41 (quoted above, on 
page 46) which would in fact be the best basis for such an interpretation. 
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made at the fall, and so had to be mediated through the flesh, that is the human and 
physical words of the Bible161 : 
Now God also makes the green of the field, but by raining upon the earth; that is, he makes souls 
become green again by his word. But he waters them from the clouds, that is, from the writings of 
the prophets and apostles .... But before sin God had made the green of the field and food, and we 
said that this expression signified the invisible creature. God watered it by an interior spring, 
speaking to its intellect, so that it did not receive words from the outside, as rain from the 
aforementioned clouds. Rather it was satisfied from its own spring, that is, by the truth flowing 
from its interior. (Gn. adu. Man TI.iv.5) 162 
This impression is further enforced by the working out of the analogy of the 
cloud, which seems to refer not to the verbal nature of the truth, but rather to its fleshly, 
external nature: 
our Lord deigned to assume the cloud of our flesh and poured out most generously the rain of the 
holy gospel. He promised that, if anyone should drink of his water, he will return to that inner 
spring so that he does not seek rain externally. (Gn. adu. Man. II.v.6) 163 
In this way we can see that language as such is not necessarily a post-fall 
phenomenon, but rather that its externality is necessitated by the sin of humanity 164• This 
is perhaps more on account of humanity's turning from God, who is Truth, than turning 
161 So Harrison (2000: 29f). Augustine will later cautiously suggest the contingency of the Bible in doctr. 
chr. I.xxxix.43. He expresses agnosticism concerning whether pre-fall words of God went straight into the 
mind or took bodily form in gn. litt. IX.ii.3f 
162 
"Quia et nunc vi ride agri De us facit, sed pluendo super terram, id est, facit animas revirescere per 
verbum suum; sed de nubibus eas irrigat, id est de Scripturis Prophetarum et Apostolorwn . ... Ante 
peccatum vero, cum viride agri et pabulumfecisset Deus, quo nomine invisibilem creaturam significari 
diximus, irrigabat eamfonte interiore, loquens in intel/ectum ejus: ut non e.\1rinsecus verba exciperet, 
tanquam ex supradictis nubibus pluviam; sedfonte suo, hoc est de intimis suis manante veritate, 
satiaretur." Augustine will later (gn. litt. VIII.xvi.35) argue that God himself taught A dam and Eve to 
speak, just as children are taught by those around them. 
163 
"Dominus noster nubilum carnis nostrae dignatus assume re, imbrem sancti Evangelii /argissimum 
infudit, promittens etiam quod si quis biberit de aqua ejus, rediet ad ilium intimumfontem, utforinsecus 
non quae rat pluviam". Contrast the later gn. litt. VIII.xviii.37: "God spoke to the man in Paradise just as he 
also spoke later on to the fathers, as he did to Abraham, as he did to Moses, that is, in some kind of bodily 
aEpearance. (in aliqua specie corporali)" 
1 4 A similar move can be seen in gn. litt. VIII.27.49f, where God's physical words in the garden (Gen. 3.8) 
are contrasted with his spiritual speech designed "not only for creating but also for enlighting" 
58 
from each other. For it is not communication that is made difficult, but the 
communication specifically of God and his truth. To hold that all things verbal are 
therefore a result of the Fall for Augustine would be a rash move indeed, for "why should 
we have any doubts that God spoke to [Adam in Gen 2.16-17] through some creature of 
that sort, with such vocal signs as he would be able to understand?" (gn. litt. 
VIII.xxvii.50) 165 
11.3: The Trinity 
"You think you're writing words that'lllast for ever? It's not like that. This newspaper stuff ... that's 
words that last for a day. Maybe a week." 
Terry Pratchett, The Truth 
An obvious place for Augustine to locate his theological thought on language is 
the prologue to John's gospel, where the writer speaks of Christ as the Word. Indeed, this 
passage seems to have been of enormous importance to Augustine throughout his 
Christian life, from just before his conversion (Conf VII.9), right through to the late 
stages of his bishopric, when he wrote a series of sermons on the gospel of John (Tractati 
in lohannis Evangelium CXXIV). 
So it is not surprising to find a number of sections of the Augustinian corpus 
considering the similarities between the incarnation and human language: he will want to 
know where the analogy is to be kept, and what would be pushing it too far. There are 
two strands we need to consider: the first, which generally includes earlier sources, drives 
the two apart (designating where the analogy will not hold), and the second, from later 
sources, emphasises the similarities between human and divine words, allowing the 
metaphor to do more work. 
The source we look to for the first is an early discourse on the creed, called De 
Fide et Symbolo, which Augustine addressed to a gathering of bishops at Carthage, while 
serving as a priest in Hippo. The section of note is of course that on Christology, where 
he immediately speaks of Christ as the Word (Verbum), in spite of that designation not 
165 
"cur ambigimus per a/iquam hujusmodi creaturam ei esse locutum Deum, talibus vocum signis quae 
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being mentioned in the creed. He makes three main distinctions between the Word of God 
and human language. 166 
Firstly, human language is temporal, whereas God's word remains forever. This 
distinction not only divides the human and the divine, but also the corporeal and the 
incorporeal, as any inner word produced by an immortal soul could be said to last forever. 
This kind of criticism arose also in cat. rud. ii.3 (cf above, p27). In this work, though, 
words are criticised explicitly for their fleshly nature: "We must not think that the Word 
is like our words, which proceed from our mouths and are passed on by vibrations in the 
air and abide no longer than the sound of them remains. That Word abides 
unchangeable." (j. et. symb. iii.3) 167 
The second criticism is that the word is fundamentally different from its source. 
The mind is incorporeal, but words are corporeal, and therefore the two can not resemble 
each other. Again, we have words criticised for their fleshly nature. "We do not beget 
verbal sounds but make them; and in making them we make use of the body as material. 
Now there is a great difference between mind and body. When God begat the Word, the 
Begetter was "he who is."" (j. et. symb. iii.4) 168 
The final criticism of human language made in this text is that humans fail to 
make adequate signs of themselves. This is not surprising, given the process involved: we 
have to produce something which our listener will be able to use as a causal sign of our 
will (cf the discussion of given and natural signs above on page 35). We are unable to 
communicate, and this comes as a result of the difference between our words and our 
minds. We fail, for "no one has ever expressed himself well enough to be understood by 
everybody on everything" 169 (trin. 1.5). This seems to be a failure on the part of both our 
powers of expression and the listeners' comprehension, though. We intend them to "know 
intelligere posset?" 
166 These are only those found in this work. Matthews (1972b [1967]: 182) for example, notes three 
completely different ones. By far the most common is the temporal nature of human outer words: gn. /itt. 
VI.iii.4, viii.13, VIII.iii.7; lib. arb. II.xxxiv.38; trin. VIII.vi.9 
167 
"Quod tamen Verbum non sicut verba rwstra debemus accipere, quae voce atque ore prolata verberato 
aere transeunt, nee diutius manent quam sonant. Manet enim il/ud Verbum incommutabiliter"- cf. also diu. 
qu. 43; trin. II.9, VII.1 ,4; lo. eu. tr. XXXI1.4 
168 
"Nos quippe non gignimus sonantia verba, sedfacimus; quibusfaciendis materia subjacet corpus. 
Plurimum autem interest inter animum et corpus. De us vero cum Verbum genu it, id quod est ipse genuit" 
169 
"verumtamen nul/us hominum ita locutus est, ut in omnibus ab omnibus intelligeretur" 
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and understand" ("cognoscendum et perspiciendum": f. et symb. iii.4) our own minds, but 
we do not manage to do this, because the signs we give are too obscure; they do not 
portray like with like. For God, though, both situations are accounted for - both the 
speaker's weakness and the listener's incomprehension. 
But God the Father had the will and the power to make himself truly known to those who were 
destined to know him, and to make himself known he begat one who is like himself, and who is 
called the Power and Wisdom of God because God operated through him and arranged all things. 
(/. et. symb. iii.4) 170 
So we can note that in this treatise on the creed, Augustine needs to make a 
number of changes to our conception of words in order to allow the analogy of the Word 
of God to obtain171 . All these "upgrades" can be seen as further difficulties with the 
fleshly nature of words, and contrasting it with the spiritual, the incorporeal. They would 
not be needed were we to imagine a spiritual word, even if it were not divine. 
In contrast to De Fide et Symbolo, a short, but theologically suggestive mention of 
the incarnation in relation to words makes quite a different kind of point in Augustine's 
De Doctrina Christiana: 
When we speak, the word which we hold in our mind becomes a sound in order that what we have 
in our mind may pass through ears of flesh into the listener's mind: this is called speech. Our 
thought, however, is not converted into the same sound, but remains intact in its own home, 
suffering no diminution from its change as it takes on the form of a word in order to make its way 
into the ears. (doctr. chr. I.xiii.I2) 172 
170 
"De us autem Pater, qui verissime se indicare animis cognituris et voluit et potu it, hoc ad se ipsum 
indicandum genu it, quod est ipse qui genuit" 
171 Perhaps the nerves of a new priest lecturing a mass of politician bishops were set on edge by the recent 
condemnation of bishop Photinus of Sirmium (at the synod of Sirrnium, just 42 years previous, in 351), on 
the grounds of an unorthodox likeness between Christ and a word: "if anyone says that the son of God is an 
inner or outer word, let him be anathema" (translation mine: "inner or outer word" refers to Stoic 
categories). I owe this point to Watson 1988:90. 
172 
"Sicuti cum loquimur, ut id quod animo gerimus, in audientis animum per aures carneas illabatur, fit 
sonus verbum quod corde gestamus, et locutio vacatur; nee tamen in eumdem sonum cogitatio nostra 
convertitur, sed apud se manens integra, formam vocis qua se insinuet auribus, sine a/iqua labe suae 
mutationis assumit:" cf. also trin. XV.20 ("omnia quibus signi.ficatur signa praecedit, et gignitur de scientia 
quae manet in animo, quando eadem scientia intus dicitur, sicuti est."); /o. eu. tr. XIV.?; XXIll.8 
61 
In this passage, we see the story that had been told in De Fide et Symbolo put into 
context. For words do indeed turn into fleshly sound, and therefore acquire the qualities 
associated with the flesh as outlined above. But it is explicitly not the wordiness itself that 
is the problem here, but the fleshliness. Augustine is very clear that when the thought 
takes on the form of a word in the mind, there is no downgrading of any sort. So we can 
infer that the mental word is just as incorporeal as the thought itself. The inner word "is 
absolutely the same kind of thing as the knowledge it is born from" 173 (trin. XV.x.l9) 
Words are not such bad things as we had thought when we outlined Augustine's attitude 
to language above: instead, they are useful mental events that are necessary in the process 
of communication, which itself will eventually take place in the fleshly realm, bringing 
all its fragility and weakness. These latter do not appear, however, before the physical act 
of speaking. "The incarnation of transcendence 'in flesh' does not undo its transcendence; 
the signum does not deny the mysterium, but rather points to it." 174 
11.4: Language and Mind 
That was not the point. The point was in his being a gifted creature, and that of all his gifts 
the one that stood out pre-eminently, that carried with it a sense of real presence, was his 
ability to talk, his words - the gift of expression, the bewildering, the illuminating, the 
most exalted and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of light, or the deceitful flow 
from the heart of an impenetrable darkness. 
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness 
In this section I intend to discuss more deeply the possible similarities that could 
be drawn between Augustine's views of language and mind. A great and arduous task, 
since neither aspects of his thought are in any way simple! 
Augustine's thought on language can be broken down into many parts, but for the 
purposes of this argument, I will be elucidating it in terms of memory, understanding and 
will, the concept arrived at in trin. XIV f. Augustine arrives at this framework of the mind 
while trying to describe the trinity adequately, in terms of relations and identity. After 
setting out the parameters given by orthodoxy and logic (trin. I-VI), he takes as his 
173 
"nascatur verbum quod ejusmodi sit omnino, cujusmodi est ilia scientia de qua nascitur." 
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starting point humanity's creation in the image of God (trin. VII). This image is to be put 
to use by the Christian's love of the God known in the person, since no one can love 
someone they do not know in themselves (trin. VIII). He spends much of the rest of the 
book (trin. IX-XV) examining the appropriateness and (more importantly) the inadequacy 
of the various trinities he finds in people. The trinity of memory, understanding and love 
satisfies many of the logical problems, in that each is related to the other, and each can be 
seen as an operation of the other (I will to understand what I remember; I will to 
remember my understanding, etc). This is not, however, some kind of solution to the 
problem of the trinity (although it does provide us with a felicitous account of the mind), 
but rather a challenge to engage with God in order to perfect the image and thus know 
God more. 
My purpose is to show that just as the mind is not taken to be simply an 
independent rational being175, but also a willing and remembering agent, created by God, 
so language is not purely about information (for the distinction between knowledge and 
information, cf above on page 23), as we shall see. 
Here is an example: when I name my memory, understanding, and will, each name refers to a 
single thing, and yet each of these single names is the product of all three; there is not one of these 
three names which my memory and understanding and will have not produced together176 (trin. 
IV.xxi.30) 
11.4.1: Memory 
The memory is indeed a very complicated notion in Augustinian thought. It will 
always be difficult to distinguish his meanings when speaking of it, and I do not intend to 
analyse the concept at this juncture. For now, let us take the idea of memory as a part of 
the mind which is la,tent, as opposed to the activity of the understanding and will. "That is 
174 Smith 2000:78 
175 cf. Williams 1990: 317f 
176 
"Et quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomina, singula quidem nomina 
ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singulafacta sunt; nullum enim horum trium 
nominum est, quod non et memoria et intellectus et voluntas mea simul operata sint:" 
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why we were constantly presenting a trinity in this way, placing in the memory that from 
which the gaze of thought is formed ... " 177 (trin. XIV. vi.8) The understanding and the will 
act upon what they extract from the memory, whereas the latter merely stores them. It is 
actually a good deal more complicated than that, as perception itself is of course more 
complicated, but we may leave it at that for now 178. 
It is important to note that we never witness an act of the memory alone: there will 
always be understanding and will involved in any mental act we might be describing, and 
we will see that the same is true of the equivalent aspect of language. 
So I take the notion of memory in the make up of the mind to be roughly 
equivalent to information or propositions in language. We noted above (1.5: Words 
Alone?) that these never appear on their own -they will always be assented to, always 
apprehended by an understanding subject- yet they exist nonetheless, and we may talk of 
them as long as we remember that we never talk of them on their own. 
In the earlier Soliloquorum libri duo, the memory is understood to contain whole 
propositions. We have already seen that the objects of knowledge in that work seem to be 
verbal in nature: error is not found in things, but in their sense (in sensu: II.iii.3 - quoted 
on page 23); truth is a matter of dialectic (II.xi.21, xv.2i 79 ; dialectic itself being a matter 
of words); and truth resembles falsity in its form of expression (II.xv.29 180). Near the 
beginning of the work, though, he speaks of the objects of knowledge and belief (which 
we now see are verbal in this work) as being contained in the memory: 
For many people speak at length of things they do not know, just as I myself said I desired to know 
all those things for which I prayed .... Indeed, I spoke, not of things which I grasped with my 
intellect, but of the things which I had gathered from many sources and committed to memory, the 
things which I believed as much as I could. (Sol. I.iv.9) 181 
177 
"Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus, ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria 
poneremus;" 
178 For a fuller discussion of memory, cf. O'Daly 1987, ch.S 
179 
"veritatem esse disputandi rationem" 
180 
"Jmitatur ergo ipsa enuntiatione veras sententiasfa/sa sententia." 
181 
"Nam multi copiose dicunt quae nesciunt, ut ego ipse omnia quae oravi, me dixi scire cupere, quod non 
C!lperem si jam scirem: ... sed quae undecumque collecta memoriae mandavi, et quibus accommodavi 
quantam potui fidem: scire aut em aliud est" 
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Here also, we see the memory portrayed as a necessary condition for speech. 
Although he did not know or understand the things of which he spoke, as long as he 
remembered them, he could speak of them. In this way, we find that the "memorial" 
function of language is perhaps the most basic, and the memory is the part of the mind 
most associated with language: 
[Augustine:] consider memory not in its role as the link with familiar situations, but as the 
recorder and compiler of facts without number: ... the invention of so many signs in letters, in 
words, in gesture, in the pronunciation of these, in paintings and carvings. Consider the languages 
of so many peoples, the varied teachings, some new, some renewed. Consider the great number of 
books and similar documents for preserving memory, and all this provision for posterity. 
(an.quant. xxxiii.72) 182 
11.4.2: Understanding 
Once again, we come to a notion which we have already argued is intimately 
involved in the language process (cf 1.5.2: Teaching and Understanding). It was 
maintained above that understanding can not be transferred from a teacher to a student 
(which doesn't exclude the role of a teacher - cf util. cred. xvii.35), but that what is 
understood can (must?) be verbal. 
The role of understanding in ascertaining someone's meaning is already 
established in the Augustinian corpus. If active perception is responsible for witnessing 
the physical qualities of the word (sound and its form), understanding then relates that 
apprehension to its signification. This, of course, will be the obvious assumption if we are 
to adopt the hypothesis above (1.6: Natural Signs) that words are given signs, 
apprehended by the hearer's use of them as natural signs. Naturally the understanding will 
182 
"cogita memoriam non consuetudine inolitarum, sed animadversione atque signis commendatarum ac 
retentarum rerum innumerabilium, ... inventiones tot signorum in litteris, in verbis, in gestu, in cujuscemodi 
sono, in picturis atque figmentis; tot gentium linguas, tot instituta, tot nova, tot instaurata; tantum librorum 
numerum, et cujuscemodi monumentorum ad custodiendam memoriam, tantamque curam posteritatis;" 
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be called upon to make the deductions (if-then) required in that process. The link is made 
more explicitly in texts, though: 
Augustine: Now, since a word is made up of sound and meaning, and the sound refers to the 
hearing, but the meaning to the understanding, does it not seem to you that, just as in some living 
body, the sound of the word is the body and the meaning is, as it were, the soul? (an.quant. 
xxxii.65) 183 
Now clearly, language, in its proper function, was developed not as a means whereby men could 
deceive one another, but as a medium through which a man could communicate his thought 
[understanding; cogitatio] to others. (ench. vii.22)184 
In another manifestation, though, it can be maintained that understanding is an 
altogether more essential part of language, and not simply the part of the mind that 
apprehends meanings. To elucidate this, let us accept as a starting definition that 
understanding is the use of reason (uti/. cred. xi.25 (quoted above, n72); also Lib. arb. 
I.vii.l6) 185 . Reason is not simply the connecting of various facts, as Bumyeat might have 
it (cf above, 1.5.2: Teaching and Understanding), but in general holds a more evaluative 
function: it is by reason that we discern what is good and what is bad. What is worthy of 
praise and what of blame "Do you think it's the same thing to be delighted 186 by sense 
and to appraise by reason?" (mus. Vl.ix.23) 187• 
If it is indeed to the understanding that we attribute a correct estimation and value 
(cf n68 above) of things, then that is also the source of value judgements, and the crucial 
aspects of praise and blame in Augustinian thought. Just as the mind notices something, 
plucking it from the memory, valuing it by understanding, and moves towards it or 
183 
"A. Cum ergo nomen ipsum sono et significatione constet, sonus autem ad aures, significatio ad mentem 
pertineat; nonne arbitraris in nomine, vel ut in aliquo animante, sonum esse corpus, significationem autem 
quasi animam soni ?" cf also A cad. I.v.15; mus. III.viii.19; lib. arb. II.xi.16. Evodius, however, does not 
seem to hold to Augustine's usage: "Evodius: I understand what you say, but not yet, perhaps, what you 
mean."; "lntelligo quid dicas, sed nondumfonasse quid velis." (an.quant. xii.21) 
184 
"Omnis autem qui mentitur, contra id quod animo sentit loquitur volulltate fallendi. Et uti que verba 
propterea sunt instituta, non per quae se homines invicemfallant, sed per quae in alterius quisque notitiam 
cogitationes suas perferat" 
185 It should come as no surprise, then, that reason is also involved in understanding language: ord. Il.xi.32, 
xii.35 
186 delight being the function of the will (lib. arb. III.i.3) and appraisal the understanding. 
187 
"An tibi unum at que idem videtur delectari sensu, et aestimare ratione?" Cf also uera. rei. xxix.53 
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retreats from it through the will, so language describes the world with value pregnant 
words, dictating our own attitudes and actions towards it. 
There are various strings of evidence to demonstrate that language is necessarily 
evaluative for Augustine. The more obvious ones are the examples Augustine tends to 
give in his discussions of true and false propositions. Take the case of his own contrast in 
De Magistro: '"'What if I should say that I had seen a flying man? Do my words then 
make you as certain as if you were to hear that wise men are better than fools?" ... you 
know the latter statement with utter certainty." (mag. xii.40) 188 
So we see that for Augustine, the paradigmatic case of a true statement is a value 
judgement. 189 These are made by reason, through the understanding. So language mirrors 
the mind in having a kind of comprehending element to it. In many places Augustine will 
switch between mental functions and language functions 190, not least when addressing the 
difficulties of God talk: "Now since we ought to think about the Lord our God always, 
and can never think about him as he deserves; since at all times we should be praising 
him and blessing him, and yet no words of ours are capable of expressing him, 
(trin. V.i.l) 
,191 
The place we see evaluative discourse used most often is where Augustine is 
talking theology proper, i.e. God-talk. Here, the kind of informational fact-discourse is 
inadequate, since God will tend to transcend adjectives we attribute to him. In order to 
avoid the silence enjoined by this theological dilemma, though, he makes recourse to the 
mode of praise in a kind of logico-linguistic ascent (which we will treat in more detail 
below, 111.3.2: Causing). 192 "Hence the fact that he is called God: he himself is not truly 
known by the sound of these two syllables, yet when the sound strikes the ear it leads all 
188 
"Quid si me hominem volantem vidisse dicerem, itane te certllm verba mea redderent, quemadmodum si 
audires sapientes homines stultis esse meliores? ... hoc autem certissime scire." For the context of this 
argument, cf 1.5.1: Academic Assent · 
189 This may include moral statements: "Augustine: I also believe you will not deny that we should have a 
zeal for wisdom and will agree that this in fact is true.": "Item credo te non negare studendum esse 
safientiae, atque hoc verum esse concedere." (lib. arb. II.x.28) 
19 for his justification of this, cf trin. XV.I7 
191 
"primum ab ipso Domino Deo nostro, de quo semper cog ita re debemus, et de quo digne cogitare non 
possumus, cui laudando reddenda est omni tempore benediction, et cui enuntiando nulla competit diction" 
192 
cf O'Leary: "[Augustine] breaks open the framework of metaphysical names and evokes God in the 
open-ended "Thou" whom we may name as we will ("Summe, optime, potentissime, omnipotentissime ... ," 
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users of the Latin language to think of a supremely excellent and immortal being." (doctr. 
chr. l.vi.6) 193 
It can also be seen in the De Mendacio that praise and blame seem to be the very 
grounding of moral discourse. Instead of asking what is right and wrong, he asks how we 
should speak about these actions. 
But it is one thing to hold something as praiseworthy in itself, and another thing to think of it thus 
by favourable comparison. For in one way we congratulate a healthy man, and in another when a 
sick man improves. 194 (mend. v.7 (translation mine) cf also 1.1, IX.l5, X.\7, XII.20, XIII.21,24) 
Given the importance in this work of doctrine as related to piety (mend. xix.40), it 
is of no small importance that the forms of praise and blame also repeatedly arise. Indeed, 
knowing what is good is the most important part of knowing any kind of truth for 
Augustine. He not only makes a habit out of prioritising things (which sometimes results 
in increased confusion- mag. ix.25-28- and sometimes in great clarity- mend. xiv.25), 
but also counts good judgement as key knowledge that leads us to God: cf doctr. chr. 
Il.xxxviii.57. So praise appeals to the understanding, but not necessarily to definitive 
knowledge (otherwise it could not be applied to God): 
Thus, it is possible to speak about God, but in the mode of praise, as a non-objectifying, non-
positivistic mode of conceptualization which does not reduce God to a concept, but rather employs 
language in such a way that respects God's transcendence and refers the listener to experience the 
thing itself. 195 
Conf 1.4.4) as long as every name is heard as declaring the surpassing greatness of that "Thou" and does 
not fall back again within the limits of a metaphysical representation." (1985: 196) 
193 
"Nam inde est et quod dicitur Deus. Non enim revera in strepitu istarum duarum sy/labarum ipse 
cognoscitur; sed tamen omnes latinae linguae scios, cum aures eorum sonus iste tetigerit, mover ad 
cogitandam exce/lentissimam quamdam immortalemque naturam." 
194 
"Sed aliud est quod per ipsum laudibile proponitur, aliud quod in deterioris comparatione praeponitur. 
Aliter enim gratulamur cum sanus est homo, aliter cum me/ius habet aegrotus." V.7 
195 Smith 2000: 79 
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11.4.3: Will 
Language resembles the will in a very similar way: firstly, because praise and 
blame seem to be affective language for Augustine. Secondly, because language signifies 
the will just as much as anything else, and most importantly because of the role language 
has in moving people and self196• 
The idea that language is movement of the affections does not come as a major 
surprise when looked at in the context of the doctr. chr. I, where the res-signa (thing-
sign) distinction is immediately overlaid with that of frui-uti (loving by enjoyment or by 
use)197 , and one of the key res is identified as the human agent, choosing what to enjoy 
and what to use (doctr. chr. I.iii.3). In this way, it would seem that the ascent described 
above (on page 66) involves both the will and the word. "Nevertheless, as he emphasizes, 
God 'has accepted the homage of human voices' (DC 1.6.6). But for Augustine, this 
'praising him with human words' is an order of discourse which is more affective than 
cognitive." 198 
So words can be and often are emotional by nature. Again, the surprise of this 
point is lifted slightly by one of the earliest definitions of speaking (a sign of the will), as 
given in the mag. I.2 (quoted above on page 27). In this instance, we not only see the 
confirmation of our thesis (above, on page 35) that words are natural signs given by 
speakers (and therefore both signa naturalia and signa data), but also that the immediate 
thing we are trying to give a sign of is our will. What is more, this is not some early idea 
that was later grown out of by the bishop: ""Know the will of that man," which is not 
available in any way to our sense perceptions, nor even to our intelligence unless certain 
bodily signs of it are given" 199 (trin. X.ix.12) 
In another early work, Augustine remarks that language functions in order to 
move people. Not only do we see the rhetor coming out in this, but it can also be noticed 
196 cf trin. X.i.l: "love commonly results from hearing: thus the spirit is roused by talk of someone's beauty 
to go and see and enjoy it," ("so/ent existere amores ex auditu, dum cujusque pulchritudinis fama ad 
videndum ac fruendum animus accenditur") 
197 Williams 1989 is the seminal work on this aspect of Augustine's theory- see especially p 139. 
198 Smith 2000: 78 (emphasis original) 
199 
"Cognosce voluntatem il/ius lwminis: quae nobis nee ad sentiendum ul/o modo, nee ad inte/ligendum 
praesto est, nisi corporalibus signis editis;" 
69 
that this account tallies with the description we have just given of speaking. If we give a 
sign of something, nothing will happen unless someone is moved to use it as a sign. We 
need the good will of the listener in order to work our language. 200 
Let us now briefly consider the power of words, insofar as the thing is open to investigation. The 
power of the word is that by which we know how much it is worth. Its value is the extent to which 
it is able to move the hearer. It either moves the hearer by itself or by what it means or by both. 
(dial. vii)201 
In a similar fashion, Augustine will later draw on Cicero to argue that the 
functions of language are to inform, delight and to move202 (doctr. chr. IV.xii.27). Speech 
is a type of action, and its form will be determined by the intention behind it. Hence 
language (as a given sign) will only ever occur with the co-operation of the will. Both 
ours and that of our listeners. 
This threefold function of language further demonstrates our contention here. For 
just as he repeatedly forms various trinities in the human (appearance, image, and 
looking; mind, knowledge of itself and love of itself, etc), so there are various trinities of 
language. So Augustine conceptualises a kind of grammar of truth in language through 
these three forms: "For this reason also, in the search for truth, there can be no more than 
three kinds of question: Does a thing exist at all? [memory] Is it this particular thing or 
something else? [understanding] Should it be approved or disapproved? [will]"203 (diu. 
qu. 18) 
In such a way, language does indeed mirror the mind in its various elements, 
which is no surprise, if it is meant to be a sign of what is going on in the mind. More, 
though, it mirrors the three transcendentals: for language has a capacity to communicate 
200 Hence Augustine urges teachers towards love as the best pedagogical tool in de catechizandis rudibus, as 
interpreted brilliantly in Louth (1989) 
201 
"Nunc vim verborum, quantum res patet, breviter consideremus. Vis verbi est, qua cognoscitur quantum 
valeat. Valet autem tantum quantum move re audientem potest. Porro mover audientem aut secundum se aut 
secundum id quod significat aut ex utroque communiter." (Cf n68 above) 
202 
"ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat" 
203 
"ldeoque etiam cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera quaestionum esse non possunt; utrum 
omnino sit, utrum hoc an aliud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit." 
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the true, the good and the beautiful in a more complete way than any other aspect of 
creation. 
11.5: Significant Scriptures 
In this section, I hope to apply much of what has been discovered in the previous 
chapters to one particular locus of theology in Augustine: the interpretation of Scripture, 
as explained in doctr. chr. 11. This particular part of the work has received a great deal of 
attention by scholars in past decades, not least because of the debate concerning the 
concluding section (xix.29-xl.63), describing and evaluating various streams of learning 
available in Augustine's time. The passage tends to be treated as an "excursus"204, 
standing alone with its own structure and topic, nestled between the books on unknown 
signs (doctr. chr. 11) and ambiguous signs (doctr. chr. Ill). 
In order to untangle the interpretation of this text, we will have to put it in its 
context in the plan of the book as a whole, which will involve an examination of 
metaphor, a literary-interpretive technique Augustine makes great use of, as accounted for 
by his own theory, and termed by him "transferred signs". Then the role of knowledge in 
the book will have to be looked at, before we turn to the importance of signs for the 
theory. I hope to demonstrate that with the understanding of signs we have drawn up in 
the above chapters, we do not need to treat this particular section (i.e. doctr. chr. 
II.xix.29-xl.63) as an "excursus" - not that such literary moves are atypical either of 
Augustine or the rhetorical tradition from which he sprung - but as a distinct theme 
falling in line with the real purposes of the book as a whole. That is, the purpose of 
turning our signs to God. 
204 Verheijen 197 4 
71 
11.5.1: Transferred Signs: Non-verbal Continuity 
Transferred signs (signa translata) are often called analogies, metaphors, or 
figurative signs. In the context we are considering them, it is probably easiest to keep to 
the terminology of transferred signs, given his explanation of them shortly before he 
expounds their interpretation: 
[Signs] are metaphorical (translata) when the actual things which we signify by the particular 
words are used to signify something else: when, for example, we say bovem and not only interpret 
these two syllables to mean the animal normally referred to by that name but also understand, by 
that animal, 'worker in the gospel' (doctr. chr. II.x.15)205 
There are a number of points to note from this definition. The first is that the 
transferred meaning is determined by its use (cf above, on page 33), although it is unclear 
whether he is talking here about speaker's intention or reader's interpretation: usually 
these distinctions are determined by the reader for Augustine. The second point that 
stands out is that it is not the word itself that signifies the metaphorical meaning (so 
transferred signs are very different from, for example, ambiguous signs, which are treated 
in book Ill), but the thing which has been signified by the word, which is to say that there 
are effectively two moments of signification, whereby (1) the word is treated as a sign of 
the ox206, and (2) the ox as a sign of the evangelist: "The analogy is not only in verbis but 
also in factis."201 This is why I shall avoid terminology involving "figurative" language, 
even though it is to be found in the text: 
Yet "figurative signs" will prove misleading, if it suggests that associations between words and 
things, rather than associations between things and other things, are at the centre of Augustine's 
205 
"Translata sunt, cum et ipsae res quas propriis verbis significamus, ad aliud aliquid significandum 
usurpantur: sicut dicimus bovem, et per has duas syl/abas intelligimus pocus quod isto nomine appe/lari 
solet; sed rursus per illud pecus intelligimus evangelistam," 
206 This is the literal meaning: cf. gn. litt. VIII.i.l: ut quemadmodum ipse A dam, 
etsi aliquid aliud significat secundum id quod eum formam futuri dixit esse Apostolus, homo tamen in 
natura propria expressus accipitur, qui vixit certo numero annorum, et propagata numerosa prole mortuus 
est, sicut moriuntur caeteri homines 
207 Eco 1984: !51; cf. also Markus 1996 : 8-11; Louth 1983: 118f. Strictly speaking, this should only be 
applied to allegories (trin. XV.ix.15), but in that case we must add that Augustine tends to keep to that 
trope, with few exceptions. He shuns the analogy in verbis (or what is more accurately described as 
allegoria verbi in Louth 1983: 119) in gn. litt. VIII.iv.8, vii.13. 
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attention. As I have already indicated, a verbal sign counts as a signum translatum for Augustine 
when the thing that it signifies itself signifies some further thing. 208 
Whilst Babcock has caught the point about the mechanics of transferred signs, he 
seems to have skipped over the importance of the continuity of signification. It is to be 
noted that no great distinction is made between verbal signification and non-verbal 
signification: these categories do not arise in Augustine's work. For when he writes of the 
two moments of reference, he speaks not of words and then things, but of "two syllables" 
followed by "animal" followed by "worker in the gospel". Two syllables are very 
different from the word itself, as we discovered in De Magistro (the "homo"/wagon 
problem- cf mag. viii.22ff and n15 above). For both Augustine and the Stoics, the words 
we use are primarily physical (cf above, 11.2: Verbum vs Lingua), but their meaning is the 
incorporeal part (cf an.quant. xxxii.65f, quoted above, on page 65). In this way, 
Augustine draws attention to the word as res, just as he calls the ox by its own name, and 
not by its function of signifying. They are both things, caught up in Scriptural 
interpretation. Hence when Augustine gives a summary of signs before dividing them up 
into groups, he moves freely between words and things: 
So when we see a footprint we think that the animal whose footprint it is has passed by; when we 
see smoke we realize that there is fire beneath it; when we hear the voice of an animate being we 
observe its feeling; and when the trumpet sounds soldiers know they must advance ... (doctr. chr. 
II.i.l)2o9 
It is in the context of this discussion of transferred signs, which occur when 
hearers continue the signification process on the signified (here, the ox) to give a further 
layer of reference, that Augustine writes the controversial passage concerning the various 
branches of knowledge. 
208 Babcock 1995: 150 
209 
"sicut vestigio viso, transisse animal cujus vestigium est, cogitamus; etfumo viso, ignem subesse 
cognoscimus; et voce animantis audita, affectionem animi ejus advertimus; et tuba sonante, milites vel 
progredi se" 
11.5.2: World and Text 
"You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the 
times." 
Matthew 16.3 (NRSV) 
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We saw above (1.5: Words Alone?) that signs will always require a certain amount 
of understanding, and therefore knowledge, for their interpretation. If we take it for 
granted that given signs are a subset of natural signs (cf. above, on page 35) then we will 
expect the knowledge necessary to interpretation to be not only linguistic (although that is 
important, cf. doctr. chr. II.xvi.23210), but also that of causes, and the natural order: such 
things as aid us in inductive reasoning. 
We would also expect Augustine to be exhorting us to understand causal 
reasoning and laws of inference, since it was established that natural signs were 
essentially to do with logic and propositions. In this way, he follows both Aristotle and 
the Stoics211 , for whom "Sign theory is linked to the theory of demonstration, and once 
again what interests its authors is the nature of the knowledge to be derived from it."212 
This is exactly what we find in this section: not only does Augustine single out the 
principles of logic by actually teaching them, as opposed to the contents page summary 
received by the other disciplines in doctr. chr. II.xxxi.48-xxxv.53, but he finds their use 
throughout the whole activity of interpretation, rather than just certain instances, as would 
be the case for geography, history, etc. 
It might also be possible to put together an explanatory account of numbers, confined to numbers 
mentioned in the divine scripture .... Whether the same can be done for logic, I do not know. I 
rather think not, because logic permeates the whole body of scripture, rather like a network of 
muscles, (doctr. chr. Il.xxxix.59)213 
210 
"In translatis vera signis si quaforte ignota cogunt haerere lectorem, partim linguarum notitia, partim 
rerum, investiganda sunt." 
211 
and indeed all "Hellenistic reflection about signs and its traces in Roman rhetoric and Christian 
theology", according to Markus (1957 : 78) 
212 Todorov 1982 [ 1977]: 23 
213 
"Pot est etiam de numeris fieri, ut eo rum tantummodo numerorum expos ita ratio conscribatur, quos 
divina Scriptura meminit ... Quod utrum de ratione disputandifieri possit, ignoro: et videtur mihi non 
posse, quia per totum textum Scripturarum colligata est nervorum vice;" 
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In keeping with the sign theory described above, Augustine immediately proceeds 
in our section to areas of knowledge involving a kind of cause and effect relationship, 
which could be accounted for by signification. These areas include medicine, predictions, 
and effects on the mind. 
As we saw above, medicine has always been a semiotic business. Diagnoses are 
formed on the basis of symptoms, which is essentially another word for natural signs (cf 
above, on page 39). Similarly, remedies take the same form - "if you take this pill, you 
will get better." So Augustine goes to great length to distinguish between real signs to be 
used in medical science, and arbitrary signs that are based on superstition: 
For it is one thing to say 'if you drink this plant in powdered form your stomach will stop hurting', 
and another to say, 'if you hang this plant round your neck your stomach will stop hurting'. In the 
one case the health-giving mixture is commendable, in the other the superstitious meaning 
(significatio) is damnable. (doctr. chr. II.xxix.45)214 
Augustine also takes issue with astrologers, who make just as obvious a use of 
signs215 • Here, his main argument is to undermine the logic of the signification. So he 
points out that if the time of birth of a person and their constellations are signs of the life 
of that person, then surely the same signs should give the same reference: so two people 
in the same situation born at the same time with the same constellations should strictly 
speaking lead the same lives, or at least parallel lives, whereas experience suggests that 
this is not the case. Notice he does not judge the choice of object (i.e. stars), nor the 
practise of interpreting the world, but instead the signifying process comes into question: 
"So these ideas too, because they involve signs instituted by human presumption, must be 
classed among those contracts and agreements made with devils." (doctr. chr. 
Il.xxii.34l16 
214 
"Aliud est enim dicere, Tritam istam herbam si biberis, venter non dolebit; et aliud est dicere, /stam 
herbam collo si suspenderis, venter non dolebit. lbi enim probatur contemperatio salubris, hie significatio 
superstitiosa damnatur." 
215 e.g. Plotinus (Enneads 11.3.x) maintains that we cannot attribute causality to the stars, but only 
signification (CTilJ.W.<na.cr). cf. also gn. litt. Il.xiv.29, where Augustine contrasts astrology with the weather 
forecast! 
216 
"Quare istae quoque opiniones quibusdam rerum signis humana praesumptione institutis, ad eadem ilia 
quasi quaedam cum daemonibus pacta et conventa referendae sunt." For signification as prediction, cf. Jo. 
eu. tr. XVI.3 : "prodigium enim appellatum est quasi porrodicium, quod porro dicat, porro significet, et 
aliquid futurum esse portendat" 
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A similar pattern can be observed in his treatment of superstitions (whereby 
certain situations are signs of bad luck, future disaster, etc), for he repeatedly refers to the 
natural meaning of events, rather than the strange invalid deductions of the superstitious. 
So, for example, he quotes Cato as seeing nothing unusual in mice eating his slippers, 
though it would indeed have meant something special if the slippers had been munching 
on mice. "some people are so superstitious that they go as far as striking a dog who comes 
between them, but they do so to their cost, because as a result of this inane remedy the 
dog sometimes sends its assailant straight to a real doctor." (doctr. chr. II.xx.31)217 
One other aspect of cause and effect pointed out in this section is his explanation 
of language. It is in these pages that Augustine writes of the conventional nature of 
language, contrasting the various understandings of certain words by Greeks and Latins. 
His theory of language, though, still very obviously involves a form of natural sign: "All 
these meanings, then, derive their effects on the mind from each individual's agreement 
with a particular convention. As this agreement varies in extent, so do their effects." 
(doctr. chr. Il.xxiv.37)218 
Repeatedly in our section of the text, Augustine contrasts God's order with the 
contingent order. Medicines that work by nature are good, but those that work by some 
superstitious convention (and here anti-nature goes with anti-God, i.e. demonic 
conventions) are bad. Predictions based on causal factors are good, those based on 
hidden, illogical signs are bad. The distinction Augustine makes between established, 
divinely-instituted facts and constituted ones (without doubt related to natural and given 
signs, if not identical to them219) is reminiscent of the distinction between signs and 
simple observation (interpreted above in 1.6.3: Observation, as natural signs) in mag. x.32 
(quoted on page 44). "there are two kinds of learning pursued even in pagan society. One 
consists of things which have been instituted by humans, the other consists of things 
217 
"nam plerumque tam superstitiosi sunt quidam, ut etiam canem qui medius intervenerit, ferire audeallt, 
non impune; namque a vano remedio cito ille interdum percussorem suum ad verum medicum mittit." 
218 
"sicut ergo hae omnes significationes pro suae cujusque societatis consensione animos movent, et quia 
diversa consensio est, diverse movent;" 
219 For their being identical, cf. Babcock (1995: 152f); for there being a distinction, cf En gels (1962), and 
Todorov ( 1982 [ 1977]: 48). For my note on the distinctions, cf above, on page 46 
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already developed, or divinely instituted, which have been observed by them." (doctr. 
chr. Il.xix.29)220 
In this respect, Augustine exhorts the practise of subordinating our instituted order 
to God's order in nature, something we will come back to in the context of transforming 
our language, below in III.3.3: Naming. This program of linguistic reform seems to be in 
Augustine's mind here as well, applying it not only to our words, but also to whole 
institutions, turning their appropriateness to reflect the natural order: 
There are some human institutions which are modelled on natural ones or at any rate similar to 
them. Those which involve an alliance with demons are, as I have said, to be completely rejected 
and abhorred, but those which men practise along with their fellow men are to be adopted, in so far 
as they are not self-indulgent and superfluous. (doctr. chr. II.xxvi.40)221 
Throughout all these considerations, though, Augustine keeps returning to the 
interpretation of scripture. These areas of knowledge are considered as aids to the 
interpretation of things as signs, and hence to understanding transferred signs. Education 
in this work is not a tool for a career, as it had functioned before Augustine's conversion, 
but as a way of finding truth. 
In human life knowledge of [crafts and skills] is to be used sparingly and in passing, and not in 
order to make things - unless a particular task demands it, which is not my concern now - but to 
assist our judgement, so that we are not entirely unaware of what scripture wishes to convey when 
it includes figurative expressions based on these arts. (doctr. chr. II.xxx.47, emphasis mine)222 
So it would seem that all this section concerning various areas of knowledge "is 
inseparably connected to the previous section on the figurative use of ignota signa,"223 
220 
"duo sunt genera doctrinarum, quae in gentilibus etiam moribus exercentur. Unum earum rerum quas 
instifllerunt homines; alterum ea rum quas animadverterunt jam peractas aut divinitus institutas." 
221 
"Adumbrata enim quaedam et naturalibus utcumque similia hominum instituta sunt. Quorum ea quae ad 
societatem, ut dictum est, daemonum pertinent, penitus repudianda sunt et detestanda: ea vera quae 
homines cum hominibus habent, assumenda, in quantum non sunt luxuriosa atque supeiflua;" 
222 
"Harum autem cognitio tenuiter in ipsa humana vita cursimque usurpanda est, non ad operandum, nisi 
forte officium aliquod cogat, de quo nunc non agimus; sed adjudicandum, ne omnino nesciamus quid 
Scriptura velit insinuare, cum de his artibus aliquas figuratas locmiones inserit." 
223 Schaublin 1995:50 
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and the scheme outlined above (II.5.1: Transferred Signs: Non-verbal Continuity). It will 
not be a surprise, then, to see Augustine situating his discussion in the third (devoted to 
Scriptural knowledge) of the seven steps to understanding, mentioned in doctr. chr. 
II.vii.9-ll, which start with fear of the Lord, and seeking God's will in humility (doctr. 
chr. II. vii.9; ix.14), and doing this in exactly the quotation that would otherwise confirm 
the argument that this is an excursus on education: "So it seems to me that the following 
advice is beneficial for young people who are keen and intelligent, who fear God and 
seek a life of true happiness." (doctr. chr. II.xxxix.58)224 
11.5.3: Signs and Ascents 
"Nothing humbles human pride more than inability to understand a language. It's a perfect image of 
spiritual limitation. The cleverest man looks a fool if he can't speak a language properly." ... 
"God wanted us to see how limited we were?" 
"He wanted us to see that goodness is a foreign language." 
Iris Murdoch, A Word Child 
So it becomes clear that signs can not be understood apart from the knowledge of 
the society in which they are used. This is to be expected from the argument concerning 
understanding and reasoning in signification (cf. 1.5: Words Alone?, 1.6: Natural Signs), 
and the arbitrary community contract that drives meaning (cf. below, III.3.3.2: Contracts). 
So it is to be expected that Augustine will treat the understanding of society and the world 
while teaching sign interpretation. To learn language is to learn a civilisation, and 
civilisations must be learnt through language. "Language, the work common to a whole 
civilisation, harbours precious values, truths, in its very structure .... Augustine doubtless 
goes a long way in this direction. "225 
In this way, we can see that the polarisation between seeing this section as a 
hermeneutical handbook and as an assessment of pagan learning is not a necessary one: 
the two perspectives are mutually dependent. The standard view226 is to unite these 
options in remarking that general education is vital for understanding signs, and therefore 
224 
"Quamobrem videtur mihi studiosis et ingeniosis ado/escentibus, et timentibus Deum, beatamque vitam 
zuaerentibus," 
25 Marrou 1938-49:676 (Retractation): La langue, o:uvre commune de toute une civilisation, recele bien 
des valeurs precieuses, des verites, dans sa structure me me .... Sans doute Augustin va tres loin dans cette 
direction. cf. also Markus 1995. 
78 
reading Scripture. This view is indeed well-founded: there are many reasons for believing 
that the interpretation of Scripture is the main reason for writing, whilst general 
knowledge is a corollary to be related to that aim. So "students of the divine scriptures, 
equipped in this way," (doctr. chr. II.xli.62)227 will learn the various disciplines, but only 
insofar as they are relevant to right interpretation. Hence, in the quotation above (on page 
73), the numbers that are to be studied are only the ones that appear in scripture. 
Similarly, in speaking of history, he gives an example of how this study can be applied to 
the interpretation of a transferred sign in a passage in John: 
Ignorance of the consulships in which the Lord was born and died has led many to the erroneous 
idea that the Lord suffered at the age of 46, because it was said by the Jews that their temple 
(which represented the Lord's body) was built in forty-six years .... since the number cannot be 
explained in terms of the Lord's age, it must be explained as an abstruse lesson about the human 
body, (doctr. chr. II.xxviii.42)228 
The text is frustratingly ambiguous, though, since Augustine then goes on to apply 
the study of history to a much less hermeneutical subject, namely the chronology of 
monotheistic teaching, as set out in Ambrose's research: "So as a result of studying the 
chronology it is much easier to believe that the pagans took everything that is good and 
true in their writings from our literature than that the Lord Jesus Christ took his from 
Plato- a quite crazy idea." (doctr. chr. Il.xxviii.43)229 
It does not help resolve the question to find further texts where Augustine speaks 
about the usefulness of his teaching both in the understanding of scripture on the one 
hand and in other Christian projects on the other, for he seems to be tantalisingly neutral 
in his own assessment of the various functions of knowledge: 
226 Harrison 2000: 59; Hill 1991: 23; Verheijen 1974: 19 
227 
"Sed hoc modo instructus divinarum Scripturarum studiosus" 
228 
"et ignorantia consulatus, quo natus est Dominus, et quo pass us est, nonnullos coegit errare, ut putarent 
quadraginta sex annorum aerate passum esse Dominum, quia per tot annos aed!ficatum templum esse 
dictum est a Judaeis, quod imaginem Dominici corporis habebat . ... ut cum referri iste numerus ad aetatem 
Domini non potuerit, ad secretiorem instruction em humani corporis referatur" 
229 
"Ita consideratis temporibusfit multo credibilius istos potius de Litteris nostris habuisse quaecumque 
bona et vera dixerunt, quam de Platonis Dominum Jesum Chr;stum, quod dementissimum est credere." 
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But when [eloquence] is learnt, it has to be used in communicating what has already been 
understood rather than in the actual process of understanding. The rules about syllogisms and 
definitions and classifications, on the other hand, greatly help people to understand, provided that 
they avoid the error of thinking that when they have mastered them they have learnt the actual 
truth about the happy life. (doctr. chr. II.xxvii.55)230 
Similarly, the subjection of pagan knowledge to the bar of scriptural knowledge at 
the end of the book does not solve the interpretive problem of this text: it does not tell us 
that the overview just given was written for the sake of either. Instead, Augustine seems 
to be threading a treatment of pagan knowledge in itself together with a discourse on 
hermeneutics including the usefulness of various themes to that purpose. It is probably as 
a result of seeing this ambiguity that Schaublin writes: 
Thus it becomes clear that the "system of sciences" is a self-contained, extraneous element which 
does not precisely fit the context. If we consider the structure of the whole work, the intended 
function of this discussion within it is clear. However, because of the prearrangement of this 
foreign material, that function is fulfilled only in a limited sense, and not explicitly enough ... 231 
What seems to be unambiguous, however, is that pagan knowledge is indeed 
subordinate to scriptural, and that all these signs have one function only: to point to God, 
whether they be general knowledge or textual (for the latter implies the former232). So 
pride (perhaps to be construed as pointing to oneself?) is condemned in both cases, 
whether one is interpreting scripture (II.xli.62)233 or learning maths (xxxviii.57i34• 
no "Sed haec pars cum discitur, magis ut proferamus ea quae intellecta sunt, quam ut intelligamus, 
adhibenda est. Illa vera conclusionum et definitionum et distributionum, plurimum intellectorem adjuvat: 
tantum absit error, quo videntur homines sibi ipsam beatae vitae veritatem didicisse, cum ista didicerint." 
231 Schaublin 1995: 51f 
232 trin. l.i.2 - It was therefore to purify the human spirit of such falsehoods that holy scripture, adapting 
itself to babes, did not shun any words, proper to any kind of thing whatever, that might nourish our 
understanding and enable it to rise up to the sublimities of divine things ... The divine scriptures then are in 
the habit of making something like children's toys out of things that occur in creation, by which ... to get 
us step by step to seek as best we can the things that are above and forsake the things that are below. 
233 
"Sed hoc modo instructus divinarum Scripturarum studiosus, cum ad eas perscrutandas accede re 
coeperit, illud apostolicum cogitare non cesset: Scientia inflat, charitas aedificat" 
234 
"Quae tamen omnia quisquis ita dilexerit, utjactare se inter imperitos velit" 
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So it would seem that in all areas, the maxim of signification (together with using 
this world - remember that good knowledge is useful knowledge in this book -
Il.xlii.63235) is the overriding theme of the section, whenever Augustine speaks of 
learning about things. "If we were perfected in charity, we should not need Scripture 
(l.xxxix) -just as, if we had known how to 'read' the created order, we should not have 
needed the incarnation (xii)."236 Just as the things. marked out in scripture are valuable for 
their abstract qualities, the snake for its cunning, the hyssop for its medicinal virtues 
(II.xvi.24), so an understanding of logic and categories is not only there for the 
interpretation of scripture, but also to point to God, in the form of an ascent such as we 
have seen scattered throughout the Augustinian corpus (eg. on page 66): 
Some people take such delight in all this that they like to boast among the unlearned instead of 
asking why the things which they simply perceive to be true actually are true, or why things that 
are not only true but also unchangeable ... actually are unchangeable; nor do they, as they come 
from the visible and physical to the human mind and find this too to be changeable ... relate all 
these things to the praise and love of God, realizing that it is from him that all things have their 
existence. (doctr. chr. n.xxxviii.57)237 
So it can be seen that an Augustinian understanding of the transference involved 
in signing and loving will shift our interpretation of book 11 of De Doctrina Christiana 
away from the false distinction between knowledge of scripture and general education, 
into a hierarchy of reality and praise, culminating in God, the supreme thing (res), that 
may be seen to underlie his philosophy of language and interpretation throughout. So it is 
to this hierarchy, and the relatedness of language to reality and desire that we must turn in 
the next chapter. 
235 
''Nam quidquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi invenitur." 
236 Williams 1989: 141 
237 
"Quae tamen omnia quisquis ita dilexerit, ut jactare se inter imperitos vel it, et non potius quaere re unde 
sint vera, quae tantummodo vera esse persenserit; et unde quaedam non solum vera sed etiam 
incommutabilia, quae incommutabilia esse comprehenderit; ac sic a specie corporum usque ad humanam 
mentem perveniens, cum et ipsam mutabilem invenerit, quod nunc docta, nunc indocta sit, constituta tamen 
inter incommutabilem supra se veritatem, et mutabilia infra se caetera, ad unius Dei /audem atque 
dilectionem cuncta conveHere, a quo cuncta esse cognoscit;" 
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11.6: Conclusion 
We began this chapter by vindicating the verbal process of signification against its 
critics who might accuse it of being a result of the fall through looking first at mental 
words (as opposed to physical language) and the description of the incarnation in terms of 
the Word of God. As a result of this discussion, it became clear that words are not bad per 
se, but only fallen insofar as they are realised in the flesh. Words were further seen to be 
integrated with the mind, paralleling the various functions of memory, understanding and 
will. In our consideration of Scripture, we see Augustine approving of those areas of 
knowledge that are turned to God through signification. In this way, neither scriptural 
signs nor pagan doctrines238 are necessarily good or bad of themselves, but are treated 
correctly when they are humbly used - passed through - in order to witness God. 
The clarification of these distinctive characteristics serves to determine and order a proper attitude 
to all temporal reality, to all signa (including Scripture as well as secular culture), which treats 
them as ultimately inconclusive, as pointing beyond themselves, as finding their meaning only in 
God the Trinity.239 
So we can see one final parallel between signs and the mind: just as the point of 
the De Trinitate is that "the image of God in us ... is realised when the three moments of 
our mental agency all have God as their object"240, so the sign processes outlined in the 
closing sections of doctr. chr. 11 are good when they sweep the reader up into an ascent 
from earth to heaven, from knowledge to God241 . "The difficulty in Scripture arises from 
the depth of its signification, and forces us to find a point of stability, or is rather a 
warning that we have yet to find it."242 
It is in this way that words are good, and language is redeemed. For if human 
language was a hopeless case, why would Augustine go to such trouble in writing of it? 
238 or any form of knowledge: cf. use of agricultural knowledge in gn. lift. VIII.viii.16 
239 Harrison 2000: 64 
240 Williams 1990: 319 
241 cf. Harrison (2000: 64), who sees the Christian community as having the res to which Scriptural signa 
p,oint, rather than using the process of signification to seek it. 
42 Louth 1983: 112 
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Yet if it were unproblematic, he would not need to bother. Such is the ambiguity of 
words: not that they are wrong, but that they are usable, not enjoyable. 
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III: A Sign o[Ascents 
In this chapter I will be arguing that there are three kinds of hierarchy underlying 
the first book of Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana, and that they correspond to the 
three distinctions of non-existence/existence, use/enjoyment, and sign/thing. My thesis 
will be that signification works for Augustine's thought as the mechanics of ascent. 
Through signification, we use the world in order to apprehend and enjoy God. So we will 
look first at cosmology, then at desire, before we arrive at the issue of signification and 
naming. 
Ill. 1: Cosmology 
There are a number of exegetical reasons for believing that the notion of God as 
the source of all being underlies a good deal of thought in the doctr. chr. I. Although he 
mentions it explicitly only a handful of times (eg l.ii.2: "what is under consideration at 
this stage is the fact that things exist,"), the framework was almost certainly at the back of 
his mind, not least as he was probably writing the Confessions at about the same time, 
with its emphasis on the puzzle of evil (as solved by the platonists through the notion of 
privatio boni (Conf. VII)) as well as the commentary on the creation account in books XI-
XIII. 
Another fact that catches the eye and gives us pause is that one of Augustine's 
greatest mediaeval commentators, Thomas Aquinas, made heavy use of the doctr. chr. I 
in the context of some of his work on cosmology: namely concerning the notion of the 
goodness of existence, and God as its originator (cf Summa Theologiae la.5.1,4). 
It is a typical Augustinian explanation of the doctrine of creation, so I will 
summarise it briefly. The world is created from nothing (creatio ex nihilo), which means 
that anything that exists derives its whole existence from God, and not from anything 
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else. So it was not crafted out of pre-existent materiae43 • We were not, however, created 
solely out of God's own existence (as, for example, the Son is), for that would not be 
creating, but begetting. We are created out of nothing (hence a difference with the neo-
platonists, for whom the world proceeds from the One- cf Louth (1981: 75ff) on this). 
Hence we owe all our existence to God, but our evil to nothing244. So evil is nothing - it 
is a privation of the good (privatio boni) which is God. 
We exist because he is good, and we are good to the extent that we exist. Moreover, because he is 
also just, we are not evil with impunity; if we are evil, to that extent we exist less. God exists in the 
supreme sense, and the original sense, of the word. (doctr. chr. I.xxxii.35)245 
In this way, goodness is equated with existence. Humans are good, because they 
exist, and are caused to do so by God. In a sense, we exist because God dwells in us, and 
we participate in him. We are good through goodness, which is God246 : "It is God from 
whom all those who love him derive both their existence and love;"247 (doctr. chr. 
l.xxix.30; cf also xxxi.34, xxxiii.37 and viii.8). It is interesting to note, in passing, that 
Augustine includes language in this scheme: 
... the heart of a friend is good with its sweet accord and loving trust, and a just man is good, and 
riches are good because they are easily put to use, and the sky is good with its sun and moon and 
stars, and angels are good with their holy obedience, and speech is good as it pleasantly instructs 
and suitably moves the hearer, and a song is good with its melodious notes and its noble 
sentiments. 248 (trin. VIII. iii.4) 
So the main points to remember for our treatment here are that evil does not exist 
- it is a kind of process acting upon good substance, turning it towards nothing; the world 
243 This is the substance of most Augustinian anti-manichaen polemic in egf et. symb. ii.2f 
244 The best treatment of Augustine on evil I know is Williams (2000) 
245 
"Quia enim bonus est, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Porro autem quia etiamjustus est, non 
impune sum us mali; et in quantum mali sumus, in tantum etiam minus sumus. ll/e enim summe ac primitus 
est" 
246
,0n this cfO'Daly (1991) 
247 
"et a quo habent omnes qui eum diligunt, et quod sunt, et quod eum diligunt;" 
248 
"et bonus animus amici consensionis dulcedine et amorisfide, et bonus vir justus, et bonae divitiae, quia 
facile expediunt, et bonum coelum cum sole et /una et stellis suis, et boni Angeli sancta obedientia, et bona 
locutio suaviter docens et congruenter monens audientem, et bonum carmen canorum numeris et sententiis 
grave." 
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exists only through participation in God, from whom it came; the world is fundamentally 
good; the world is fundamentally not God, and therefore not goodness, and therefore not 
the best thing. It is created, and so is inferior to its cause, though it is essentially good, 
since any defect derives from its disappearance, not any positive substantial faults. 
We will see these insights gained from Augustine's consideration of the church 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo interlocking neatly with the other two systems we are 
examining in the De Doctrina Christiana. So the thing that must be loved, that must be 
enjoyed, is the same thing that is the source of existence. Just as it is the only one that can 
exist in and of itself, so it is the only one that may be loved in and of itself. 
The things (res) which are to be enjoyed, then, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and 
the Trinity that consists of them, which is a kind of single, supreme thing, ... but perhaps the 
Trinity is better called the one God from whom, through whom, and in whom everything is. (doctr. 
chr. I.v.5)249 
In a similar way, the things which signs signify are existent things, and signs 
themselves fall into the category of things only insofar as they exist. "So every sign is 
also a thing, since what is not a thing does not exist."250 (doctr. chr. l.ii.2) 
In this way, we have seen that there is a good case for believing Augustine's 
doctrine of creation to be just below the surface throughout the first book of De Doctrina 
Christiana, and that it complements the other two major themes in the book nicely. 
111.2: Desire 
249 
"Res igitur quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, eademque Trinitas, una quaedam 
summa res, communisque omnibus fruentibus ea; si tamen res et non rerum omnium causa sit, si tamen et 
causa. Non enimfacile nomen quod tantae excellentiae conveniat potest inveniri, nisi quod me/ius ita 
dicitur Trinitas haec, unus De us ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia" 
250 
"Quamobrem omne signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est" 
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If the notion of existence is vital to the doctr. chr. I, that of love is perhaps even 
more important. It takes no exegetical wizardry to show that the fundamental distinction 
he makes here is between things that are to be enjoyed lfrui) and those that are to be used 
(uti). 
111.2.1: Definitions 
''There's something fishy about describing people's feelings," said Hugo. "All these 
descriptions are so dramatic." 
"What's wrong with that?" I said. 
"Only," said Hugo, "that it means that things are falsified from the start." 
Iris Murdoch, Under the Net 
Augustine employs these two verbs to break down the crucial idea of love that 
drives his interpretation of the Bible. For him, love can take one of two forms - to 
lovingly use something for the sake of some greater good, or to lovingly enjoy something 
on account of what it is. "If he neither enjoys nor uses us, then I fail to see how he can 
love us at all"251 (doctr. chr. l.xxxi.34). The distinction is introduced firstly as a division 
of things, rather than of actions, though: 
There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose 
function is both to enjoy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy; those which are 
to be used assist us and give us a boost, so to speak, as we press on towards our happiness, so that 
we may reach and hold fast to the things which make us happy. (doctr. chr. I.iii.3)252 
However, although the distinction is an ontological one, the way we treat these 
things is not. The main source of sin in this book is an improper approach to reality, 
implicitly because we do not apprehend things as they are, in these two categories. 
And we, placed as we are among things of both kinds, both enjoy and use them; but if we choose 
to enjoy things that are to be used, our advance is impeded and sometimes even diverted, and we 
251 
"Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quemadmodum diligat." For a good summary of 
previous scholarship on these terms, cf. O'Donovan 1982: 361-5 
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are held back, or even put off, from attaining things which are to be enjoyed, because we are 
hamstrung by our love of lower things. (doctr. chr. l.iii. 3)253 
Strictly speaking though, as we saw in the previous section (III.l: Cosmology), 
the only thing to be enjoyed is God, and the world is to be used exclusively for the sake of 
attaining God?54 "So in this mortal life we are like travellers away from our Lord: if we 
wish to return to the homeland where we can be happy we must use this world, not enjoy 
it" (doctr. chr. l.iv.4i55 
So God is the only true thing. Similarly, there is no real notion of hatred in the 
doctr. chr. 1256 • There are things to be enjoyed, and things to be used, but no things should 
be hated. Even where things are there to be used but not loved, they tend not to be 
elements of creation, but rather processes (like all things we can call "evil" in that 
respecti57 : "It is not the case that all things which are to be used are to be loved: ... The 
martyrs, certainly, did not love the wickedness of those who persecuted them, but used it 
to win their way to God." (doctr. chr. I.xxiii.22l58 
111.2.2: Love and Things 
252 
"Res ergo a/iae sunt quibusfruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quaefruuntur et utuntur. Illae 
quibusfruendum est, beatos nosfaciunt. lstis quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adjuvamur, et 
quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beat os faciunt, pervenire, atque his inhaerere possimus." 
253 
"Nos vero qui fruimur et utimur, inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, 
impeditur curs us noster, et aliquando etiam dejlectitur, ut ab his re bus quibus fruendum est obtinendis vel 
retardemur, vel etiam revocemur, inferiorum amore prae pediti." 
254 Although cf doctr. chr. I.xxii.20, where enjoyment is merely restricted to "the eternal and unchangeable 
things which I mentioned" (having just spoken about the soul, although he could be making reference to 
earlier talk of God as the one to be enjoyed). This ambiguity may reach back to Cicero's adaptation of the 
one good of the Stoics in terms of many virtues (honestum) in the De Officiis (cf. Colish 1985a: 145) 
255 
"sic in hujus mortalitatis vita peregrinantes a Domino, si redire in patriam volumus, ubi beati esse 
possimus, utendum est hoc mundo, nonfruendum;" 
256 In actual fact he does talk of hate existing as a kind of self love, where we act irrationally to our own 
detriment- cf I.xxiii.23- "talis aut em sui dilectio me/ius odium vacatur" 
257 
contrast O'Donovan 1983: 387, who holds that we do not love temporal things in general, despite the 
fact that Augustine's explicit exception was only given to things not in relation to us (doctr. chr. I.xxiii.22), 
while endorsing love of our bodies. Unrelated things are curiously excluded from the category of temporal 
things in general for O'Donovan. 
258 
"Non autem omnia quibus utendum est, diligenda sunt, ... Nam utique martyres non dilexerunt see/us 
persequentium se, quo tamen usi sunt ad promerendum Deum." 
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Although God is the only thing par excellence, he seems to have been generous 
with that quality, and so Augustine calls others res at various points in the book. And 
similarly the distinction of usables vs. enjoyables is not as hard and fast as it first looked 
either. It is possible that the love hierarchy is beginning to look more and more like that 
of existence. "Augustine lays the dichotomy between uti and frui over the division 
between creator and the created. The created is never anything other than means to be 
used. The creator is the only end to be enjoyed."259 
First of all, Augustine holds that humans can be termed as things. Our thing-ness 
derives from God, and is especially attributed to humans on account of the imago dei, 
which implies that it is also applicable to other creatures, but to a lesser extent. In the 
context of considering whether we should enjoy humans or not, he writes: 
We ourselves who enjoy and use other things are things. A human being is a major kind of thing, 
being made 'in the image and likeness of God' not by virtue of having a mortal body but by virtue 
of having a rational soul and thus a higher status than animals. (doctr. chr. I.xxii.20)260 
In this way, although he goes on to note that humans are themselves to be used on 
account of God, and not to be enjoyed on their own, there later appears a way in which 
we do actually enjoy humans: a way which opens up a key to the whole system. "This 
reward is the supreme reward - that we may thoroughly enjoy him and that all of us who 
enjoy him may enjoy one another in him." (doctr. chr. l.xxxii.35)261 
It is perhaps important to note that this latter quotation follows immediately on the 
cosmological considerations we referred to above (III.l: Cosmology), where Augustine 
notes that our goodness and existence derives from God's. He goes on to write that we 
can enjoy God insofar as we find him in other people. And this notion can approximate to 
what he means when he speaks of using people with love. 
259 Eriksen 2000: 223. "Augustin legger tvedelingen mellom uti ogfrui oppa skillet me/lom skaperen og det 
skapte. Det skapte er a/dri annet enn midler som skal brukes. Det skapte er det eneste formal som skal 
nytes." 
260 
"Nos itaque qui fruimur et utimur aliis re bus, res aliquae sumus. Magna enim quaedam res est homo, 
factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, non in quantum mortali corpore includitur, sed in quantum 
bestias rationa/is animae honore praecedit." 
261 
"Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur, et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso 
perfruamur." 
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When you enjoy a human being in God, you are enjoying God rather than that human being. For 
you enjoy the one by whom you are made happy, and you will one day rejoice that you have 
attained the one in whom you now set your hope of attaining him. (doctr. chr. I.xxxiii.37)262 
The parallel with the system of goodness and existence should be obvious: just as 
we are good and existent because of God's presence in us, so we can be enjoyed insofar 
as God is in us - and then it is God who is being enjoyed, and not us. The loving agent, 
then, has to discern when they are enjoying the good (the divine) in someone and when 
they are sinfully enjoying the bad in someone. "we too desire to enjoy [God]; and the 
more we enjoy him in this life, whether 'in a mirror' or 'obscurely', the easier it is for us 
to endure our absence and the stronger our yearning to end it." (doctr. chr. l.xxx.31 )263 
The neo-platonic elements thus emerge. Augustine's schema is similar to neo-
platonic emanation in that all our existence derives from God, and loving the world, we 
start our contemplative ascent towards the One. The echoes of Plotinus and Origen are 
sometimes quite striking, not least in the suggestion that our own existence depends on 
our enjoying God, lest we fall into nothing: 
For this reason such a mind [that loves injustice] becomes weak and is tormented because of its 
mortal body, for it is inevitable that it should love the body and be weighed down by the body's 
corruption. A body's immortality and immunity from corruption derives from health of mind, and 
health of mind means resolutely holding fast to something better, namely the unchangeable God. 
(de doctrina christiana I.xxiii.23/64 
On the other hand, the God-world distinction is made by the possibility of sin in 
loving what is substantially not God. Augustine's idea of using those things which are 
created reality is made necessary by the ontological divide between humanity and God 
262 
"Cum autem homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris. Ilia enim frueris quo efficeris 
beatus; et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias." 
263 
"quo et nosfrui desideramus: et quanta in hac vitafruimur vel per speculum vel in aenigmate, tanto 
nostram peregrinationem et tolerabilius :mstinemus, et ardentius fin ire cupimus." 
264 
"et ideo fit infirmus animus, et de mortali corpore cruciatur. Necesse est enim ut illud diligat, et ejus 
corruptione praegravetur. lmmortalitas enim et incorruptio corporis de sanitate animi existit; sanitas 
autem animi est firmissime inhaerere potiori, hoc est incommutabili Deo." 
90 
implicit in the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. For Plotinus, all the world is of the 
same substance as the One - there is no substantial distinction between created reality and 
begotten reality, since the world simply emanates from the One- and so no distinction is 
needed between enjoyment and use. Everything can be enjoyed - we just enjoy the One 
more than we enjoy things that have emanated from it. 
But in the terms outlined in the doctr. chr. I, not only do we identify the world as 
created, but also as good. Although there are various levels of existence in creation, they 
complement one another such that the whole is good. Similarly, when we use and enjoy 
the world correctly, we derive goodness from things that are not necessarily as good as 
we ourselves are. 
if we wish to return to the homeland where we can be happy we must use this world, not enjoy it, 
in order to discern 'the invisible attributes of God, which are understood through what has been 
made' or, in other words, to derive eternal and spiritual value from corporeal and temporal things. 
(doctr. chr. l.iv.4, emphasis mine) 265 
So we have seen that the order of love reflects the order of reality?66 Things to be 
enjoyed in themselves are equivalent to the thing that exists of itself, namely God. Things 
that derive their existence from God are to be used. God, however, is present to be 
enjoyed in creation, and so we may enjoy him through things that exist by him, for him 
and through him. In such cases, we may say (in a kind of transferred sense - doctr. chr. 
l.xxxviii.37267) that we enjoy someone in the Lord. "So in fact, whether we notice it or 
not- and we seldom do - God, who is truth, and God, who is goodness, is the category in 
terms of which we know anything, and the category or value in terms of which we love 
anything."268 
265 
"si redire in patriam volumus, ubi beati esse possimus, utendum est hoc mundo, nonfruendum; ut 
invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciantur, hoc est, ut de corporalibus temporalibusque 
re bus aeterna et spiritualia capiamus." 
266 The linking of ethics and physics is a Stoic habit: cf Colish 1985a: 36; 1985b: 159 
267 O'Donovan 1982: 389f seems to miss the significance of the ontological (and semantic) scheme in doctr. 
chr. I, and so considers Augustine to be speaking "loosely" here, whereas it seems to me that this 
qualification is a rigid reflection of his doctrine of creation. 
268 Hill 1991: 24f 
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111.2.3: Enjoying eschatology 
This all seems quite simple: the world is divided up into two groups of things, and 
so long as we manage to see that division fairly clearly, we should have our love ordered 
appropriately and be sure to avoid sin. There are, however, some serious problems to be 
encountered. Our sinful habits prevent us from working the system, so that we mistake 
our hopes for the reality, making the continuous life of journeying a most difficult 
achievement. 
Seasoned Augustine scholars could easily predict what Augustine would go on to 
say once he has settled down into the Plotinian metaphor of the journey: the road is not 
straight, nor clear. In addition, it is a journey of desire, which is not something we tend to 
be very much in control of. It is not just a case of hating one thing and loving another, but 
of preferring one thing to another (doctr. chr. I.xxiv.24). As a result, we are consistently 
weighed down by our former ways of life - the way we lived and loved, chose and 
bought, talked and taught. "We are on a road- in spiritual (affectuum), not spatial terms-
and one blocked as it were by thorny hedgerows, which flourish through the evil 
influences of our earlier sins,"(doctr. chr. I.xviii.17)269 
In a similar vein, it appears that we will never enjoy God in an unmediated way, 
which creates problems- if we only ever get to witness God in and through creation (and 
admittedly revelation), how are we to know what is God and what is bad? The present 
world is only provisional in that sense: "For if something is to be loved on its own 
account, it is made to constitute the happy life, even if it is not as yet the reality but the 
hope of it which consoles us at this time." (doctr. chr. l.xxii.20)270 
So in spite of the fact that we are meant to love God and enjoy him, we are not 
able to do so yet, and must be comforted by hope. Not that we should be satisfied by 
hope, but should continuously strive to apprehend the divine through the world. So long 
269 
"Porro quoniam in via sumus, nee via ista locorum est, sed affectuum, quam intercludebat, quasi septa 
quaedam spinosa, praeteritorum malitia peccatorum" 
270 
"Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur vita beata; cujus etiamsi nondum res, tamen 
spes ejus nos hoc tempore consolatur." 
92 
as we are satisfied with hope, we have stopped, in a sense, which is the essence of 
enjoyment: to "go no further". 271 
But if you hold fast [to something] and go no further, making it the goal of your joy, then you 
should be described as enjoying it in the true and literal sense of the word. This is to be done only 
in the case of the Trinity, the supreme and unchangeable good. (doctr. chr. I.xxxiii.37)272 
Not even hope should be enjoyed, but only God. In this way, we should be forever 
in movement in this world, which may only be used. It is perhaps for this reason that 
Augustine gives brilliant expression in this book to the idea that begins the work he was 
composing concurrently (the Confessions): the unquiet mind. 
Nothing must detain us on our way, since not even the Lord, at least in his graciously chosen role 
of being our way, wanted to detain us; rather he wanted us to pass on, not sticking feebly to 
temporal things - even though they were accepted and endured by him for our salvation - but 
hastening eagerly through them so that we may achieve progress and success in our journey to the 
one who has freed our nature from temporal things and set it at the Father's right hand. (doctr. chr. 
I.xxxiv.38)273 
So we must use the world, passing through it in order to attain to God. This is the 
chief role of the use/enjoy distinction: to cultivate a mind that seeks God in everything. 
Such also is the role of the sign/thing distinction to which we must now turn, and which 
could also be described in terms of passing through the world in order to attain to God. 
We use the significant realm of signs in order to arrive at what is truly res, what really 
exists, and to which all signs ultimately point. 
271 The most common imagery Augustine associates with this notion is a journey to the homeland: cf doctr. 
chr. I.iv.4; trin. XI.vi.IO 
272 
"Si vera inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui 
dicendus es: quod non faciendum est nisi in ilia Trinitate, id est summa et incommutabili bono." 
273 
"Ex quo intelligitur quam nulla res in via tenere nos de beat, quando nee ipse Dominus, in quantum via 
nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos voluerit, sed transire; ne rebus temporalibus, quamvis ab ilia pro salute 
nostra susceptis et gestis, haereamus infirmiter, sed per eas potius curramus alacriter, ut ad eum ipsum, qui 
nostram naturam a temporalibus liberavit, et collocavit ad dexteram Patris, provehi atque pervehi 
mereamur." For a relationship of the unquiet soul to semiotic activity, cf Williams 1989, and Markus 1995: 
113f 
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It is when he cancels all sovereignty and all authority and power that the Son will reveal the 
Father, that is, when there is no more need for the regime of symbols administered by the angelic 
sovereignties and authorities and powers .... Until that happens, we see now through a glass in a 
puzzle, that is in symbols, but then it shall be face to face (trin I.viii.16, emphasis Hill's)274 
111.3: Signs 
'I'm not going after all,' he said with a frown. 'I've changed my mind. Do you know the 
meaning of a sign?' 
'A sign?' she repeated. 
'The world is full of signs. Everything is a sign. They need to be interpreted. You were 
due to go, you got tight, and you didn't go: why didn't you go? It was because you 
oughtn't to have gone. It's a sign: you had a job to do here.' 
Sartre, The Reprieve (tr. Eric Sutton) 
In this section I will argue that Augustine's theory of signs in the doctr. chr. I 
works as a kind of ascent, in much the same way as the theory of love. "It is not a matter 
of chance that the context of the usus-fruitio distinction is to be a discussion of 
semantics,"275 This in itself is unremarkable, given the correspondence of res as the end 
of both systems276. The technicalities will need to be teased out, though. Signs can be 
used as an ascent through causation, in much the same way as the Thomist cosmological 
way of knowing God involves causation. The world is a signum naturalium of God - if 
the world, then God. We will also need to look at the role of names in this inductive 
ascent, which will in its turn be explained in the role of praise and blame in both 
community and language. "It follows that the only thing that is not a sign (because it is 
the object of enjoyment par excellence) is God."277 
274 
"Tunc revelabitur a Filio Pater, cum evacuaverit ornnem principatum et omnem potestatem et 
virtu tern; id est, ut necessaria non sit dispensatio similitudinum per angelicos principatus et potestates et 
virtutes . ... Quod ante quam fiat, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, hoc est in similitudinibus; 
tunc autem, facie ad faciem." 
275 O'Donovan 1982: 384 
276 Cf. Also the theme of use-enjoyment in the context of word production in trin. IX. viii. 13 
277 Todorov 1982 [1977]: 41, emphasis original 
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111.3.1: Signifying 
As we saw, the hierarchy of love does not help us unless we understand and 
evaluate what is to be used, and what to be enjoyed. We need to be able to discern the 
God in things so that we can enjoy them in him, but also the createdness in them, so that 
we can use it to enjoy him. Without this element of discernment, the theory of love is 
more of a descriptive observation than a prescriptive exhortation. It is a banal point that 
we love everything in different amounts: 
Some say that they would prefer not to have a body at all, but they are mistaken. For what they 
hate is not their body, but its imperfections and its dead weight. ... But it should not be said that 
someone does not value his body's health and safety just because he values something else more 
highly. A miser buys himself bread in spite of the fact that he loves money; in doing so he gives 
away the money which he loves so much and wants to have more of, but he does this because he 
puts a greater value on the health of his body. (doctr. chr. I.xxiv.24, xxv.26)278 
So it is clear that we need to understand the world in order to use it correctly. In 
fact, in some places it almost seems as if the element of understanding is the redemptive 
part- we understand the fallen world aright in order that it may lead us to God (cf doctr. 
chr. l.iv.4, quoted above on page 90). Correct recognition is vital. We must know the 
world for what it is in order to discern what kind of thing it is - whether it should be used 
or enjoyed: 
But since human beings, assimilated as they were to this world because of their desire to enjoy the 
created order instead of its actual creator ... did not recognize it, the evangelist said, "and the 
world did not recognize it". So "in the wisdom of God the world was incapable of recognizing God 
through wisdom". (doctr. chr. I.xii.ll)279 
278 
"Et quod nonnulli dicunt, malle se omnino esse sine corpore, omnino falluntur: non enim corpus suum, 
sed corruptiones ejus et pondus ode runt . ... Et quod no1111ulli dicunt, malle se omnino esse sine corpore, 
omninofalluntur: non enim corpus suum, sed corruptiones ejus et pondus oderullt." 
279 
"Sed quoniam cupiditatefruendi pro ipso Creatore creatura, homines configurati huic mundo, et mundi 
nomine congruentissime vocati, non eam cognoverunt, propterea dixit Evangelista: Et mundus eum non 
cognovit. ltaque in Sapientia Dei non poterat mundus per Sapientiam cognosce re Deum." 
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As we noted above (1.6.1: Intention), we recognise things through signs280• For 
example, low head, dark fur, and night prowling are all signs of the hyena. In this sense, 
we use signs in order to decide what should be loved and in what way. 
It is interesting to note what it is we do to signs. We use them.281 If the world is to 
be used, it is perhaps no accident that it is in good company with signs. In fact, it is 
exactly this that designates things as signs -that they are used as such282 . Similarly, the 
world is defined by what we do with it. Use/enjoyment, we saw (above, III.2.1: 
Definitions), is primarily a cosmological distinction. So when we use signs, we are 
making a cosmological distinction in the world: signs are what should be used: 
What I now call things in the strict sense are things such as logs, stones, sheep, and so on, which 
are not employed to signify something ... There are other signs whose whole function (usus) 
consists in signifying. Words, for example: nobody uses (utitur) words except in order to signify 
something. From this it may be understood what I mean by signs: those things which are employed 
to signify something. (doctr. chr. I.ii.2)283 
So signs are not things in and of themselves: they are functions of things284• In this 
way, anything can be a sign, if it is used as such285 . So we can see how our approach to 
the world can be characterised by an attitude of either signification or merely perception. 
When we just perceive something, we accept it as it is, and "go no further". If we use it as 
280 uti/. cred. xiii.28; /o. eu. tr. XXV .11 
281 doctr. chr. Il.ii.2: "Hae namque ita res sunt, ut aliarum etiam signa sint rerum. Sunt autem alia signa 
quorum omnis usus in significando est, sicuti sunt verba. Nemo enim utitur verbis, nisi aliquid significandi 
gratia." Ill. vii.11: "Si ergo signum utiliter institutum pro ipsa re se qui, cui significandae institutum est, 
carnalis est servitus; quanta magis inutilium rerum signa instituta pro re bus accipere ?" III.viii.12: 
"Quamobrem christiana libertas eos quos invenit sub signis utilibus," ; mag. ix.26 (on words): "vides 
profecto quanta verba minoris habenda sint, quam id propter quod utimur verbis; cum ipse usus verborum 
jam sit verbis anteponendus: verba enim sunt ut his utamur; utimur autem his ad docendum." (latter quote 
~ointed out in O'Donovan 1982: 377) 
82 so also de Saussure 1960 [1916]: 118 
283 
"Proprie autem nunc res appellavi, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, sic uti est lignum, 
lapis, pecus, at que hujusmodi caetera . ... Sunt autem alia signa quorum omnis usus in significando est, 
sicuti sunt verba. Nemo enim utitur verbis, nisi aliquid significandi gratia. Ex quo intelligitur quid appellem 
signa; res eas videlicet quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur." 
284 
so also de Saussure 1960 [1916]: 122- "language is a form and not a substance" (emphasis original) 
285 The use can also be part of the drama and symbolic action of Scripture: trin. 11. vi. II -"it was by reason 
of some dramatic action that [the rock] symbolized Christ and was called by his name; ... All these things 
existed and were given significance by certain symbolic actions." (Ilia enim petrajam erat in creatura, et 
per action is modum nuncupata est nomine Christi quem significabat; sicut lapis ille, quem Jacob positum 
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a sign, the world as we know it becomes a kind of unstable system of signs that ultimately 
point to God. 
But just as if we were to look at beautiful letters somewhere, it would not be enough for us to 
praise the writer's hand because he made the letters uniform, even, and elegant, if we were not also 
to read what he made known to us through them, so he who only looks at this deed is delighted by 
the deed's beauty so that he admires the artist; but he who understands also reads, so to speak. (lo. 
eu. tr. XXIV.2)286 
It is perhaps for this reason - i.e. that the world should be treated as a sign, passed 
through in order to get to God287 - that Augustine describes the world as proclaiming to 
him who God is, once he uses his reason to ask and be answered, in the Confessions X.6. 
I spoke to all the things that are about me, all that can be admitted by the door of the senses and I 
said, "Since you are not my God, tell me about him. Tell me something of my God." Clear and 
loud they answered, "God is he who made us." I asked these questions simply by gazing at these 
things, and their beauty was all the answer they gave. 288 
111.3.2: Causing 
The question is: is there an unanswered question about the existence of the world? Can we be 
puzzled by the existence of the world instead of nothing? I can be and am; and this is to be puzzled 
about God. 
Herbert McCabe, God Matters 
It is relatively clear how we can take the world to be one big sign system. That 
aspect of Augustine's thought should not be particularly new to anyone - oracles of the 
time would interpret anything and everything as an omen, and it may be presumed that 
ad caput etiam unctione, ad significandum Dominum assumpsit; sicut /saac Christus erat, cum ad se 
immolandum ligna portabat. Accessit istis actio quae dam significativa jam existentibus:) 
286 
"Sed quemadmodum si litteras pu/chras alicubi inspiceremus, non nobis sufficeret /audare scriptoris 
articulum, quoniam eas pari/es, aequales decorasquefecit, nisi etiam legeremus quid nobis per illas 
indicaverit: ita factum hoc qui tantum inspicit, delectatur pulchritudine facti ut admiretur artifice m; qui 
autem intelligit, quasi legit." 
287 A move also made by Markus 1996: 26-29. Williams 1989: 141 sees the incarnation as revealing that the 
world is signum, and not res. 
288 Cf also s. dam. m. II.iii.l2; trin. IV.xix.25 
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such a practise could be construed as treating the world as a sign. So Todorov comments 
on late antique mantics: 
As a first step toward a semiotic conception, let us consider the sheer variety of substances that 
could become the starting point for interpretation: from water to fire, from the flight of birds to 
animal entrails, everything seems capable of becoming a sign and thus of giving rise to 
interpretation. 289 
It is altogether more difficult, however, to see that the world is a sign directed ultimately 
at God. In order to tease out this idea we will have to first return to the theory of natural 
signs, then look at the kind of ascent Augustine describes in the doctr. chr. I, before 
finally explaining this sign theory in terms of conversio. 
So natural signs, as interpreted above (1.6: Natural Signs) may not be as trivial a 
category to Augustinian thought as is sometimes assumed290• Indeed, it has now been 
argued there that they are the foundation of given signs, and stand as a basis for his theory 
of knowledge and understanding. The natural sign is a result of an observant onlooker 
going beyond what is immediately obvious in order to discern other information and 
phenomena the situation is, as it were, hiding. We saw that the form of a natural sign is an 
if-then proposition. Augustine's example is the observation of smoke, resulting in the 
assumption that there is fire (doctr. chr. Il.ii.2). 
While for Augustine some words functioned as signs both of things and of meanings held in the 
mind, he nevertheless made the distinction between the meanings of words and the meanings of 
things for which words stand. The former has to do with the definitional meanings in terms of 
common usage. The latter has to do with things in terms of their causes, purposes, explanations, 
and what these things as the vestiges of God's creative and providential care signify.291 
In this way, we ascertain causes of things through their results. The smoke was 
caused by fire, but we do not see the fire: we merely infer the existence of fire from the 
289 Todorov 1982 [ 1977]: 31 
290 
eg Markus (1957: 89), for whom Augustine only uses signa naturalia in the De Doctrina Christiana "to 
distinguish it from the second type, which he calls signa data." 
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existence of smoke. The natural sign introduces a relation between what we see and what 
we do not see. And what we do not see comes before our mind as a result of this relation. 
Our mind does not stop at the obvious and immediate, but can be said to observe it for the 
sake of the hidden cause. 
that is why, when the psalmist mentions fire, hail, snow and ice and the stonny winds, he adds, 
which carry out his word, in case anyone should imagine that they exist purely by chance, or as a 
result only of physical causes, or even spiritual ones, but without reference to God's wi11292 (trin. 
III.ix.l9) 
The similarities between natural signs and love should not be missed. With a 
natural sign, agents relate the thing immediately before their senses to an unseen thing 
that they then apprehend. In love, the agent related the thing close to them (proximum, 
neighbour- cf doctr. chr. I.xxviii.29) to the unseen thing that they then enjoy. 
So a person who loves his neighbour properly should, in concert with him, aim to love God with 
all his heart, all his soul, and all his mind. In this way, loving him as he would himself, he relates 
his love of himself and his neighbour entirely to the love of God, which allows not the slightest 
trickle to flow away from it and thereby diminish it. (doctr. chr. I.xxii.2li93 
So natural signs work in a parallel to loving use in Augustine's thought. They both 
involve a crucial relation. This common relation can be epitomised by the Latin word 
"propter"?94 For in just the same way as a word can stand "for" (propter) a thing295, so 
when using things in the world, we love them "for" (propter) God?96 This relation itself 
291 Ayer 1979: 72 
292 
"unde et in Psalmo, cum quaedam hujus generis essent commemorata, Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, 
spiritus tempestatis; ne quis ea velfortuitu, vel causis tantummodo corporalibus, vel etiam spiritualibus, 
tamen praeter voluntatem Dei existentibus agi crederet, continua subjecit, Quae faciunt verbum ejus" 
293 
"Quisquis ergo recte proximum diligit, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota 
mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tanquam seipsum, totam dilectionem sui et il/ius refert in il/am 
dilectionem Dei, quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cujus derivatione minuatur." 
294 In the notes on propter 1 follow O'Donovan 1982: 377-382 
295 cf mag. ix.25: "[Aug:] Quidquid enim propter aliud est, vi/ius sit necesse est quam id propter quod est; 
nisi tu aliud existimas. Ad. Videtur mihi non temere hie esse assentiendum: nam cum dicimus, Coenum, 
longe hoc nomen arbitror rei quam significat antecel/ere." 
296 doctr. chr. I.i.l: "Qui bus explicatis docetur totius Scripturae sacrae plenitudinem et finem esse geminam 
charitatem, Dei propter seipsum, ac proximi propter Dewn." I.iv.4: "Frui enim est amore a/icui rei 
inhaerere propter seipsam," et passim 
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implies both causation and priority simultaneously. For causes are always superior to 
their effects for Augustine: "They seek to know the causes of the will of God though the 
will of God is itself the cause of all that exists. For if the will of God has a cause, there is 
something that surpasses the will of God- and this we may not believe." (Gn. adu. Man. 
l.ii.4 )297 
So we see the two systems of signs and desires integrating at this point, in the 
word "propter", with God at their head, denoted in both cases as the highest and the best: 
The doctrine of instrumentality, which we encountered frrst in Augustine's thought about 
semantics, is now brought into closer connection with the ontological concern with the summum 
bonum. That is to say, the general rule that whatever is 'for' something else is inferior to it, is now 
regularly associated with the claim that there is one thing which all other things are 'for' .298 
In a similar way, the descriptions of his ascent to God in doctr. chr. l.vii.7ff, 
echoing the very similar account in Conf VII.17, outline his consideration of good things 
and what makes them good, through a kind of logico-metaphysical account of 
causation. 299 
And since all who think of God think of something alive, the only thinkers whose conceptions of 
God are not absurd and unworthy can be those who think of life itself .... They understand that the 
living corporeal form, however outstanding its light, however outstanding its size, however 
outstanding its beauty, consists of two separate things, namely itself and the life by which it is 
energized; and they raise that life above the mass which is energized and activated by it to a 
position of unrivalled status. (doctr. chr. I.viii.8)300 
297 
"Causas enim vo/untatis Dei scire quae runt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim 
habet causam voluntas Dei, est a/iquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere." 
298 O'Donovan 1982: 381 
299 
cf Mizuochi (1993) for an account of how Augustine does this with the liberal arts, specifically in de 
dialectic a 
300 
"Et quoniam omnes qui de Deo cogitant, vivum a/iquid cogitant, illi soli possunt non absurda et indigna 
existimare de Deo, qui vitam ipsam cogitant ... eamque ipsam viventem corporis formam, quantalibet luce 
praefulgeat, quantalibet magnitudine praeemineat, quantalibet pulchritudine ometur, a/iud esse ipsam, 




This passing through the world is done through a combination of seeking the good 
and seeking the cause. First of all the observer looks to what is best in the world. Then a 
relation is made. If there are living things, then there must be life. The living things act as 
a kind of natural sign of the hidden concept of life, in much the same way as the praxis of 
the bird catcher acted as a natural sign of the art of bird catching in mag. x.32. 
Again, once Augustine has considered wise things, he ascertains the existence of 
wisdom from them. This progression parallels his consideration of reason, his own 
judgements, and the truth that makes them true or false. Just as the world has been treated 
as a sign, now the self is also treated in such a way, so that natural causality runs 
alongside platonist contemplation and returning to the self. 
They certainly see that the actual standard of truth, by which they maintain the superiority of that 
life, is not subject to change, and they can only see this as belonging to a realm above their own 
nature (doctr. chr. I.ix.9)301 . For I wondered how it was that I could appreciate beauty in material 
things on earth or in the heavens ... I wondered how it was that I was able to judge them in this 
way, and I realized that above my own mind, which was liable to change, there was the never 
changing, true eternity of truth. (Conf VII.l7.23)302 
So it is possible that signs are not such an arid, insufficient thing for Augustine, 
but the way he uses the world in order to attain to a spiritual apprehension of God. 
Natural signs help the mind to transfer its gaze beyond the physical towards the spiritual. 
Not that the physical is bad, but that it is not the end. It is a perfect tool for exemplifying 
both the system of love and the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 
We see this kind of thought also in the fact that for Augustine, "a sign is a thing 
which of itself makes some other thing come to mind" (doctr. chr. Il.i.1)303 • Similarly, 
301 
"/psam quippe regulam veritatis, qua illam clamant esse meliorem, incommutabilem vident; nee uspiam 
nisi supra suam naturam vident," 
302 
"quaerens enim unde approbarem pulchritudinem corporum, sive caelestium sive terrestrium, ... hoc 
ergo quaerens, unde iudicarem cum ita iudicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis 
aeternitatem supra mentem meam commutabilem" (O'Donnell's Latin: to be found at 
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/conf/frames7.html) 
303 
"Signum est enim res, praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex sefaciens in cogitationem 
venire:" 
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when speaking of enjoying things, it is not simply the affections that are turned towards 
the object of desire, but also the intellect, and perception: 
Since, therefore, we must enjoy to the full that truth which lives unchangeably, and since, within it, 
God the Trinity, the author and creator of everything, takes thought for the things that he has 
created, our minds must be purified so that they are able to perceive that light and then hold fast to 
it. (doctr. chr. I.x.l 0)304 
In fact, the love command itself implies that the whole mind be active in its 
fulfilment - a fact that is not lost on Augustine, as he describes it in terms that could 
equally well be applied to signification as they could to use: 
And when it says "all your heart, all your soul, all your mind", it leaves no part of our life free 
from this obligation, no part free as it were to back out and enjoy some other thing; any other 
object of love that enters the mind (animus) should be swept towards the same destination as that 
to which the whole flood of our love is directed. (doctr. chr. I.xxii.21)305 
The whole section is scattered with conversio terminology, spilling over from his 
work on the Confessions. Given that signs turn our attention towards the cause, it is 
perhaps no surprise that they are useful in Augustine's program of continually turning 
towards God, who is the cause and creator of all we see and all we are. 
For the divinely established rule of love says "you shall love your neighbour as yourself' but God 
"with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind", so that you may devote all 
your thoughts, all your life and all your understanding to the one from whom you actually receive 
what you devote to him (doctr. chr. I.xxii.21, emphasis mine)306 
304 
"Quapropter, cum ilia veritate peifruendum sit, quae incommutabiliter vivit, et in ea Trinitas Deus, 
auctor et conditor universitatis, re bus quas condidit consular; purgandus est animus, ut et perspicere illam 
lucem valeat, et inhaerere perspectae." 
305 
"Cum autem ait, toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nu/lam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare 
de beat et quasi locum dare ut alia re velit frui; sed quidquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc 
rapiatur, quo totus dilectionis impetus currit." 
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111.3.3: Naming 
So signs are certainly important for Augustine's spiritual praxis. The way we 
understand the world will affect what we see behind it, what the world means. In their 
turn, our names for things will affect the way we use those things as signs (for if signs are 
dependent on if-then propositions, they are therefore dependent on something that we 
usually consider to be verbal). They will also determine to a certain extent our attitudes to 
the things they name. 
111.3.3.1: Names 
God looked at Daniel. 
Shall I call him God? One solitary word and everything changes. 
Sartre, The Reprieve 
On a basic level, this will appear in his treatment of Scriptural command, which 
directs our love and educates our desire. It is an old hermeneutical point that Scripture 
will only give us guidance in terms of our own meanings, which will not necessarily be 
the same as those understood by the community from which the writings arose. So our 
own understanding of the words prevails: the names and definitions used in that process 
are importantly influential in how we direct our loves. This factor is not lost on 
Augustine: 
The aim of the commandment is love, a twofold love of God and of one's neighbour. But if you 
understand by this your whole person - mind and body - and your whole neighbour - that is, his 
mind and body, for a person consists of mind and body - no class of things to be loved is missing 
from these two commandments. (doctr. chr. I.xxvi.27, emphasis mine)307 
306 "Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: Diliges, inquit, proximum tuum sicut teipsum; 
Deum vero ex toto corde, et ex tota anima et ex tota mente; ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam 
et omnem intellectum in ilium conferas, a quo !tabes ea ipsa quae confers." 
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It is not only the meanings we interpret scripture with that are important for 
Augustine, though. The way we express our understanding of the world, and (more 
importantly) the words we use to describe our relationships to one another will play a 
large role in forming our attitudes, behaviour, and ethical choices concerning other 
people. What we call one another (mind, body, father, sir, friend, enemy) is by no means 
an ethically neutral choice. It will have ramifications for the order of love: for use and 
enjoyment. "And the angel warned the man who was adoring him to adore God instead, 
as the master under whom he was but the man's fellow servant." (doctr. chr. I.xxxii.36)308 
We saw above (Ill.2.2: Love and Things) that the use-enjoy distinction can be 
thought of as a way of talking about the world as a good creation from God at the same 
time as being able to call a spade a spade, and evil, evil. The usual accusation against 
Augustine's solution to the problem of evil is that bad things are clearly very substantial: 
if we call ethnic cleansing and politically oppressive imperialism "insubstantial", we 
stand in severe danger of trivialising it. So it is that Augustine develops this distinction of 
use and enjoyment to give us an unambiguous attitude to God - that we should forever 
love and enjoy him - and a twin approach to the world. The world is contingent, only to 
be used, but it is not inexpedient, since it is indeed useful. In this way also he steers 
between the Scylla of Manichaean dualism and the Charybdis of Plotinian emanationism. 
The first undervalues the world and the second ignores its faults. 
This interpretation of the use-enjoy distinction tallies well with the way Augustine 
treats naming. For naming will not only negotiate relationships, but will work on our 
appraisal and valuing too (e.g. we may describe a changeable person as either flexible or 
fickle). When we name all things as God's creations (as any creational monotheistic 
religion must), we therefore name them as good. Naming them as fallen will 
correspondingly condemn them as bad. But with such an ambiguous creation to deal with, 
how do we speak of the world or decide on our attitude towards it? 
307 
"Finis itaque praecepti est dilectio, et ea gemina, id est Dei et proximi. Quod site totllm inte/ligas, id est 
animum et corpus tuum, et proximwn totllm, id est animum et corpus ejus (homo enim ex animo constat et 
corpore), nullum rerum diligendarum genus in his duobus praeceptis praetermissum est." 
308 
"Et ange/us hominem se adorantem monet ut potius ilium adoret, sub quo ei Domino etiam ipse 
conservus est." Cf also the discussions on who may rightly be called enemies and neighbours in doctr. chr. 
I.xxix.30, xxx.33 
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Augustine's solution to this problem involves a correspondence of naming and 
loving. Just as we saw above our names for things determining our love for them, so they 
will also help us to direct our love without having to love evil things and upset the value 
of the world (for we must remember that a correct value and love of things is the 
summary of the law). The platitude "love the sinner, hate the sin" is not available to 
Augustine, not just because it is impractical, but also because sin is not a thing that can be 
loved or hated: evil is insubstantial. 
The person who lives a just and holy life is one who is a sound judge of things. He is also a person 
who has ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to love, or fail to love what 
should be loved, ... No sinner, qua sinner, should be loved; every human being, qua human being, 
should be loved on God's account; and God should be loved for himself .... All people should be 
loved equally. (doctr. chr. I.xxvii.28f)309 
The fact that these statements come clustered together indicates that Augustine 
was indeed struggling with the notion of loving people who are bad. The fact that he does 
so in a book that treats of signs and things, in the book where he overlays the sign-thing 
distinction on the use-enjoy one, merely confirms that an ordered love of things makes 
crucial reference to their names, "so that ordering [things] was the same as naming them." 
(Gn. litt. inp. vi.26l 10: "(It is] as if there are two things, man and sinner. What is called 
man, that God has made; what is called sinner, that man himself has made." (Tractati in 
Iohannis Evangelium XII.l3; parentheses original)311 
There is a sense in which the correlation of naming and an ordered love should not 
be a surprise to us, for there is an essential part of Augustine's cosmology that unites the 
two even before we begin to talk of the value-pregnant nature of language. That concept 
309 
"llle autemjuste et sancte vivit, qui rerum integer aestimator est: ipse est autem qui ordinatam 
dilectionem habet, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod est diligendum, ... Omnis 
peccator in quantum peccator est, non est diligendus; et omnis homo in quantum homo est, diligendus est 
propter Deum, De us vera propter seipsum . ... Omnes autem aeque diligendi sunt:" cf also Gn. adu. Man. 
II.xxviii.42: "And so," they ask, "is the devil good, because he is useful?" On the contrary, he is evil insofar 
as he is the devil, but God who is good and almighty draws many just and good things out of the devil's 
malice;" (emphasis mine); cf. also duab. an. 7 .9; s. dam. m. I.xv.4l; de fide, spe, et caritate IV.l3 
310 
"ut hoc sit ordinasse ista quod vocasse." 
311 
"Quasi duae res sunt, homo et peccator. Quod audis homo, De us fecit: quod.audis peccator, ipse homo 
fecit." 
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is order. For our love needs to reflect the nature of the world312 - how God made things 
with measure, number and order313 -just as our language needs to rightly describe the 
world. 
Consequently every human perversion (also called vice) consists in the desire to use what ought to 
be enjoyed and to enjoy what ought to be used. In turn, good order [ordinatio] (also called virtue) 
consists in the desire to enjoy what ought to be enjoyed and to use what ought to be used. (diu. qu. 
Indeed, for philosophers like the Stoics315 , the very project of language implies a certain 
order present in the world. We may only describe it insofar as it is a logical world. For the 
Stoics, and it would seem also for Augustine, the logic of the world is not imposed by a 
name-giving subject, but read off the world by perceptive semiotic agents. The difference 
is that the Stoics merely had a faith in the orderedness of things316, whereas for 
Augustine, the world was ordered at creation by a logical God. 
For in what language did God call the light day and the darkness night? Was it in Hebrew, or 
Greek, or Latin, or some other? In the same way we can ask regarding everything he named the 
language in which he named them. For with God there is pure intellect, without the noise and 
diversity of languages. Still, "he called" was said in the sense that he made them to be called, 
because he separated and ordered all things so that they could be distinguished and receive names. 
(Gn. adu. Man. I.ix.l5i 17 
312 doctr. chr. I.xxvii.28: "Jlle autemjuste et sancte vivit, qui rerum integer aestimator est: ipse est autem 
qui ordinatam dilectionem habet" 
313 Gn. adu. Man. I.xvi.26; c. ep. Man. I.xxix.32; c. adu. leg. I.iv.6 
314 
"Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vacatur, fruendis uti vel/e, at que utendis frui. Et 
rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui, et utendis uti." 
315 
as echoed by Neoplatonists: "all things make a chain, so that we can speak of things universally" - "ei 
de, semainetai pantos gap ako/outhei al/e/ois panta dio kai pantos" (Plotinus, Enneads ll.3.xiv; cf. also 
11.3. vii). "The Stoics ... see grammar as paralleling nature" Colish 1985a: 57 
316 
cf Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII.I.138: "The world, in their view, is ordered by 
reason and providence ... inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us." 
317 "Qua enim lingua vocavit De us diem lucem, et tenebras noctem? utrum hebraea, an graeca, an latina, 
an aliqua alia? et sic omnia quae vocavit, quaeri potest qua lingua vocaverit. Sed apud Deum purus 
intel/ectus est, sine strepitu et diversitate linguarum. Vocavit autem dictum est, vocari fecit; quia sic 
distinxit omnia, et ordinavit, ut et discerni possent, et nomina accipere." cf also Gn. litt. inp. vi.26, x.33; 
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As it happens, the notion of a rational and coherent creator is not the only basis for 
an ordered creation. God is in a sense the ordering principle: at the top of the hierarchy of 
order, just as he reigns over all values: "Nor does perfect reason use God, but it enjoys 
him. For God must not be ordered to anything else, because everything which must be 
ordered to another is inferior to that to which it is ordered." (diu. qu. 30)318 So in naming 
the world we are trying to ascertain the order God intended in it, and mirroring it in our 
discourse and praxis. In this way, our ordered love is dependent on our appraising 
language. So we must name the world rightly as well as love it proportionately. For 
naming, signing, and loving all go together, as they need one another. 
Ill.3.3.2: Contracts 
"A civilization runs on words, your reverence. Civilization is words. Which, on the whole, should 
not be too expensive." 
Terry Pratchett, The Truth 
Unfortunately for Augustine, we do not choose the words we use for things. 
Although we have seen above that names do influence our attitudes to the world, the 
practise of naming is obviously limited. In general, our words are chosen for us by the 
community we live in. Our practical everyday language works on the basis of a contract 
that we enter into with our linguistic surroundings, i.e. other signing agents (cf. above, 
1.6.4: Agreement). This is a common insight in linguistic philosophy. De Saussure, who 
seems to unconsciously follow Augustine in so much319, notes "Because the sign is 
arbitrary, it follows no law other than that of tradition, and because it is based on 
d. . . . b' ,320 tra ItiOn, It IS ar 1trary. 
If this is the case, then our community will help to determine what kind of things 
we love and what kind of things we will rejece21 • A form of use and enjoyment, an 
attitude to the world, is already served us on the plate of the society we are born into. So, 
in his conversion account in book VIII of the Confessions, Augustine will bring in a 
318 
"nee eo utitur, sedfruitur. Neque enim ad aliquid aliud Deus referendus est. Quoniam omne quod ad 
aliud referendum est, inferius est quam id ad quod referendum est." 
319 cf Kelly 1975 
320 de Saussure 1960 [ 1916]: 74 
321 The following paragraph relies heavily on the argument of Soskice 2002 
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number of themes that describe his rebirth into a new community, and his re-learning to 
speak: for example, the lung complaint that deprived him of speech for some time (IX.2); 
the incoherence of his tears (previously associated with Monica's incoherent prayers: 
111.11.19); and of course his reinstatement into a speaking community by the words of a 
childish game (VIII.12), combined with a biblical text. Augustine's conversion was not 
just that of a philosophical position (which he had already attained in book VII anyway), 
but a conversion of the will. As such, it is a conversion of both language and community, 
vindicating O'Leary's instinct that "the attunement of speech to the phenomenality of 
revelation is a task which goes against the grain of all conventional religious 
language. "322 
It is for this reason that Augustine will later exhort biblical interpreters to be 
aware of the assumptions they make about their surroundings that might not be necessary 
truths, but facts that they have grown to accept- fashionable truths that come and go like 
seasons of times (doctr. chr. III.x.16; xviii.26). He will also warn against community and 
contracts with demons (doctr. chr. III.xxiii.36). "Signs are the conventional, or at least 
established, means of conveying the wills, intentions, wishes and hence values (or in 
Augustinian terms the loves and hates) of the society."323 
It is perhaps for this reason that Augustine talks of bad habits not only in our 
works, but in our ideas, as we are led astray by the fallen communities into which each 
child is socialised. Clearly, language is not the only aspect in which our communities lead 
us astray, but it seems natural to suppose that it is indeed a part of the fallen contract that 
leads us to valuing things in a wrong way, since our naming affects our ideas: 
nor does the flesh fight back out of hatred, but because of the stranglehold of these habits which, 
after establishing themselves in the stock of our ancestors, have become naturally ingrained. The 
spirit's aim in subduing the flesh is to break the perverse contracts (so to speak) of these evil 
habits and establish the peace brought by good habits. Even those who are corrupted by false ideas 
322 O'Leary 1985: 26. 
323 Rist 1994: 35 
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and hate their bodies would not be prepared to lose one eye, ... unless constrained by some greater 
necessity. (doctr. chr. I.xx.iv.25, emphasis minei24 
So when Augustine does appeal to the common judgement of his readers, he does 
so on the grounds of some truth that is accessible to all, because he can not trust the 
evaluations made by the societies in which they live and speak: 
Nobody is so brazenly stupid as to say, "how do you know that the form of life that is 
unchangeably wise is to be ranked more highly than the changeable form?" The answer to his 
question, about how I know, is publicly and unchangeably present for all to behold. (doctr. chr. 
I.ix. 9)325 
The Bible, however, rights the naming that takes place in our communities, and 
therefore helps us to live aright with each other. Our language and institutions affect each 
other in the give and take of common life, and "faith's discontent with its language 
unleashes an energy of questioning and reformation ... In contesting a word one may find 
oneself subverting an institution or changing a way of life."326 Just as the language and 
rhetoric of the Bible becomes a prescriptive norm for preachers in the doctr. chr. IV, so 
the words used in the Scriptures will help determine our ways of thinking and speaking in 
church, leading us to a right assessment of things according to the order laid out in 
creation. This is only to be expected if both the order of the world and the words of 
Scripture reflect the mind of God327• 
Thus he finds there [in the holy Scriptures and the divine Law] an abundance of ideas and words 
which, like the grains, serve partly as an improvement of his conduct in human society, which is 
324 
"nee per odium resistente came, sed per consuetudinis vinculum, quod a parentum etiam propagine 
inveteratum naturae lege inolevit. Id ergo agit spiritus in domanda carne, ut so/vat ma/ae consuetudinis 
quasi pacta perversa, et fiat pax consuetudinis bonae. Tamen nee isti qui falsa opinione depravati corpora 
stw detestantur, parati essent unum oculum vel sine sensu do/oris amittere, etiamsi in altero tantus 
cernendi sensus remaneret, quantus erat in duobus, nisi aliqua res quae praeponenda esset, urgeret." 
325 
"Nemo est enim tarn impudenter insulsus qui dicat: Unde scis incommutabiliter sapientem vitam 
mutabili esse praeferendam? Jdipsum enim quod interrogat, unde sciam, omnibus ad contemplandum 
communiter atque incommutabiliter praesto est." 
326 O'Leary 1985: 67 
327 Or, as Babcock 1995: 156 puts it, "a pattern of significations that is rooted in caritas" 
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like the fruit-bearing trees, and partly to strengthen faith, hope, and charity for eternal life, which is 
like the green plants. (Gn. adu. Man. I.xxiii.40)328 
328 
"partim ad concipiendamfecunditatem rationum atque sermonum, tanquam herbis seminalibus; partim 
ad utilitatem morum conversationis humanae, tanquam lignisfructiferis; partim ad vigoremfidei, spei et 
charitatis in vitam aeternam, tanquam herbis viridibus," 
111.3.3.3: Praise and Blame Revisited 
[God]leaned 
over and looked in the dictionary 
they used. There was the blank still 
by his name of the same 
order as the territory 
between them, the verbal hunger 
for the thing in itself. And the darkness 
that is a god's blood swelled 
in him, and he let it 
to make the sign in the space 
on the page, that is in all languages 
and none; that is the grammarian's 
torment and the mystery 
at the cell's core, and the equation 
that will not come out, and is 
the narrowness that we stare 
over into the eternal 
silence that is the repose of God. 
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R S Thomas, from "The Gap" 
So it seems that we are in a sorry state. Although we can in theory pass through 
the world and use it to enjoy God, our habits, names, and conventions are all stacked 
against us. Language is still arbitrary, but we can not simply break with tradition and 
decide to call a cat a spade and a spade a cigar. We are confined to our traditions (mus. 
11. viii.l5; III.ii.3; IV.xvi.20; V.i.l) in exactly that area where reasoning is so arbitrary. 
One person can not change the tradition and society that dictates our words: it seems 
Augustine's problem is insuperable. 
language is a system of arbitrary signs and lacks the necessary basis, the solid ground for 
discussion. There is no reason for preferring soeur to sister, Ochs to boeuf, etc .... Of all social 
institutions, language is least amenable to initiative. It blends with the life of society, and the latter, 
inert by nature, is a prime conservative force. 329 
So pure reason is not a sufficient way out. The argument is already weighted in 
one direction. In this section, we will examine a small number of ways out Augustine 
saw, in the form of gracious beauty, community teaching, and praise and blame. 
Ill 
Firstly, it is a common Augustinian theme to note that God's grace stoops to pick 
us out of our distress, helping us to right our priorities through beauty. If we are not able 
to employ our reason and judgement correctly, then God will short circuit the process by 
making good things beautiful, and giving us a predisposition to love the truth.330 
And yet if any man should propose to himself so to love truth, not only that which consists in 
contemplation, but also in uttering the true thing, which each in its own kind of things is true, and 
no otherwise to bring forth with the mouth of the body his thought than in the mind it is conceived 
and beheld; so that he should prize the beauty of truth-telling honesty, not only above gold and 
silver and jewels and pleasant lands, but above this temporal life itself altogether and every good 
thing of the body ... (mend. xx.41)331 
Augustine here combines the challenge of loving truth with the reason we would 
have for doing so: namely, that it is beautiful. It is not unusual to hear him urging that 
truth should be well expressed (dial. vii), and that we should judge our appreciation of 
beauty, so that we love the good and hate the evil (mus. VI.ix.23), but that is not the end 
of the story. Although the doctrine of original sin will tell us that we are tied up in a web 
of loves that are variously appropriate and sinful, on the other hand the doctrine of grace 
tells us that delight naturally comes with truth: 
when truths are being demonstrated by a speaker - this relates to the task of instruction - it is not 
the aim of the eloquence or the intention of the speaker that the truths or the eloquence should in 
themselves produce delight; but the truths themselves, as they are revealed, do produce delight by 
virtue of being true. (doctr. chr. IV.xii.28)332 
329 de Saussure 1960 [1916]: 73f 
330 The whole theory of God's redemptive beauty in creation and discourse, cf Harrison (1992), esp chapter 
2 
331 
"Et tamen si quisquam proponeret sibi sic amandam veritatem, non tantum quae in contemplando est, 
sed etiam in vero enuntiando quod in suo quoque rerum genere verum est, et non aliter proferendam ore 
corporis sententiam, quam in animo concepta atque conspecta est; ut fidei veridiciam pulchritudinem non 
solum auro et argento et gemmis et amoenis praediis, sed et ipsi universae temporali vitae omnique 
corporis bono praeponeret;" 
332 
"quandoquidem cum dicendo vera monstrantur, quod ad officium docendi pertinet, non eloquio agitur, 
neque hoc attenditur, ut vel ipsa vel ipsum delectet eloquium, sed per se ipsa, quoniam vera sunt, 
manifestata delectant." 
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Another source of help that Augustine refers to, surprisingly enough, is the 
teacher. This seems a strange move for him to make, considering the earlier attitude 
towards teachers outlined in the De Magistro. It was noted in an earlier chapter (n37 
above), though, that teachers were not so rejected in the works contemporary with that 
dialogue. Indeed, they were recommended in an. quant. xviii.32, xxxiii.72; util. cred. 
vi.l3; duab. an. vii.9. In fact, the use of teachers is not even condemned in the De 
Magistro itself, but rather it is argued that "true advice, ... should be ascribed not to man 
but to the unchangeable God~' (doctr. chr. prologue 7)333 . 
We should not call anyone on earth our teacher, since there is one in heaven Who is the Teacher of 
all. Furthermore, He himself will teach us what 'in heaven' is -He Who prompts us externally 
through men by means of signs, so that we are instructed to be inwardly turned toward Him. (mag. 
xiv.46, King's emphasis)334 
Here it should be noted that Augustine's picture of the learning of truth also 
parallels his schemes of love and existence. "With Augustine ... knowledge and love are 
held together."335 Just as whenever we enjoy someone, we do not enjoy them, but the 
God-ness we find in them (see above, on page 89), without which we would have no truth 
in us, so whenever we learn some truth, we do not learn it from a teacher, but from God, 
who is the Truth and the Teacher. "Yet nobody should regard anything as his own, except 
perhaps a lie. For all truth comes from the one who says 'I am the truth.'" (doctr. chr. 
prologue 8)336 
This interpretation of teaching the truth bears working out: we can see, for 
example, that just as something without God can neither exist or be good (see above, 
III.l: Cosmology), and nothing that exists can be hated (above, on page 87), so nothing 
evil can be learnt or taught: 
333 
"Noverat enim ille vir, ex quacumque anima verum consilium processisset, non ei, sed illi qui est veritas, 
incommutabili Deo tribuendum esse." Cf. also lo. eu. tr. XIV.8: "Quia nemo hominum potest dicere quod 
veritatis est, nisi illuminetur ab eo qui mentiri non potest'' 
334 
"ne nobis quemquammagistrum dicamus in terris, quod unus omnium magister in coelis sit. Quid sit 
autem in coelis, docebit ipse a quo etiam per homines sign is admonemur et foris, ut ad eum intro conversi 
erudiamur:" 
335 Louth 1983: 5 
336 
"quanquam nemo debet aliquid sic habere quasi suum proprium, nisi forte mendacium. Nam omne 
verum ab i/lo est, qui ait: Ego sum veritas;" cf also ibid II.xviii.28: "imo vero quisquis bonus verusque 
christianus est, Domini sui esse intelligat, ubicumque invenerit veritatem," 
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Augustine: since, in fact, knowledge is imparted or awakened in us by learning, and it is only in 
this way that something is learned. Or do you have a different idea? 
Evodius: I think that only good things come to us by learning .... 
Augustine: Consequently, evil is not something learned, and it is pointless for you to ask who it is 
that teaches us wrongdoing. (lib. arb. I.i.2)337 
So while we learn from God whenever we learn the truth, that by which we know 
something is true - that by which we judge, but which we ourselves do not judge - turns 
out to be God himself (lib. arb. Il.xii.34, xiv.38). But in order to get to God, we have to 
pass through a number of truths before we get to the stage when "the sharp and strong 
vision of the mind beholds a number of immutable truths known with certainty, it directs 
its gaze to truth itself' (lib. arb. Il.xiii.36)338 . 
[Augustine:] In order to contemplate eternal truth in a way that will enable us to enjoy it and cling 
to it, a path through temporal things, suited to our infirmity, has been marked out for us, namely, 
that we accept on faith past and future events so far as this suffices for men on their journey 
towards things eternal. (lib. arb. Ill.xxi.60)339 
[Augustine:] But if ignorance and difficulty are man's natural state, then it is from this condition 
that the soul begins to progress and advance towards knowledge and a state of rest until the happy 
life is fully realized in it. (ibid III.xxii.64)340 
Given these correlations, then, it is not at all surprising to find that truth and 
wisdom are things that we are meant to love - more specifically, they are things to be 
. d 341 enJoye : 
337 
"siquidem scientia per illam datur aut excitatur, nee quisquam nisi per disciplinam aliquid discit: an tu 
aliter putas? E. Ego per disciplinam non nisi bona disci arbitror . ... non igitur discuntur mala, etfrustra 
ilium a quo male face re discimus, quaeris;" Similarly, knowledge cannot be evil: cf lib. arb. I. vii.17 
338 
"sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta cum multa vera et incommutabilia certa ratione conspexerit, dirigit se 
in ipsam veritatem," 
339 
"Sed ad contemplandam veritatis aetemitatem, ut ea perfrui eique inhaerere valeamus, infirmitati 
nostrae via de temporalibus procurata est, ut quantum itineri sufficit ad aetema tendentium, praeterita et 
futura credamus" 
340 
"Ignorantia vera et difficultas si natura/is est, inde incipit anima proficere, et ad cognitionem et 
requiem, donee in ea perficiatur vita beata, promoveri." 
114 
[Augustine:] Since it is in truth that we know and possess the highest good, and since that truth is 
wisdom, let us see in wisdom our highest good. Let us make it our aim to enjoy fully, for happy 
indeed is the man whose delight is in the highest good. (lib. arb. II.xiii.36)342 
In this way it is a good deal easier to understand the distinction between pre-fall 
interior inspiration and post-fall use of external truths. It is because humanity had turned 
away from God, no longer enjoying and participating in God, that it needs corporeal signs 
to climb back through the system (of love, existence and signification) to the one who 
may be enjoyed.343 At other points, Augustine would describe this as falling from 
existence, goodness, beauty, etc. In the De Genesi adversus manichaeos, though, it is 
described as turning from the light of truth: 
Hence, they became hidden to themselves so that they might be troubled by their wretched errors 
after they had left the light of truth which they were not. For the human soul can be a partaker in 
the truth, but the truth is the immutable God above it. (II.xvi.24)344 
So the teacher of truth is an important way of apprehending God in the world for 
Augustine. It both tells us what needs to be loved, and leads us to God himself. We also 
have evidence to believe that, in general, he did not hold to that definition of teacher 
under attack in the De Magistro. Not all teachers necessarily use words, nor do we 
imagine their students are meant to acquire exactly that information and knowledge that 
they have through the mediation of words. In another early work, for example, he 
describes teaching thus: "Disciple: For imitation seems to me to be so much a part of the 
arts that, if it is removed, nearly all of them are destroyed. For masters exhibit themselves 
to be imitated, and that is what they call teaching." (mus. l.iv.6, emphasis minei45 
341 Indeed, according to Gn. adu. Man. Il.xxvii.41, the fullness of knowledge is charity. 
342 
"lmo vero quoniam in veritate cog noscitur et tenetur summum bonum, eaque veritas sapientia est, 
cemamus in ea, teneamusque summum bonum, eoque peifruamur. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo 
bono." 
343 Hence children who cannot speak are helpless to nurture their inner life- trin. XIV.v.7 
344 
"Ergo ad seipsos absconderunt se, ut conturbarentur miseris erroribus, relicta lumine veritatis, quod 
ipsi non erant. Particeps enim veritatis potest esse anima humana: ipsa autem veritas Deus est 
incommutabilis supra illam." 
345 
"Nam video tantum valere in artibus imitationem, ut, ea sub lata, omnes pene perimalltur. Praebent enim 
se magistri ad imitandum, et hoc ipsum est quod vacant docere." 
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In this way, teachers that are trying to elicit a certain practise (in this case, that of 
speaking well) will not necessarily make use of the transference of information. 
Correspondingly, the aim of the teacher will be an ordered love. This was true even at the 
time of writing of the De Magistro: "Furthermore, all practical instruction in this matter 
has this for its aim, that, renouncing and restraining this kind of movement, we turn our 
will from the instability of temporal things to the enjoyment of the everlasting good." (lib. 
arb. III.i.2)346 
So the teacher's place fits in well with the picture we have been working out of 
love and language. In fact, for Augustine, one of the main roles for teaching is parallel to 
the role of language in society (cf ord. II.xii.35, quoted above, on page 47). It works as a 
kind of cement to communities, enabling the loving flow of intercourse to lead us all to 
God: 
Moreover, [without human teaching] there would be no way for love, which ties people together in 
the bonds of unity, to make souls overflow and as it were intermingle with each other, if human 
beings learned nothing from other human beings. (doctr. chr. prologue 6)347 
On the basis of these two boons (beauty and teaching), we can show a major 
Augustinian solution to the problem of disproportionate love: praise and blame (cf above, 
11.4.2: Understanding). For the teacher is not there to teach mere cold facts, but instead to 
"communicate what is good and eradicate what is bad"348 (doctr. chr. IV.iv.6). How else 
is this to be done but by praise and blame? As Augustine prays, "If only I only spoke 
when preaching your word and praising you!"349 (trin. XV.xxviii.Sl) "[Augustine:] 
346 
"omnisque de hac re disciplina uti/is ad id valeat, ut ~o motu improbato atque cohibito, voluntatem 
nostram adfruendum sempiterno bono, a lapsu temporalium convertamus"cf. also trin.XV.xi.20: "Here 
too, if it is a true word, it is the beginning of a good work. And a word is true when it is begotten of the 
knowledge of how to work well," (Sed etiam hie cum verum verbum est, tunc est initium boni operis. Verum 
autem verbum est, cum de scientia bene operandi gignitur,) 
347
" Deinde ipsa charitas, quae sibi invicem homines nodo unitatis astringit, non haberet aditum 
refundendorum et quasi miscendorum sibimet animo rum, si homines per homines nihil discerent" It is 
perhaps a lack of this kind of discourse that led to the downfall of Babe! in Augustine's interpretation, since 
although they had one language, their minds were dissonant: doctr. chr. Il.iv.S 
348 
"et bona docere, et mala dedocere." cf also xvii.34: "Qui ergo nititur dicendo persuade re quod bonum 
est," 
349 
"Sed utinam praedicando verbum tuum, et /audando te tantummodo loquerer!" 
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Nevertheless, all things are rightly deserving of praise by the very fact that they exist, 
since they are good inasmuch as they exist." (lib. arb. III.vii.21)350 
Similarly, God's order is reflected not simply in our describing the world, and our 
naming, but in our praising and blaming. This insight came quite early to Augustine. It is 
most clearly exemplified in uera. rei. (xli.77f): 
Do not be surprised if I call [corruptible things] beautiful things, for everything is beautiful that is 
in due order. As the apostle says: "All order is of God". We must admit that a weeping man is 
better than a happy worm. And yet I could speak at great length without any falsehood in praise of 
the worm. I could point out the brightness of its colouring, the slender round shape of its body ... 
Every existing thing however lowly is justly praised when it is compared with nothingness. 351 
These two activities also involve the gracious beauty of the world that gives us 
delight in the things that are good, for praise is a beautiful thing (cf the notes on making 
praise beautiful in doctr. chr. IV.xxvi.56f): "[God] has sanctioned the homage of the 
human voice, and chosen that we should derive pleasure from our words in praise of 
him." (doctr. chr. I. vi.6i52 
Likewise, praise and blame sort out the good from the bad, untangling the 
ambiguity of creation (being both created and fallen) we saw above (on page 103). For 
praise does not necessarily attribute goodness to any one thing, but to its characteristics -
praising it insofar as it is of God, and blaming it insofar as it has fallen: 
[Augustine:] Hence it is clear that the very thing whose vice is being blamed is itself deserving of 
praise because of its nature, and that we must therefore acknowledge that, in blaming their vices, 
350 
"Omnia tamen eo ipso quo sunt, jure /audanda sunt; quia eo ipso quo sunt, bona sunt." 
351 
"Nee miremur quod adi!Uc pulchritudines nomina: nihil enim est ordinatum, quod non sit pulchrum; et, 
sicut ait Apostolus, omnis ordo a Deo est Necesse est autemfateamur me/iorem esse hominem plorantem, 
quam laetantem vermiculum: et tamen vermicu/i /audem sine ullo mendacio copiose possum dicere, 
considerans nitorem eo/oris, figuram teretem corporis, ... Omnis aut em natura quam vis extrema, quam vis 
infima, in comparatione nihili jure laudatur." 
352 
"admisit humanae vocis obsequium, et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos voluit." 
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we are bestowing praise upon the natures, upon those natures, that is, whose vices are being 
blamed. (lib. arb. III.xiv.41)353 
In what is perhaps Augustine's most eloquent description of these two 
paradigmatic values of language (doctr. chr. I.xxix.30), there is portrayed a theatre 
(notably the same context as his later argument for language being conventional and 
based in community: doctr. chr. Il.xxv.38), where one person tries to bring around a 
neighbour to the love of a certain actor. The passage is reminiscent of Plotinus' image of 
the dance of life (Enneads lll.2.xvff), where the world's order is demonstrated in the 
actors' various parts. For Plotinus, the order is seen in the singers' song, but Augustine 
concentrates on the audience's reaction. "This Universe is good not when the individual is 
a stone, but when everyone throws in his own voice towards a total harmony, singing out 
a life -harsh, imperfect though it be." (Plotinus, Enneads lll.2.xvii)354 
Augustine's allegory will bear teasing out: a large group of people, their attention 
taken by something going on before them, of a different order of reality to them, a 
different story, and some choose to love it, "as it were a great good, or even the supreme 
one"
355
, whereas some reject it, hate it, or love it less. 
In the context of this qt•asi-ecclesiastical gathering, the ones having their love 
surely directed also have a determined attitude to those around them, who are not the 
direct object of their love, but sharers in their enjoyment. So the lover "also loves those 
who share his love, not on their account, but on account of the one they equally love".356 
On the other hand, "If he finds anyone antagonistic, he violently hates that person's 
hatred of his hero, and goes all out to remove it by whatever methods he can."357 
353 
"Vitium autem, dicere coeperam, non aliunde malum est, nisi quia naturae adversatur ejus ipsius rei 
cujus est vitium. Unde manifestum est hanc eamdem rem cujus vitium vituperatur, natura esse laudabilem; 
ita ut omnino hanc ipsam vituperationem vitiorum, natura mm laudem esse fateamur, ea rum scilicet 
quarum vitia vituperantur."cf also trin. VIII.iii.4, quoted above on page 103 
354
"kai to lwlon touto kalon, ouk eidinos [MacKenna reads lithos] eie ekastos all ei ton phthoggon ton 
autou eisphero menos suntelei eis mian armonian zoen kai autos phonon, e/atto de kai atelesteran." 
355 
"et tanquam magno vel etiam summo bono" 
356 
"omnes diligit qui eum diligunt secum, non propter ill os, sed propter eum quem pariter diligunt;" 
357 
"si aut em contravenientem invenerit, odit in illo vehementer odium dilecti sui, et quibus modis valet, 
instat ut auferat" 
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It is clear that both the language ("on account of') and the shape of the argument 
("hate that person's hatred") parallel the order of love we have already been speaking of. 
That is how he loves. The way he speaks is in praise. 
The more passionate he is in his love, 
the more he tries by whatever methods he can to make his hero loved 
by a greater number of people, 
and the more he desires to point him out 
to a greater number of people. 
If he sees someone unenthusiastic he rouses him with his praises as much as he can.358 
So praises work in community as the way we use our language (note the 
parallelism between loving and pointing out (ostendere)). This is clearly important since 
it is the way teaching works in a community, but also shows us how we act in respect to 
one another's worship, allowing our neighbour to "pass through" their own neighbour, 
namely us, in order to attain to God. In praise, we do not only make signs to point to God, 
but we become a sign towards God. 
But a holy person or a holy angel restores us when we are weary and when we desire to rest in 
them and stay with them, using either the resources which they have received for their own sakes 
or those which they have received for our sakes (but in either case they have certainly received 
them); and then they impel us, thus restored, to go to the one by enjoying whom we likewise are 
made happy. (doctr. chr. I.xxxiii.36)359 
Just as importantly, this model of praise and blame reveals the Christian 
community as a redemptive community, insofar as it is defined by using things and names 
to point in the right direction. For, "the new people called to an eternal inheritance use the 
language of the New Testament" (de sermone Domine in monte II. v.17)360. If our 
358 
"et quanto est in eius amore ferventior, tanto agit quibus pot est modis, ut a pluribus diligatur, et tanto 
pluribus eum cupit ostendere; et quemfrigidiorem videt, excitat eum quantum potest laudibus illius;" 
359 
"Sanctus autem homo et sanctus angelus etiamfessos nos atque in se acquiesce re et remanere cupielltes, 
reficiunt potius, aut eo sumptu quem propter nos, aut i/lo etiam quem propter se acceperunt, acceperunt 
tamen; atque ita refectos in ilium ire compellunt, quo fruentes pariter beati sumus." 
360 
"Utatur ergo voce Novi Testamenti populus novus, ad aetemam haereditatem vocatus" 
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names inform our treatment of things, and names are determined by the society in which 
they arise, then a community of praise is exactly what is needed in order to acquire a well 
ordered love. It is in this that Augustine shows his genius: in the multi-faceted use of 
language to signify and move towards the one that all signs ultimately signify. So we 
name what is bad, name what is good, in order to see what is God in the disciplines of 
blame, praise, and silence. 
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Conclusion 
This work started by arguing that signs are not necessarily a negative, sinful thing 
for Augustine, based on an interpretation of De Magistro. The line of argument then 
proceeded towards signs of the mind and signs of scripture, in order to discern their 
appropriateness for the task in hand. The conclusion was reached that signs are good 
when used as steps towards God. In the final section it was proposed that the system of 
signification parallels the various hierarchies of ontology and love, such that the world 
exists by God, is loved because of God, and points to God. This signification works 
according to Augustine's sign theories: signs can advert to causes, signs can be true, signs 
can be corporeal or otherwise361 • "It is, however, important to know what kind of 
likenesses these lower things have to those higher realities. There is, you see, no other 
route along which reason can rightly direct its course and its efforts to move from here to 
there." (gn. litt. IV.iv.9) 
In the introduction, I apologised for the inevitable omissions made in this essay. 
Unfortunately, there can be no justification (except perhaps for the limits of space) for not 
going into all the tantalising and philosophically suggestive areas of sign theory 
Augustine touches upon: the relation of the inner word to speech intentions362; miracles 
and signs363 ; the possibility of a Messianic slip of the tongue364 ; sacramental signs365 ; the 
grammar of praise and blame366• 
Possibly the most obvious lacuna, though, is that there has been no sustained 
treatment of the material to be found in De Trinitate. There are two reasons for this: the 
first is that I found nothing in the work to contradict the theory outlined above, and the 
second, that any interpretation of that great piece of literature requires a great deal of 
contextualisation and recapitulation of earlier argument, so intricate and rewarding is the 
thinking lying within it. 
361 Cf. Someone's knowledge as sign in trin. XIV.viii.ll 
362 an quant.xxxii.65f; trin XV.xi.20 
363 /o. eu. tr. XXIV.! 
364 /o. eu. tr. XXVII.8 
365 /o. eu. tr. LXXX 
366 /ib. arb. III.v.15 
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For example, Augustine seems to hold to the same relation of signs to desires that 
has been elucidated above (cf esp. III.3.2: Causing), even further explaining it in terms of 
the tension between the signs own existence and that of the signified: 
The more therefore the thing is known without being fully known, the more does the intelligence 
desire to know what remains; if it only knew that there was a vocal sound like this and. did not 
know that it was the sign of something, it would not look further for anything else, having already 
perceived as much as it could about a sensible object by sensation. But as it knows that this is not 
just a vocal sound but also a sign, it wants to know it completely; and no sign is completely known 
unless it is known what thing it is the sign of. If a man then earnestly, enthusiastically, and 
persistently seeks to know this, can he be said to be without love?367 (trin. X.i.2) 
It is interesting to note that Augustine probably started work on this book shortly 
after laying aside work on the De Doctrina Christiana, which provided most of the 
material for section Ill: A Sign of Ascents. In the light of what we have been saying about 
signification as a way of understanding the world as created, a way of worshipping God 
in and through the lives we live in the place we are, Augustine's description of his 
method in De Trinitate may sound familiar: 
I quote this passage [Wis. 13.1-5] from the book of Wisdom in case any of the faithful should 
reckon I have been wasting time for nothing in first searching creation for signs of that supreme 
trinity we are looking for when we are looking for God, going step by step through various trinities 
of different sorts until we eventually arrive at the mind of man. (trin. XV.3)368 
In this way, we can discern Augustine's theory of signs as a founding insight to 
his thought. In his search for God, he treats everything as a sign, stopping at nothing, 
367 
"Quo igitur amp/ius notum est, sed non plene notum est, eo cup it animus de illo nos se quod reliquum est. 
Si enim tantummodo esse istam voce m nos set, eamque alicujus rei signum esse non nosset, nihil jam 
quaereret, sensibili re, quantum poterat, sentiendo percepta. Quia vera non solum esse vocem, sed et 
signum esse jam novit, perfecte id nos se vult. Neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur, nisi cujus rei signum 
sit cognoscatur. Hoc ergo qui ardenti cura quaerit ut noverit, studioque accensus insistit, num pot est dici 
esse sine amore?" 
368
"(Sap. XIII, 1-5). Haec de Iibra Sapientiae propterea posui, ne me fidelium quispiam frustra et inaniter 
existimet in creatura prius per quasdam sui generis trinitates quodammodo gradatim, donee ad mentem 
hominis pervenirem, quaesisse indicia summae illius Trinitatis, quam quaerimus cum Deum quaerimus." -
for signs as images, cf trin. XV.x.18, xii.22. 
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going further at every point, that he might somehow find a glimpse of God, signified in 
the world "through a mirror, in an enigma" (1 Cor 13.1lf). 
123 
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